

## **Reading Russian Philosophy and Max Scheler Together: The Problem of the Other I**

### **Русская философия и Макс Шелер: проблема другого Я**

*А.А. Чикин*

*Институт философии РАН, Москва, Россия*

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#### **Аннотация**

В статье исследуются параллели между теорией симпатии Макса Шелера и пониманием чужого Я в русской философии. Н.О. Лосский высоко оценивает труд Шелера «Сущность и формы симпатии», но к выводам Шелера относится критически: темой чужой душевной жизни русская философия занималась уже с 80-х гг. XIX в. и с ее точки зрения теория Шелера не может подняться выше уровня заражения эмоциями. Истинная же симпатия возможна, когда Другой уже явлен Я, или, по Лосскому, существует изначальная гносеологическая разница между «переживанием» и «предметом наблюдения». Эта гносеологическая разница важна с двух точек зрения. Во-первых, русская философия подчеркивает в проблеме чужого Я герменевтический аспект – изначальную разделенность и поиски понимания, как это делает В.В. Розанов, который также смещает акцент с общего понимания на понимание индивидуального, конкретного, даже интимного-живого. С.Л. Франк утверждал, что чувство другого человека как предмет интуиции останется лишь пустой оболочкой, верным, но бессмысленным наблюдением, если не будет связано с живым знанием со стороны сочувствующего человека, способностью человека вступать в резонанс с чем-то запредельным собственному. Во-вторых, русская философия в исследовании проблемы чужого Я берет за основу факт изначальной коллективности, множественности сознания. Такой импульс был дан философией С.Н. Трубецкого и развит философией русского неокантианства, например, И.И. Лапшиным, говорившем о человеке-творце, берущем на себя коллективную функцию эксперимента над психикой в целях создания и расширения карты человеческих чувств. Лапшин позитивно настроен в отношении такого развития человеческого знания о психическом. При том, что модель Лапшина близка опасным иллюзиям, таким как культ одной личности, обладающей привилегированным доступом к общему чувству, она исходит из плюрализма сознаний и указывает на сложную процессуальную структуру Я.

**Ключевые слова:** симпатия, Другой, чужое Я, русская философия, Макс Шелер.

**Чикин Александр Александрович** – кандидат философских наук, научный сотрудник сектора современной западной философии Института философии РАН.

tchisan@gmail.com

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4121-7997>

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## **Reading Russian Philosophy and Max Scheler Together: The Problem of the Other I**

*A.A. Tchikine*

*Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia*

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### **Abstract**

The article explores the parallels between the theory of sympathy developed by Max Scheler and the understanding of the foreign I in Russian philosophy. Russian philosophy has been developing the topic of foreign psychic life since the 1880s, and it regards Scheler's theory as unable to raise above the level of emotional contagion. True sympathy is possible, when the Other is already present to the I, or, according to Nikolay Lossky, there is an original gnoseological difference between "the lived" (*perezhivaniye*) and "the observed" (*predmet nablyudeniya*). Russian philosophy emphasizes the hermeneutical aspect of the problem – the original division and the search for understanding, as does Vasily Rozanov, who also shifted the accent from the general to the individual, particular and even intimate. Semyon Frank pointed out that the feelings of another person will only form a shell of meaningless observation, if not connected to the living knowledge through the human ability to resonate with something transcendent. And Russian philosophy assumes the fact of the original collectiveness of consciousness. This is the impulse given to it by the philosophy of Sergei Trubetskoy and developed in the philosophy of Russian neo-Kantianism, with Ivan Lapshin depicting a creative person, taking up the collective function of experimenting over the psyche to create and expand the map of human feelings.

**Keywords:** sympathy, alterity, the other I, Russian philosophy, Max Scheler.

**Alexander Tchikine** – Ph.D. in Philosophy, Research Fellow at the Department of Modern Western Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science.

tchisan@gmail.com

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4121-7997>

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### Introduction

The German term “Einfühlung” (empathy) was introduced by Friedrich Theodor Vischer in his aesthetics to denote the sympathetic ability of the I to posit itself into the external. Citing Hermann Lotze and Johann Gottfried Herder as his forerunners, Vischer offered empathy and aesthetic vision as a new way of the understanding of pieces of art on themselves [see: Perpeet 1971; Schloßberger 2005, 59]. Theodor Lipps started from the aesthetic problem, backed his concept with research of kinaesthesia, extended empathy on understanding of psychic life and thus offered an alternative to the traditional argument from analogy. Criticism of Lipps’ idea by phenomenology gave several variants of intersubjective theory, which, despite its problems, turned out to be consistent enough to influence further research in the humanities and beyond. Max Scheler’s study of sympathy took the phenomenological aspect of the problem into account and showed, on the one hand, that some types of common feeling, usually understood as sympathy, were only superficial, and, on the other hand, that the understanding of foreign psychic life was still possible. Scheler’s concept met some interest in Russia, as Russian thinkers should had appreciated in his work:

- orientation on moral unity, communion;
- renewed religiousness and an answer to the challenge of nihilism;
- description of human condition that is realistic and true to life;
- primacy of love over duty;
- ideas on the spiritual transformation of life.

The nature of human consciousness was one of the main problems in gnoseological and psychological research in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Typical of the Russian approach [see: Tikhonova 2010] is the work of prince Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoy *On the Nature of Human Consciousness* (1889–1891). The consciousness is described as the “essential manifestation of life” and the “collective function of the humankind” [Trubetskoy 1994, 495] that emerges with the development of the personal element in man and evolves in him into the “cosmic consciousness” [Trubetskoy 1994, 549] unknown to animal. Russian philosophy placed human consciousness in history and at the same time linked it with personality metaphysics and even theology. But in 1892 the manner of considering the problem was radically changed by a neo-Kantian philosopher Alexander Ivanovich Vvedensky.

Following the idea of psychology without metaphysics, Vvedensky formulated his “new psycho-physical law” (first in: [Vvedensky 1892]): “material processes in each and every body always run as if there were nowhere and never any psychic life” [Vvedensky 1996, 217]. All material processes, from which people usually deduce foreign psychic life, are no direct proof of its existence. Intuition of it is problematic because it contradicts the fact that others exist for me exactly as others. Moreover, one can have no direct access to the relation between one’s own psychic life and its physical expressions – one cannot stop living and see what expressions will disappear with it. If we have no experience of psychic life, we can have no knowledge of its existence, but we need to have faith in it as a “device” of moral understanding (1). Vvedensky’s student Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin develops this idea of his. That what is not instantaneously felt in foreign psychic life is filled in by the foreign I as an hypothetical thought construct, and this construct is the more developed the stronger person’s ability of aesthetical impersonation (re-embodiment) in perception of self and others. Lapshin follows a consistent antimetaphysical program and his later work is an example of the phenomenology of moral consciousness and of the research of morality through its logical order that is the only possible variant of moral philosophy.

### **Creative understanding**

Writing in 1922 on the history of philosophy, Lapshin mentions Scheler only as an example of the intuitive solution to the problem of the other I, which he thought to have proven wrong. But in his works

we find motives which are similar to those of Scheler. First, Lapshin declares that the “cognition of foreign psychic life is not only a cognitive but also an affective and volitional process” [Lapshin 1999, 271]. The feeling of love between a mother and her child brings out the child’s strive for sociability, and this strive motivates curiosity for the surrounding world and foreign psychic life. Then, curiosity manifests itself in the ability of impersonation, which reaches its peak in philosophical art as “the cosmic feeling, admiration of the world as a whole” [Lapshin 1999, 290]. So when Lapshin defines the understanding of foreign psychic life through the ability, he links it with the level of human development. Finally, he declares a change, a reversal even, in the direction of psychological investigation. Understanding of foreign psychic life is a complex, collective action of the spiritual level.

In his 1914 article “On Impersonation in Artistic Creation” Lapshin first develops a concept, in his later work formulated as the thesis that “the cognition of foreign psychic life moves not from the parts to the whole... but from the whole to the parts” [Lapshin 1999, 271]. The philosopher notes that an artist makes his heroes act as if they had psychological motivation. But the artist makes that not with the scientific method, which is guided by experience and constructs foreign life as a mechanism, and not intuitively, as if foreign life were primordially known to him with some vital principle. Experiential psychology has no answer to the question of how the artist recreates souls. The autobiographical material provided by creative people is untrustworthy due to possible tricks of their memory, aptitude for “self-composing,” inclination to show themselves in a more favorable light and general artistic reserve or secretiveness. These obstacles to objective research, however, point to artist’s ability of impersonation. And the descriptive psychological research of this capability, according to Lapshin, is able to shed light on the connection between cognition and recreation of the self and the other.

