

Understanding Chinese Concept of “Face”: The Limits of F. Fukuyama’s Approach to the Problem of Identity

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Abstract

The basic concept of Chinese culture – the concept of “face” (*mianzi*) – remains one of the most debated topics in philosophy, cultural studies and ethics. The author argues that the main methodological problem is “translation” of realities of Chinese mentality into the language of European discourse, the question of how European thinking interprets concepts that have no analogues in a non-Asian worldview and outlook. The problem of understanding realities of foreign consciousness is complicated by the fact that we can say, with a certain degree of confidence, that today there is no common global scientific field of social and humanitarian research. In spite of international contacts and diligent study of foreign languages, Asian, Euro-American and Russian studies on China do not actually constitute a single area of research. In spite of assurances of unbiased research, scientific objectivity, tolerance and equal respect for scientific schools of different countries, these studies are often afflicted with Eurocentrism or, reversely, Sinocentrism. This article discusses the main ideas of F. Fukuyama’s recently published book, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, regarding the Chinese concept of “face.” The article presents a brief analysis of the concept of “heart” in Christianity, which largely formed the general European understanding of personality and identity, and then a description of “heart” in the Taoist-Confucian philosophy, which is fundamental to the Chinese mentality. The article considers the methodological foundations of Fukuyama’s concepts and demonstrates the inefficiency of Eurocentric and Americentric criteria in interpretation of the “face” and personality in China. It is shown that the traditional understanding of Chinese consciousness as collectivistic and of European consciousness as chiefly individualistic is nothing more than a cliché. The author concludes that studying the Chinese concept of “face” requires a different methodological approach, which will be relevant not to epistemological views entrenched in the West, but to the subject of research itself.

Keywords: face, personality, inner and outer self, China, sociality, identity, Christianity, heart, individualism, collectivism.

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К вопросу о китайском «лице» и проблеме идентичности у Ф. Фукуямы

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Аннотация

Базовое понятие китайской культуры – понятие «лица» – сегодня остается одной из наиболее дискутируемых тем в философии, Китаеведении, культурологии, этике. Главными методологическими трудностями автор считает проблему «перевода» реалий китайского сознания на язык европейского дискурса, вопрос о том, как европейское мышление может трактовать такие концепты, для которых нет аналогов в неазиатском мироощущении и мировоззрении. Эта проблема понимания реалий чужого сознания осложняется и тем, что с определенной долей уверенности можно утверждать: сегодня не существует общего мирового научного поля социально-гуманитарных исследований; азиатские, евроамериканские и российские китаеведческие штудии при наличии международных контактов и прилежном изучении иностранных языков на самом деле не составляют общего круга изысканий. И при всех заверениях в стремлении к научной объективности, толерантности и равному уважению к научным школам разных стран эти штудии нередко страдают евроцентризмом или, напротив, китаецентризмом. Настоящая статья посвящена анализу основных положений недавно опубликованной книги Ф. Фукуямы об идентичности в приложении к дискуссиям о содержании концепта китайского «лица». Автор статьи представляет краткий авторский анализ поня-

тия «сердца» в христианстве, которое во многом сформировало европейское понимание личности и идентичности, и описание «сердца» в даосско-конфуцианском менталитете, базовом для китайцев. Рассматриваются методологические основания идей американского философа. Демонстрируется некорректность евроцентристских и американоцентристских критериев оценки «лица» и личности в Китае. Показано, что традиционное понимание китайского сознания в качестве коллективистского и противоположного европейскому как индивидуалистическому является не более чем клише. Китайское «лицо» требует иного методологического подхода, релевантного не эпистемологическим представлениям европейца, а предмету самого исследования.

Ключевые слова: лицо, личность, внутреннее и внешнее Я, Китай, социальность, идентичность, христианство, сердце, индивидуализм, коллективизм.

