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The Disunity of Pragmatism[*]
Прагматизм: разобщенное наследие

Форстер П.
Университет Оттавы, Оттава, Канада

Аннотация:

Прагматизм обычно рассматривают как единую школу, движение или традицию. К списку его наиболее значимых постулатов, как правило, относят защиту исследовательской непредубежденности, осознание подверженности человеческого мышления ошибкам, отстаивание значимости опыта во всех его проявлениях – эстетическом, религиозном, нравственном, политическом и научном – и представление о философии как практике, переплетенной с проблемами современной жизни. Хотя разногласия среди философов прагматизма общепризнанны, эти расхождения чаще всего трактуют как легко разрешаемые или не имеющие принципиального значения для основ доктрины прагматизма, которую, как считается, разделяют философы этого направления. Автор доказывает, что эта точка зрения на прагматизм скрывает важные философские разногласия среди его приверженцев, нанося ущерб нашему пониманию традиции прагматизма. В статье демонстрируется, что фигуры, чаще всего связываемые с развитием прагматизма – Чарльз Пирс, Уильям Джеймс, Джон Дьюи, У.В.О. Куайн, Хилари Патнэм и Ричард Рорти, – отстаивают существенно различные позиции, которые отнюдь не легко примирить. Эти различия составляют суть того, как следует понимать и отстаивать прагматизм, и представляют серьезные препятствия для

любой его характеризации как традиции с общим философским методом, целью или набором основных положений. Даже мыслители, обращенные к прагматизму, могли критиковать Пирса за излишнюю метафизичность, Джеймса – за излишнюю психологичность или субъективность, Дьюи – за инструментализм, верификационизм или антиреализм. Прагматизм гораздо более разнообразен, неоднозначен и труден для определения, чем обычно предполагают современные представления о том, что живо и мертво в нем.

Ключевые слова: прагматизм, история философии, метод философии, философская традиция, Чарльз Пирс, Уильям Джеймс, Джон Дьюи, У.В.О. Куайн, Хилари Патнэм, Ричард Рорти.

Пол Форстер – доктор философии, профессор кафедры философии Университета Оттавы.

The Disunity of Pragmatism

Forster P.
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada.

Summary:
Pragmatism is usually viewed as a unified school, movement or tradition. Lists of its most important tenets typically include advocacy of open inquiry, pursued with an awareness of human fallibility, a view of justification that appeals to shared experience in all its manifestations – aesthetic, religious, moral, political and scientific – and a conception of philosophy as a practice interwoven with problems of contemporary life. While disagreements among pragmatists are widely acknowledged, they are most often treated as easily resolved or of marginal importance given the substantial body of doctrine that pragmatists are thought to share. I argue that this view of pragmatism obscures important philosophical differences among its proponents, to the serious detriment of our understanding of the tradition. I point out that figures most often credited with advancing pragmatism – Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, W.V. Quine, Hilary Putnam

and Richard Rorty – defend significantly divergent views, views that are anything but easy to reconcile. Their differences go to the very heart of how pragmatism is to be understood and defended and present serious obstacles to any characterization of it as a tradition with a common philosophical method, purpose or core set of doctrines. Pragmatism is far more diverse, subtle and difficult to come to terms with than contemporary accounts of what is living and dead in it commonly presume.

Keywords: pragmatism, history of philosophy, philosophical method, philosophical tradition, Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, W.V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty.

Paul Forster – Ph.D., Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa.

Introduction

There are profound philosophical differences separating the founders of pragmatism from each other and their contemporary advocates. While often acknowledged, these differences are commonly treated as easily resolved or relatively unimportant to the enduring legacy of pragmatism. In fact, these differences are hard to reconcile and challenge any characterization of pragmatism as a tradition with a common method, philosophical project or core doctrine.

Continuity of influence in the tradition of pragmatism is undeniable. Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Charlene Haddock-Seigfried and Cornell West – to cite a diverse group of contemporary thinkers – understandably give credit to William James, John Dewey and Charles Peirce. However, they approach early pragmatism with a view to sorting out what is living and dead from the standpoint of their own concerns. The result is ideas that early pragmatists could not have anticipated and in many cases would have found uncongenial. This literature has to be considered on its own terms, letting the historical chips fall where they may.