The riddles of artistic character can be traced to childhood. Children have the practical ability “to internally imitate foreign emotions by yielding to the influences of the environment” [Lapshin 1914, 175], which can be also observed in weak-willed adults and forms the basis of the moral feeling of sympathy. In creative people this ability is complemented by artistic inquisitiveness and watchfulness “colored by particular interest to foreign psychic life and accompanied by conscious exercise” [Lapshin 1914, 181]. This exercise includes, among other

things, practical experiments on the psychic life of the self and others, tried by every child as a game but transformed by creative people into thought experiments recreating the foreign I. Artists thus develop the spirit, furthering general, popular understanding of psychic life, which serves the interests of social development in general. In the long run, according to Lapshin, “as human solidarity grows, as democratic tendencies in human society develop, as historical knowledge progresses... the impersonation in art goes ever deeper, it grasps the ever more secret corners of human personality, the darkness of foreign soul” [Lapshin 1914, 258].

One of Lapshin’s conclusions is that the artist is better than the scientist in psychology: the former’s sophisticated ability of impersonation brings in him the talent for “aesthetic autosuggestion,” which helps to convince people, literally contaminating them with feeling. Without logical explanation he can make them feel the “counterfeelings” [Lapshin 1914, 254] of the complex human character. Lapshin’s consistency can be admired. “More often than not, we are afraid to logically develop our thought to its end, anticipating that the final conclusions will offend something very valuable for us” [Lapshin 1900, 819], he says. Developing his thought in a later article “Refutation of Solipsism,” he is not afraid to demolish the metaphysics of morality and proposes to abandon the traditional transcendental subject in favor of “the immanent representation of the pluralism of consciousnesses and of coordination of all spiritual centers under one gnoseological subject” [Lapshin 1924, 66].

Here we should remember the criticism of Scheler from another Russian thinker (2), Georgi Davidovich Gurvich. One of the problems he brings to light is the problem in defining love as an act that “elevates the object loved to the highest degrees of value accessible to it without producing new values itself” [Gurvitch 1949, 138]. However, love is an action and may be understood as freedom in violation of the hierarchy of values that guarantees their potential equality. In Scheler, as Gurvich reads him, a person “finds itself in passive intentional acts, and there is a relation of reciprocal foundation between the being of a person and the acts it accomplishes” [Gurvitch 1949, 140]. This circular reasoning may support the status quo prohibiting the creation of new moral values according to the principle of freedom as creative spontaneity, as, according to Gurvich, “Scheler consents to subordinate the moral conduct of persons to the authoritarianism of some others who have a more clear vision of values” [Gurvitch 1949, 146]. This is

just what Lapshin seems to do. He also uses circular reasoning: the rise of social solidarity develops the ability of impersonation in individual persons, and the ability of impersonation develops social spirituality and solidarity; and he puts faith in artistic creation arising from love as a value in itself and agrees to emotional contamination with no guarantee of moral autonomy but the prospect of social development (which equals the development of life). To guarantee moral autonomy Scheler stops one footstep away from Lapshin's final conclusions and posits something that is not based on phenomenological analysis – “the existence of a monistic order of values, ranked according to a unique principle that is the principle of religious values” [Gurvitch 1949, 96]. On the other hand, Scheler stays true to phenomenology in that he does not make another, further step to the clarification of the ontological status of person, which could answer the question of whether the We exists like the I or the Thou do.

Russian philosophers see the necessity of vitality in the understanding of foreign psychic life and creativity as the essence of this vitality. As Nicolas Berdyaev notes, “Max Scheler defines person as a unity of acts. But each act is a creative act, in it not the past but the new enters the world. Every act in the life of a human person, each lived relation of human to human is a creative spirit” [Berdyaev 1937, 298]. What is this creativity Russians are talking about? What is the paradigm for understanding it? When the German idea of empathy is born from the problems of the figurative art, Russian solutions to the problem of the other I are initially oriented on literature. A vivid example of the hope for solution and its practical application might be the *narodnik* (pro-people) idea that literature, free from artistic interest and expressing the rejection of class identity, could bring the intelligentsia and the people together in the common task of uncovering popular, worldly wisdom and understanding that springs from life itself.