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Introduction

The Chinese traditional concept of “face” (*mianzi*) comprises the personal relations that involve socially recognized qualities and virtues, mutual obligations between children and parents (father-son), members of a family or clan (veneration of ancestors), family members and the clan, between a person within his/her social community and those who occupy a higher or lower position on the social ladder (emperor, officials, peasants, etc.). Thus, the “face” includes an entire set of social roles (masks) of an individual, and in this sense *a person always has different “faces”* in relation to other people, depending on their gender, age, kindred, professional and social statuses¹. That is why the Chinese “face” is frequently regarded by Europeans as the “insincerity” of a Chinese person, his or her “hypocrisy,” “deceit,” “falsehood,” “pretense,” and “duplicity.” And here it is advisable to remember that

¹ On the notion of “face” (*mianzi*) and its role in Chinese culture, see: [Gan 2015; Zhou, Zhang 2017; Han 2016; Song 2018].

all people, regardless of whether they are Europeans or Asians, perform different “roles” in society: we are parents, children, neighbors, fellow-travelers, members of a religious community or interest club, etc., and in each of our “roles” we reveal different aspects of ourselves. However, Europeans are convinced that there exists a certain main internal universal self, which they often fail to see in the Chinese (“the Chinese have no personality”) or which seems to them to be a hidden, secret, unrevealed self.

And here we cannot but notice that, from the point of view of F. Fukuyama, expressed in his recently published work *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (2018), the inner self (of course, the Euro-American one, which, according to Fukuyama, is universal and obligatory for all “civilized” nations and all cultures) is more valuable than the external one. In other words, noting that the demand for equal public recognition and respect – which is characteristic, for example, of some nationalities or religious communities – often develops into a demand for recognition of their superiority [Fukuyama 2018, xiii–xiv], Fukuyama finds himself affected by this criticized practice, subject to the modern manner of searching for the “primary” and the “secondary”: political bias has its adverse effects. The American author always sees society as a hostile environment striving to subjugate and imprison an individual (who is the “primary” to all the relations). The dialectic of freedom is a time-honored issue, but in Fukuyama’s book, the reader faces a certain sociophobia. Yet in this, Fukuyama is far from original. The postmodern era is based on statements about repressiveness of all social practices, starting with the custom of swaddling babies and ending with the rituals of burial, starting with language and ending with reason, logic, culture, and truth. Describing the principles of postmodernity, G.S. Knabe wrote: “The initial cell and the real unit of history and culture is the human individual in all the singularity and uniqueness of his emotionally wilful ‘self.’ Therefore, for such an individual, any community that is not internally justified by himself, any collective norm or a common rule act as violence or repression, from which he strives (or should strive) to free himself. At the philosophical level, logic, a logically functioning mind, and the concept of objective truth based on them are recognized as an external repressive force. Along with denial of logic and reason, the postmodern paradigm denies and criticizes such concepts as organization, orderliness, and system; the proposition according to which chaos, i.e., all that is unformed and unfulfilled, all that is

more fruitful and humane than the structure, is perceived as an axiom. At the social and state level, postmodernism sees in modern Western countries the capitalist establishment, controlled by the bourgeoisie in its own interests and, therefore, subject to, if not annihilation, then at least exposure” [Knabe 2006].

The outer and the inner. On Chinese “hypocrisy”

As for the Chinese identity, in the very mentality of the inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, the outer and the inner are so mutually reversible that it is beyond the European rational reasoning focused on polarities and on the struggle of opposites. In many chapters of the *Tao Te Ching*, the main text of Taoism, fundamental to all Chinese thought, it is repeatedly stated that the outer and the inner are merged, and the individual self is rooted in the depths of the universe. As Shchutsky notes, according to the major principles of the *I Ching* (*Book of Changes*), another fundamental source of the Chinese worldview, “the conflict of the outer and the inner is excluded, ... they [the outer and inner] only develop each other by the fact that the inner is determined by the outer and is expressed in the outer... Whereby the person pays sufficient attention both to oneself and to the surrounding society and, being satisfied with his or her position, finds it possible to experience the highest form of creativity: the creativity of goodness, instead of fulfilling rules of common morality” [Schutsky 2003].