When influence is taken as evidence of deep and abiding philosophical agreement, on the other hand, historical criticism is entirely appropriate. Pragmatism's enduring appeal is often and rightly attributed to its advocacy of open inquiry pursued with an awareness of human fallibility, a view of justification that appeals to shared experience in all its manifestations (moral, religious, aesthetic,

political and scientific) and a view of philosophy as interwoven with problems of contemporary life. However, these commitments are not univocally understood and viewing them as definitive of pragmatism obscures important differences among proponents of pragmatism, to the serious detriment of our understanding of this tradition.

Peirce, James and Dewey: shared views and controversies

Consider Peirce's and Dewey's views of the logic of inquiry – their accounts of the evidence and reasoning involved in the pursuit of truth. Ground common to both is not hard to find. They agree that the experimental method lies at the core of pragmatism and take practical effects – consequences of interventions in the course of events aimed at engineering predictable, repeatable results – as the sole test and warrant of theory. They both also develop accounts of experience, belief, meaning, reason, justification and truth based on their understanding of the logic of experimental testing.

When we look beyond these shared views and consider what sort of account they think philosophy requires, however, significant fault lines emerge. In devising his theory of inquiry, Dewey draws on facts about human beings, their culture and environment, facts disclosed in the natural and behavioral sciences especially. Peirce, on the other hand, considers this approach "wretched" (8.243) and "a debauch of loose reasoning" (8.240), insisting that it "forbids all such researches as those which I have been absorbed in for the last 18 years" (8.243) (1).

In defense of his line, Dewey urges that pursuing a theory of inquiry without regard for the full range of human endowments assumes that our cognitive capacities (the mind) operate independently from human activity (the body), a view that he thinks runs counter to the continuity of human beings and other animals established in biology. In view of the long history of failed attempts to ground beliefs and values *a priori*, he bases his logic of inquiry on empirical knowledge of the organic, psychological and social conditions that give beliefs a secure, if fallible, footing in experience. The hope is that this will improve methods of fixing beliefs – an aim Peirce shares – just as better understanding of the conditions of plant growth has improved crop yields. For him, it is not only sufficient but philosophically well and good that a logic of inquiry provides a certain sort of organism – human beings – with the means to develop a well-ordered system of beliefs and values, one that anticipates and enriches their interactions with their environment as it happens to be.

To Peirce's way of thinking, Dewey's view is too closely tied to psychology. Peirce has no interest in isolating knowledge from action or mind from body, agrees that there is much to learn about inquiry from the study of landmark cases and empirical psychology and happily embraces Dewey's insights into human learning and thought. Still, he insists that logic aims to uncover principles that apply to all inquiry – not just human inquiry – in any circumstances in which there are truths to discover – whether actual or counterfactual. For him, the principles of inquiry are prior to findings in the behavioral and natural sciences, have a universality and necessity that claims about the actual world lack, and imply principles of metaphysics (for Peirce, the most general laws of reality). In light of this, he thinks Dewey does not adequately distinguish natural history of thought and normative logic and, moreover, succumbs to the vicious circularity involved in basing a theory of inquiry on findings in the natural and behavioral sciences justified by the principles of that same theory. To avoid this circle, he insists that the theory of inquiry rests on findings in mathematics, phenomenology, normative science and semiotics – findings that, while justified experimentally, are independent of any theory of inquiry and the knowledge of the actual world Dewey relies on in crafting his logic (see Chapter 2 of [Forster 2011]).

While Peirce and Dewey each claim to have compelling criticisms against the other, it is far from clear that these objections settle their differences. Dewey no more collapses logic into natural history than Peirce separates cognition from the material and social conditions that make it possible. To opt for one side in this debate over the other on the basis of the reasons Peirce and Dewey give is to grossly underestimate the force and subtlety of the opposing view. On the other hand, to set this debate aside as unimportant given all that Peirce and Dewey seem to agree on only turns a blind eye to the fact that their disagreement about the aims, methods and subject-matter of the logic of inquiry extends to their understanding of the content and justification of pragmatism and its importance for philosophy.

Views of pragmatism as a unified philosophy – or as a tradition that converges on one – face further difficulties when dealing with the work of William James. James shares Dewey's insistence that philosophy be rooted in psychology and biology rather than in an exact logic of the sort Peirce insists on. Yet he gives far more weight than Dewey to both physiology and introspection, even in his account of thought.

As important as these methodological differences are, even weightier ones arise from his treatment of metaphysics.