The possibility of such understanding was the central theme for the Russian thinker Vasily Vasilievich Rozanov, starting from his first philosophical work *On Understanding* (1886). Looking into the past, he insists that for its reliable depiction “historians need a gift of artistic understanding of man and life” [Rozanov 1996, 601]. Further in the book he explains what this gift is about. Speaking of creation of forms of life, he puts forward the fiction as a spiritualized life and a way for transformation of life, and among men of letters he distinguishes an “artist-psychologist” [Rozanov 1996, 459], who proceeds not from the



observation of life but from the discord in his own spirit and the “lust for faith” [Rozanov 1996, 462], which force him to practice religious creation in hope of anticipating what potentially exists in spirit and life. Rozanov sees the ideal of such artist in Dostoevsky: “Among men nobody has descended so deep into the soul of men, as the latter [Dostoevsky], and nobody has discovered there so much of the surprisingly new, strange, and unfathomable” [Rozanov 1996, 466]. Dostoevsky also discovered the soul as the coincidence of opposites, which, according to Rozanov, shows the impossibility of philosophical construction of, for example, morality from the self: “The very material is poor, and no matter how wonderfully insightful everything in the construct may be, it will remain only a monument to the greatness of an individual mind and the greatness of the collective weakness in the humankind” [Rozanov 1996, 494]. Any philosophical project should be based on the religious feeling and religion as the manifested primordial idea – “the renewed relation between man and his Creator” [Rozanov 1996, 484].

The work of Rozanov found no positive response and failed in publication. He becomes a literary critic, an opinion journalist, and in this different field he develops the image of Dostoevsky as an understanding psychologist. He writes, “Dostoevsky was the first to speak of life that can beat under the most suffocating forms, of the human dignity persisting under the most impossible conditions” [Rozanov 2013, 47]. Here, in the 1891 article devoted to the legend of the Grand Inquisitor from *The Karamazov Brothers*, he emphasizes his skeptical views on the capabilities of philosophy. Our wisdom and the height of our concepts do not save us from the care for other people, which the man of letters wakes in us, delivering or passing over the art and labor of comprehension that he shares with other people. We find this art and labor, of the “artistic understanding of man and life,” which reminds us of the hermeneutic tradition, in a peculiar development of the late works of Rozanov. The metaphysics of love (3), scandalous books on religion and sex are saturated with the idea of confessional research of further and further concreteness, mundanity even, and, according to an opinion from Shklovsky, marked the end of a paradigm in Russian literature: “Rozanov’s book [*Fallen Leaves*] was a heroic attempt to leave literature, ‘to tell without words, without form,’ and the book turned out to be wonderful, because it created a new literature, a new form” [Shklovsky 1990, 125].



### **Cogito ergo sumus**

As far as the old paradigm is concerned, the first Russian Slavophiles, Ivan Vasilievich Kireevsky and Aleksei Stepanovich Khomyakov, starting from the contemporary German philosophy, wanted to cultivate an original Russian philosophy from the life of the people, and, as Khomyakov insisted, above all based on the people's religious experience. They found it fundamental that the phenomenology of spirit was open and unfinished and they saw that the oppositions of European culture, for example, the opposition of spirit and thingness, could be overcome in Slavic art, science, and religion as the manifestations of Slavic social consciousness (4). Trying to solve the problem of organic or spontaneous order in social life, Khomyakov saw the synthesis of social unity and individual independence in the religious principle of *sobornost* (roughly "communion") – "the free and organic unity whose living principle is the God's grace of mutual love" [Khomyakov 1867, 101]. At the same time, following Berdyaev, one may understand *sobornost* as a new gnoseological principle: "Love is recognized as the principle of cognition, it maintains the cognition of truth... Communion in love, *sobornost*, is the criterion of cognition... the way of cognition, opposite to the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*. It is not I think, but we think, i.e. the communion in love thinks, and not the thought but the will and love prove my existence" [Berdyaev 2008, 201] (5).

From the Slavofiles through Vladimir Solovyov to Russian intuitivism *sobornost* goes as the principle or ideal of integral knowledge. The central figure in Russian intuitivism, Nikolay Onufrievich Lossky finds that the forerunning tradition in general shares "an inherent acute feeling of reality and resists the tendency to consider the contents of external perceptions as something psychic or subjective" [Lossky 1991, 469]. In this respect, Lossky believes the question of foreign psyche to be solvable within Russian philosophy. But not by finding grounds for the knowledge of the other I. Through the intuition of the external world, the foreign psychic life, together with our own psychic life, is always directly given to us as the special case of such intuition – the object of observation. The solution is the analysis of experiences that give us the unity of the I and the non-I [Lossky 1906, 73f].