It should always be remembered that no translation of the categories of the Chinese mentality into European languages can be adequate. That means that the problem of “translating” the deepest layer of the mentality “from Chinese to European” is far from being resolved. Chinese culture contains many concepts that cannot be translated into European languages: it takes a long time to describe them, but there always remains an untranslatable, properly Chinese residual (by close analogy, the aesthetic information encoded in a work of art is equally untranslatable into the language of the logos: no matter how hard you try to describe the “content” of a work of art, there is always something that cannot be described, which forms its artistic essence proper). Nevertheless, “translation” of categories from the language of the Chinese culture and worldview into the European language is necessary, and without it there is no dialogue of cultures or understanding of other, non-European civilizations. However, this is a complex task. Ignoring this circumstance leads to the fact that the meanings attributed to the signified are inappropriate for it in

the target culture, therefore, one cannot identify the meanings of the outer/inner opposition in European mentality and Chinese mentalities. “Tradition affirms a meta-logical interconnection between the inner and the outer, the subjective and the objective in human existence. In this respect, the limit of the inner coincides with the limit of the outer, and the very concepts of the inner and the outer have a double bottom: our inner experience possesses a mystical depth incomprehensible to rational thought, and the outer always has something even more external in relation to itself – something purely ornamental and decorative” [Malyavin 2003, 5].

Therefore, the sociality of the Chinese traditionally and, in many ways, apparently, to this day is not repression of the self but a different form of its existence. And, bearing in mind the special dialectic of the outer and the inner, to suspect the Chinese of some specific duplicity, which is radically different from the Euro-American one, is to project one’s own problems on a completely different cultural environment: it would be wrong to say that there is some “real,” authentic self, but the Chinese intentionally hide it or do not have it at all... And, of course, there is nothing farther from the Chinese mentality than the postmodernist denial of culture, truth, organization, the unmasking of power as the embodiment of these fundamentals, and the apology of chaos.

The Christian roots of the European personality and the Taoist-Confucian origins of the Chinese personality

Fukuyama begins his discussion of the formation of personality with an allusion to Luther and his statement about the justification of a person by his faith and his heart [Fukuyama 2018, 26–27]. At the same time, according to Luther, the mind is a murderer and a satanic fornicator, unable to understand the truth of faith, but it is also a gift given by God for certain purposes: it helps one to comprehend what is lower than the human, but not what is higher. It is almost generally accepted in cultural studies that personality began with Lutheranism (which does not mean that the author of this article agrees with the statement). There can also be some interesting analogies here: *Tao* as the essence of the Chinese tradition is also transmitted “*from heart to heart*” without words and is revealed suddenly, unlike *jiao* that is the teaching that can be formulated in concepts and memorized. Chan Buddhist teachers also believed that wisdom is transmitted beyond words. Symbolic corporeality, or “body consciousness,” synergy, or

“body without organs,”² has become a key philosophical tradition of the Celestial Empire [Malyavin 2003, 73]. Lao Tzu defends the *xin* (the indivisible heart-mind³), which is capable to see the endless variety of properties of life and feel an inner affinity for these varieties. The “heart-mind” occupies an important place in Taoist teaching. It is obvious that in the Chinese mentality, in contrast to the Lutheran mentality, which formed the basis of European mentality of the entire modern era, there is no gap or strict borderline between the mind and the heart.

Confucius taught to observe “*fasting of the heart*,” which means the unity of will and the ability to listen to the spiritual vibes (*qi*), to hear with the heart and not with the ears. “But let hearing stop with the ears. Let the working of the mind [heart] stop with itself. Then the soul will be a negative existence, passively responsive to externals. In such a negative existence, only Tao can abide. And that negative state is the fasting of the heart” [Giles 2013, 54]. This negative (void) state helps to grasp one’s own origin/source. The mind (reason) is mediated by the heart, and the heart is mediated by the mind, and then the ultimate wisdom is achieved.

According to the Sinologist V.V Malyavin, in the *Tao Te Ching*, the heart-mind (*xin*) is a polysemantic concept that applies to consciousness, reason/mind, will, and emotion. The use of this very term to denote consciousness indicates the indivisibility and unity of the sensual and mental aspects of human life in Chinese thought. There is a kind of the “consciousness of the heart” or the “sensual mind.” The very concept of the “heart-mind” is used in the *Tao Te Ching* with remarkable ambiguity: genuine consciousness resides outside itself and corresponds to “non-consciousness,” “non-mind” (*wu-xin*). The true nature of consciousness is the “oblivion” of vast metamorphoses of being, which is equivalent to the ultimate voidness and peace of spirit. Thus, the highest awakening, the ultimate clarity of the pacified spirit are indistinguishable from obscurity [Malyavin 2018, 98].