James agrees with Peirce and Dewey in rejecting the notion that metaphysics is transcendental science. For all three, debates over free will versus determinism, absolute idealism versus scientific materialism, theism versus non-theism do not require the application of special cognitive faculties or appeals to facts in a domain underlying or beyond the world of common sense and empirical science. In contrast to Peirce and Dewey, though, James does not approach metaphysics from the standpoint of the logic of scientific inquiry. He does not consider metaphysical questions ill-posed insofar as they do not admit of resolution by the logic of the experimental method, nor does he view answers to them as akin to hypotheses in natural science testable by shared predictions (2). Instead, he views them as expressions of "temperament" – articulations of "our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means" and "our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos" [James 1907/1975, 9].

As James sees it, "tender-minded" thinkers are drawn to free will, absolute idealism and theism out of concern for securing the authority of certain moral and spiritual ideals, while "tough-minded" thinkers advocate determinism, materialism and atheism (or agnosticism) out of regard for empirical justifications and mechanical explanations. This conflict of mindsets extends to views about philosophical method – with tender minds appealing to *a priori* intuition, transcendental arguments or dialectic and tough minds relying on logical analysis and empirical testing. Against the suggestion that this debate pits intellectuals moved by scientific methods of reasoning against anti-intellectuals in the grip of unverifiable dogmas and faith, James insists that neither side is compelled solely by facts and both assume allegiance to cognitive and moral ideals, including ideals of how best to square our intellectual responsibilities with our broader sense of life's purposes (3).

For James, getting a handle on these metaphysical controversies is not primarily an exercise in logical reconstruction, as it is for Peirce and Dewey. He thinks the form and content of rival systems of metaphysics reflect the methods by which they are articulated and defended. To invoke the logic of scientific inquiry as decisive in clarifying and adjudicating these debates – as Peirce and Dewey are wont to do – is apt to be viewed as question-begging by tender minds inclined to hold

that there is more to knowledge than what experimental inquiry can disclose. Getting to the bottom of these disputes, James insists, is a matter of understanding someone else's life as if from the inside. It is a matter of appreciating the experiences that draw people to the philosophical methods and views they hold and understanding the fundamental hopes and values these metaphysical views express and validate (4).

According to James, the metaphysical debates he highlights persist because each side is moved by different, legitimate needs – the tough-minded need for beliefs firmly founded in facts and the tender-minded need for a sense of the significance of life. This suggests to him that the path to reasonable resolution of these controversies lies in thinking through a conception of the world that does justice to both tendencies, while freeing us from the compulsion to view them as irreconcilable. This method of evaluating metaphysical views – intellectually (in terms of their inner logic and consistency with established evidence) and morally (by their capacity to sustain ideals and adapt them to one another and the circumstances of life) – is, for him, the core of the pragmatic method of philosophy.

James's account of the pragmatic method is firmly rejected by both Peirce and Dewey. Peirce thinks James illegitimately subordinates knowing (truth) to doing (living) (8.115, 8.250 and 8.257) and wrongly assumes that cognitive and moral ideals can be justified merely by showing that they are indispensable to a certain sort of life (2.113). Against this, he maintains that the aim of rational inquiry is truth, not personal fulfillment, metaphysical inquiry being no exception. On his view, the logic of inquiry demands that theories be driven solely by evidence, without regard for the effects of beliefs on how we live. Whereas James finds "[t]he trail of the human serpent is thus over everything" in philosophy [James 1907/1975, 37], Peirce insists that rational inquiry requires "a method… by which our *beliefs* may be caused by *nothing human, but* by some external permanency – by *something* upon which our *thinking has no effect*" (5.384). Since rational inquiry fulfills this promise only over an indefinitely long run of experience, he thinks it assumes an ideal that transcends any individual inquirer's interests, an ideal that individuals may not live to see realized even if they are supremely rational. As for the vital questions of living that cannot wait on the verdict of inquiry, Peirce thinks, given the current state of knowledge, that they are better settled by appeal to lore that has stood the test of time than by appeal to

philosophical theories (see: [Peirce 1992], [Forster 2014], and Chapter 11 of [Forster 2011]).