This line is taken up by the philosophy of Semyon Lyudvigovich Frank. Developing the concept of the "lived knowledge" in his 1915 work *The Matter of Knowledge*, he gives an ontological twist to the gnoseological principle of *sobornost*. Meditating on the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, he notes, that "the great, illuminating meaning of

this formula lies in the fact that in the form of consciousness was revealed the being that is 'given' already not implicitly, not through the awareness of it but absolutely directly – the being that we 'know' precisely, because we ourselves *are* this being" [Frank 1995, 158]. Frank's effort was to return to the "integral science... – no matter what we call it: 'phenomenology,' 'pure logic,' 'first science' or 'ontology'" [Frank 1995, 39] – that will be able to ground the unity of knowledge and its object in lived experience (6), both logically explainable and understandable, and to answer the question of why we seek knowledge as the "revelation of the object to our consciousness as the being existing independently of our cognitive relation to it" [Frank 1995, 37]. The Russian philosopher stated that the living is inaccessible to any knowledge, including the intuitive (7), but it opens itself in communication, which is spiritual interaction possessing the character of primordial self-evidence. The primitive man, the child have a vague form of life, submerged into the life of the kin and nature. But as they get their first knowledge, the necessity of making the experience clear and of "spreading" it as lived knowledge "on all the rest of life requires... ideal actualization of a-temporality..., and... expansion of the experience itself beyond its usual borders" [Frank 1995, 363] (8), which in turn requires the development of spiritual abilities.

In his late book *The Unfathomable*, where Frank applies his ontology to the philosophy of religion, he acknowledges that "philosophical thought, with rare exceptions..., has not yet realized the 'I-thou' relation as a special, primordial form of being" [Frank 1990, 368] (9), which has long been accessible to literature and theater. This form reveals itself to human in its inarticulacy as the "internal structure of reality" [Frank 1990, 372], where the I (person) is the limit and constant definition, and the Thou (phenomenon) is the maintenance of the feeling of reality and constant transcendence (10). The I and the Thou emerge simultaneously as points in reality of the self-constituting unity of the We, uniting them as *coincidentia oppositorum*. This unity finds its "concrete-living" fulfillment as love, which is not a relation of cognition but of "expressive revelation" [Frank 1990, 377], similar to what is given in the revelation of the excessive, transcending, creative flow. Only through the possibility of participating in it the I becomes the I and the Thou becomes the Thou. Failure to understand this was the reason for the insoluble gnoseological problem of knowing the other I. Any attempt to find a way around this failure to get knowledge by analogy or empathy "presuppose... the *notion* of 'foreign psychic life'"

[Frank 1990, 349f] as already known, while the knowing of the Other is not a simple act but an infinity of acts with the Thou always appearing as new and unfathomable, with its existence (self-revelation of the Absolute) preceding the existence of its contents (the concealed I).

### **Conclusion: two problems**

Now we would like to go back to Lossky. When Scheler's *The Nature of Sympathy* appeared in 1913, the Russian intuitivist was writing an article on understanding the psychic life of others for the Russian edition of the international journal *Logos* (published in 1914). Lossky praises Scheler but shows no great enthusiasm. He even finds in Scheler's work two problems, which we can understand in light of the Russian philosophical tradition.

The first and major problem is that "Scheler notes no difference between the contents of consciousness that are lived and the contents that are only observed" [Lossky 1914, 199] and therefore misses the point that the Other will always remain alien to us. Without this gnoseological difference sympathy cannot leave the level of contamination although with a different direction: a person who does not want to be contaminated starts to contaminate with his sympathy, the results of that are most clearly seen in literature.

Russian literature tried to be uniform knowledge, a paradigmatic spiritual practice or instrument of spiritual research, but seen without any metaphysics it shows the openness to the world as experience and can turn understanding into the creation of a great person, charismatic and therefore having an absorbing, devouring power (11). As such, this literature may represent psychology with an agenda that, seeing a person, believes to perceive his actions as having a motive to be intuited and used. Representing then some immanent essence, a psychologist can force into the causal chain of "internal life" of that person. But this leaves it blind to the actual happening, because not everything that manifests in people is there for aesthetic perception, and people are always more than the story. Moreover, if psychology wants to show love as fundamental, it sometimes either does not see, or hides the conflict in the very basis of thinking, whereas it should be recognized that alterity is always alterity, the alterity eludes selfhood, it transcends selfhood and is transcendental. This is why Russian philosophers pointed to the unfathomable and tried to bridge the gap, examples of which are Frank, offering the requirement for "living knowledge" of the intuited object, and Rozanov, searching for the

concrete that supporting the anticipations of a writer-psychologist and thus transforming literature (12).