From James's point of view, Peirce's claim to a critical standpoint outside of his personal moral horizons is a pretence (5). Nothing in his objections challenges what James thinks psychology makes evident, namely, that "[t]emperaments with their cravings and refusals do determine men in their philosophies, and always will" and that "[p]urely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatever, is nowhere to be found" [James 1907/1975, 24, 37] (see also "Chapter XXVIII: Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience" of [James 1890/1981, 1215–1280]). "Wanting a universe that suits" a scientific temperament, James thinks philosophers like Peirce predictably "believ[e] in any representation of the universe that does suit it [and] fee[l] [thinkers] of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and… incompetent…in the philosophic business" [James 1907/1975, 11]. In appealing to the logic of scientific inquiry to defend his theoretical and practical ideals, Peirce tries to "sink the fact of his temperament" forgetting that this very deference is itself "the potentest of all [his] premises" [James 1907/1975, 11]. Seeing escape from temperament as impossible and its suppression as pernicious, James offers up his version of the pragmatic method as a way of bringing clashes of ideals and values in philosophy out into the open so that they may be scrutinized and better negotiated.

Dewey is no more persuaded by James's formulation of pragmatism than Peirce is. While strongly opposed to Peirce's claim that the pressing problems of life fall outside the scope of intelligent inquiry, he agrees with him that James wrongly subordinates metaphysical criticism to questions of what beliefs best advance personal ideals. He thinks James conflates the experimentalist's interest in the experiential consequences of hypotheses as a test of their credibility, with the moralist's interest in the consequences of beliefs and values for our character and conduct [Dewey 1908/1977]. To Dewey's way of thinking, questions of how to live are not settled by the abstract ideals James traces to our temperaments. To the contrary, these questions must be revisited in concrete circumstances whenever doubts about proper conduct arise. Moreover, they cannot even be broached *without* some understanding of how they might intelligently be investigated. On his view, temperament has a legitimate role in philosophy and life only to the extent that it can be shown to contribute to outcomes that can

be verified as valuable in light of public knowledge of its causes and effects on people and their surroundings.

From James's perspective, on the other hand, Dewey's criticism seems no more compelling than Peirce's. Dewey's appeal to facts of nature does not ground his ideal of intelligence, it presupposes it. That ideal is part and parcel of his deference to behavioral science as the basis of logic (as opposed to introspection, *a priori* analysis or transcendental deduction) and his insistence on the supremacy of the experimental method (over common sense reasoning, dialectic or pure reason). James sees no way to defend Dewey's approach to philosophy that does not already involve a commitment to his vision of which among our capacities it is best to develop and fulfill and to what ends.

These controversies among James, Peirce and Dewey are neither easily settled nor incidental to our understanding of pragmatism. The criticisms of Peirce and Dewey do not address the carefully crafted psychology of faith and metaphysics underlying James's views, nor do they directly confront his critique of the temptation to dismiss metaphysics as dispensable, unscientific and anti-intellectual (6). In taking James to defend the principle that metaphysical views are justified to the extent that they contribute to personal fulfillment, they assimilate his work to their own project of uncovering a set of principles of inquiry for resolving controversies. The effect is to fuel the mistake – prevalent to this day – that works like *Pragmatism* and "The Will to Believe" are simply failed efforts, of philosophical interest only for the egregious analysis of truth and justification they are (wrongly) thought to contain and of cultural interest only as retrograde efforts to forestall the rise of secular, scientific philosophy. Careful attention to the setting that gives James's work its distinctive force, meanwhile, reveals that the differences between James, Peirce and Dewey – differences involving the foundation of pragmatism in psychology, its proper formulation and its application in philosophy – are far more complex than they themselves let on. These differences are apt to be overlooked or discounted by any conception of pragmatism as a shared philosophical enterprise or tradition culminating in a canonical set of views.

Pragmatism and contemporary American philosophy

Pragmatism's claim to be a cohesive tradition of thought is even harder to sustain when discussing its legacy. For one thing, the literature inspired by Peirce, James and Dewey is massive and diverse, as even a cursory glance at titles classified under "pragmatism" in any university

library catalogue makes plain. Even if attention is narrowed to the figures in contemporary American philosophy most often credited with promoting pragmatism, there remain huge differences to consider.

While the work of W.V. Quine, for example, is often said to have an affinity with pragmatism, the resemblances are superficial, as he himself observed. His plea for pragmatism at the end of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" owes nothing to the early pragmatists [Quine 1951/1980, 46] (for his clarification of the reference to pragmatism, see: [Quine 1991]). Rather it signals his rejection of Rudolf Carnap's and C.I. Lewis's distinction between choosing a linguistic framework on pragmatic grounds – as useful for certain purposes of study – and assigning truth values to sentences expressed within a chosen framework. Quine abandons this distinction because it relies on a distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. His reservations about analyticity stem from his inability to devise an extensionally adequate definition of the notion that applies to variable sentences and variable languages and is couched in behavioral terms (7). These desiderata play no important role in the work of James, Dewey or Peirce, nor, for that matter, are they given pride of place by Lewis or Carnap. They become decisive only given Quine's physicalist reconstruction of the empirical basis of science (and philosophy), a reconstruction that has no precedent in the work of any pragmatist.

Quine's view that theory choice and basic ontology are guided by simplicity, conservatism and generality – virtues often dubbed pragmatic – cannot be attributed to the influence of pragmatism either. The importance of these virtues is stressed in many forms of empiricism, Vienna positivism included.

Nor should much be made of Quine's oft-cited tribute to Dewey in "Ontological Relativity." It was an afterthought, prompted by the fact that he was inaugurating Columbia's Dewey Lectures. In the essays he devotes to his philosophical forebears, Quine does not even mention the pragmatists (see, for example, [Quine 1969], [Quine 1981a], [Quine 1981b], [Quine 1991], [Quine 1998]). And in his discussion of the legacy of pragmatism, he finds "little in the way of shared and distinctive tenets" among card carrying pragmatists and claims "pragmatists do not relate significantly to what [he considers] to be the five turning points in post-Humean empiricism" [Quine 1981c] (8). Quine is not wrong to observe that Dewey shares his rejection of first philosophy, his treatment of knowledge, mind and meaning as part of the same world they have to do with, and his insistence that all knowledge, philosophical

knowledge included, is subject to standards of evidence best exemplified in the natural sciences. However, this should not blind us to the fact that Dewey's aim to formulate general conditions of intelligent problem solving so as to advance science, morals, education, the design of work, politics and art is vastly different from, and forms no part of, Quine's project of uncovering the physiological mechanisms involved in passing from the triggering of nerve endings to a justified system of belief.

In contrast to Quine, Hilary Putnam's debt to the early pragmatists is explicit and formative. Nevertheless, it is very hard to say what this influence amounts to. One reason is that Putnam does not see himself as carrying out an overarching philosophical project. In summing up his life's work he rehearses his positions on a vast array of problems (concerning mathematics, physics, language, mind and value) and traces revisions to his views but offers no general method or approach to them [Putnam 2015]. While claiming to follow the pragmatists in giving primacy to practice in philosophy, he departs significantly from them in abandoning any suggestion that philosophy is a scientific, or even a theoretical, enterprise. His idea that philosophy aims to provide perspicuous "pictures" of the multifarious ways we talk, think and act, pictures to be measured against our various practices rather than constraints derived from a theoretical standpoint, owes far more to his reading of Wittgenstein than to the ideas of Peirce, James or Dewey.

Putnam's list of the most important lessons to be drawn from pragmatism includes: (a) anti-scepticism (rooted in a distinction between "real" and "merely philosophical" doubt), (b) fallibilism (the impossibility of securing beliefs against future revision), (c) rejection of the fact-value dichotomy and (d) the primacy of practice in philosophy [Putnam 1994, 152]. Though he takes these lessons to be "the basis of the philosophies of Peirce, and above all James and Dewey," he also recognizes vast differences in the way they (and other philosophers) have interpreted them [Putnam 1994, 152]. Given his rejection of the various accounts of belief, meaning and truth through which the early pragmatists understand and defend these doctrines and the absence of any alternative explication or justification for them in Putnam's work, it is to very hard to identify what in his understanding of them reflects the influence of early pragmatism.

Putnam also finds antecedents in pragmatism for his views about realism, conceptual relativity and the rejection of dichotomies between concept and percept, mind and world, fact and value. But his estimation of these ideas is informed by his commitments to semantic

externalism, anti-behaviorism, anti-verificationism, the pervasiveness and irreducibility of norms and intentions, and realism. None of these commitments resulted from his turn toward pragmatism. Rather, they emerged out of his grappling with views of Hans Reichenbach, the logical positivists (especially Carnap) and W.V. Quine and they evolved alongside changes in his views about mathematical logic, philosophy of physics and philosophy mind that have no special connection to pragmatism. Taking these basic commitments to offer insights into the notions of meaning, justification, reference, truth, and value interwoven with our practices, he relies on them repeatedly when exposing the limitations and confusions of rival philosophical views, the views of the early pragmatists being among those that he rejects. Thus, however important the pragmatists are as interlocutors for Putnam, his admiration of their work falls far short of advocacy [Hahn 2015, 799].