The second problem Lossky sees in Scheler is his point that “we have immediate perception... of everything happening in the other man but organic sensations, i.e. feelings of sensual character (*sinnliche Gefühle*)” [Lossky 1914, 200]. Feeling can be strictly either alien, or ours, but it has no importance because of the collective character of sympathy and, according to Lossky, “the physical pain of others cannot be lived by me but may enter the horizon of my consciousness as observed” [Lossky 1914, 200], which means that it is always potentially in consciousness as the We, the Subject and the Other divide and mingle the two perspectives in the activity of understanding.

Meant to be an objective science, psychology may deny the Subject’s ability to live the “external” internal life, making the life of the Other objectively inaccessible, as Vvedensky and Lapshin did. We see the same in Scheler’s warning that the mixture of the Subject with the Other brings only false sympathy. When subjectivity is formed, it must remain this way and recognizes body as a barrier, although the respect and love for alterity act at the source of its creativity. Staying pure one stays in the immanent, leaving the solipsism problem unsolved.

Sympathy must include mixture. In Berdyaev we found it as the gnoseological principle of *sobornost*, in Frank it became the basis of ontology, and both philosophers showed that the danger lies in the static understanding, which conceals the fact that the selfhood is dynamic, is at its heart collective and involves others in the process of creating what we see as psychic life. The act-oriented understanding continued in the Soviet times with two examples being the cultural theory of Mikhail Bakhtin and his research into the process of “active understanding” or “living-into” (*vzhivaniye*), where body appears more as a door than a barrier, and the activist line in psychology from Lev Vygotsky to Alexei Leontiev and Sergei Rubinshtein, focusing on the principles on which consciousness is organized as a dynamic sense-producing system, understood through intersubjective relations and activities in which it emerges and develops.

Should we look for Schelerian influences in Russian philosophy? On the one hand, his theory of sympathy agreed well with the aspirations, hopes and search of the mainstream Russian philosophy and more research into the influence of Scheler’s phenomenology on such thinkers as Frank or Bakhtin is definitely required. On the other hand, as we examine the Russian experience in the problem of the other I,

we find there criticism of Scheler's ideas and must acknowledge that they could not take root, and not only because of the turbulent times in which his work on sympathy appeared. Finally, reading Russian philosophy and Max Scheler together sometimes brings the question of whether he showed any interest in what was happening in the East like some of his German contemporaries, although most probably we can speak only of curious parallels. That encourages more general research of this creative meeting with the Other that was in the air in the late 19<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries cultural relations, where we find new perspectives on such interesting questions as the question of how to understand philosophy in light of the spiritual practices of literature, religion or science and their inquiry into the riddle of man.

#### NOTES

(1) Which also is a metaphysical feeling. For Vvedensky the morally understood "unconditionally valuable purpose" of man signifies that "the Universe as a whole is governed... by the same purpose" [Vvedensky 1901, 131].

(2) More known as a central figure in French sociology of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

(3) Considered by Helmut Dahm an "astounding anticipation of the late phase in the thought of Max Scheler" [Dahm 1981, 165].

(4) Which thought is also characteristic of Slavic national renaissances, e.g. Slovak.

(5) Compare to Lossky's definition of *sobornost* in Khomyakov's works: "Sobornost is the free union of the church in the task of their communal understanding of the truth and communal search for ways of salvation, it is a union in unanimous love of Christ and godly righteousness" [Lossky 1991, 35].

(6) But unlike Dilthey's "life" as the "fact of consciousness." See: [Ehlen 2012, 115].

(7) "[E]ven an ingenious thinker having intuition of a matter but only of objectively-contemplating kind can, contacting the matter in practical life, "get lost" or feel helpless, because he lacks the lived internal grasp of the matter" [Frank 1995, 362].

(8) On the next page we find a reference to Scheler's *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*.

(9) With one of the exceptions, according to Frank, being Max Scheler.

(10) The Thou looks at the I, the I feels limitation of freedom, protects the Self, hiding it behind the collective whole, but then finds similarity in the Thou and opens up.

(11) See the controversy between the Russian literature critics Semyon Vengerov and Arkady Gornfeld in their respective articles: [Vengerov 1911] and [Gornfeld 1912].

(12) Rozanov made a great psychologist out of Dostoevsky but in fact discovered him as a writer who was moving to a form of understanding other people that is beyond psychology.

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