Richard Rorty is far clearer than Putnam about what he draws from pragmatism. While he finds nothing of value in Peirce's work beyond his rejection of Cartesianism, he credits James with urging that truth is a species of the good (rather than correspondence to fact), thought a means of adjusting behavior to the environment (rather than a representation of reality) and philosophy a search for beliefs that sustain and facilitate personal and social ideals (rather than a search for transcultural legitimation). In Dewey's work, he lauds the critique of the quest for certainty grounded in *a priori* knowledge or sensory givens, confidence in co-operative democracy as a means of advancing culture and the emphasis on human practice as the sole source of normative authority. However, he promotes these ideas with a view to changing philosophical discourse, rather than illuminating its central notions. His goal is to steer philosophy away from concern with the limits and authority of claims to truth, goodness and beauty, toward the construction of imaginative visions of human possibilities unconstrained by epistemology, metaphysics, ethics or aesthetics. As he laments time and again, however, there is no precedent for this project in the work of Peirce, James or Dewey. Having abandoned their efforts in philosophy as ill-considered, he is less a proponent of pragmatism, than a fierce critic.

Conclusion

Combing the tradition of pragmatism in search of ideas that advance contemporary discussions is fair game. There is no objection to exploring ideas wherever they might be thought to shed light. Crafting narratives

about the motives, methods and enduring insights of pragmatism as a tradition of thought is an altogether different matter and far more suspect. Careful reading of work in the pragmatist tradition reveals it to be more diverse, subtler and more difficult to come to terms with than contemporary accounts of what is living and dead in it typically presume. Grappling with this complexity helps combat the tendency to dismiss great work – as even thinkers drawn to pragmatism have dismissed Peirce's thought as too metaphysical, James's as too personal or subjective, Dewey's as too instrumentalist, verificationist or anti-realist. It also enhances awareness of the blinders that come with any philosophical outlook – the varieties of pragmatism included.

NOTES

(1) References of this form are to the volume and paragraph numbers of *Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce* [Peirce 1958]. Also see Peirce's letter to E.H. Moore in *The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce* [Peirce 1976, 914].

(2) Though he cannot define metaphysics, James thinks it discusses "various obscure, abstract and universal questions which the sciences and life in general suggest *but do not solve...* all of them relating to the whole of things, or to the ultimate elements thereof" (emphasis added) [James 1911/1979, 21].

(3) This is the strategy pursued, for example, in his "The Will to Believe" [James 1897/1979].

(4) "The books of all the great philosophers are like so many men. Our sense of an essential personal flavor in each one of them, typical but indescribable, is the finest fruit of our own accomplished philosophical education. What the system pretends to be is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is – and oh so flagrantly! – is the revelation of how intensely odd the personal flavor of some fellow creature is" [James 1907/1975, 24].

(5) "The details of systems may be reasoned out piecemeal, and when the student is working at a system, he may often forget the forest for the single tree. But when the labor is accomplished, the mind always performs its big summarizing act, and the system forthwith stands over against one like a living thing, with that strange simple note of individuality which haunts our memory, like the wraith of the man, when a friend or enemy of ours is dead" [James 1907/1975, 24].

(6) For an excellent discussion of the complex interplay of personal, psychological and metaphysical factors underlying James's views see Robert J. Richards "The Personal Equation in Science: William James's Psychological and Moral Uses of Darwinian Theory" [Richards 1982]. None of the main moves Richards highlights is addressed by Peirce or Dewey in their criticism of James.

(7) While Quine's "ersatz" definition of "analytic" meets these criteria, it does not justify the epistemological distinction of analytic and synthetic truth that Lewis and Carnap insist on. See *Roots of Reference* [Quine 1974].

(8) In this essay Quine adds that while he is "encouraged to think that behavioristic semantics is as distinctive a trait of pragmatism as any" and that this "is a trait that I applaud," he also thinks "the term 'pragmatism' is of little service as an alternative name for this one trait" [Quine 1981c, 37].

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