Confucius taught about the truth of the hear-mind, which can only be achieved by studying hard. Confucian treatise *Daxue* says introduces the concept of the “correction of the heart-mind”: “The cultivation

² “Body without organs” is also a postmodernist notion; it is amorphous, structureless, rhizomorphic, processual and not objective, and it constitutes actual infinity.

³ On the syncretism of the sensual and the mental in the concept of *xin* see also: [Cua 2005; Huff 2015; Jung, Moon 2018; Slote 2018].

of the person lies in the correction of the mind [heart].’ When you are angry, you cannot be correct. When you are frightened, you cannot be correct; when there is something you desire, you cannot be correct; when there is something you are anxious about, you cannot be correct. When the mind [heart] is not present, we look, but do not see. We listen, but do not hear; we eat, but don’t taste our food. This is the meaning of ‘the cultivation of the person lies in the correction of the mind [heart]’” [Muller 1992].

At special moments of awakening, as Chinese teachers write, in the tiny space of the heart, they are carried away beyond the earth. This kind of transcendence has no visible indications and leaves no traces, it is like a flash of lightning or a bird flying in the air. This condition can be described as actual timelessness and lacking continuity.

Let us consider in more detail whether there are parallels with the Christian doctrine of the “heart.” In the Bible and Holy Tradition, the heart is the innermost depth of the human soul (“the innermost body of the body,” according to Gregory Palamas; “the innermost man,” according to Theophan the Recluse). It can be pure and behold God or, on the contrary, unclean, evil (cf. Lao Tzu’s estranged heart), and then it should be “cleansed” (cf. straightness of the heart in Confucianism), it must be “observed,” “kept” (cf. fasting of the heart in Confucianism) and “educated” – this is the essence of asceticism and *the culture of the heart*. According to the Christian doctrine, “the intellect dwells in the ‘depths of the soul’; it constitutes the innermost aspect of the heart” [The Philokalia 1979, 362]. The “heart” occupies the central position in a human (which is called cardiocentrism, and is sometimes interpreted in an absolutely vulgar and essentially incorrect way as primacy of the emotional over the rational) [Dodonov 1999, 9], “the heart” is holistic, it is deeper than the flat mind (“head”) and prevents the creation of the cult of rationality (in general, the “mind path” to God has limited value) but does not exclude rationality and should also protect one from the evil pursuance of “visions,” “revelations” (of “stomach”), that is, from falling into “charm.” “Because every thought enters the heart in the form of a mental image of some sensible object, the blessed light of the Divinity will illumine the heart only when the heart is completely empty of everything and so free from all form. Indeed, this light reveals itself to the pure intellect in the measure to which the intellect is purged of all concepts” [The Philokalia 1979, 177]. One can find a resemblance between the Taoist idea of spiritual vigilance and the Christian idea of the kingdom of God that is withing us (Luke 17:21).

It is quite obvious that although in Christian and Sino-Taoist cultures there is some similarity in ideas, words (“heart,” “watchfulness,” “integrity,” “experience,” etc.) and techniques, the initial positions and final goals differ radically; “Man’s affinity to all,” including “dirt” and “sin,” the affinity that Lao Tzu speaks about (although he does not use the concept of sin, the distinction between good and bad is indisputable, although these are defined in their contexts) is recognized in Christianity, but only as the condition of a fallen man, which should be not accepted or “absorbed,” but overcome. To transcend one’s present self in order to return to one’s true self is the task of a Taoist sage; and only in this extremely broad sense can one speak of the apparent similarity between the ideas of the Christian deification of man and the Taoist man of the Great Way. But it is essential to say that this “eternal recurrence” in Christianity is the return of a person who has experienced suffering, freedom and death, to God, and this is different in Lao Tzu: “Eternal and all-pervasive use, the return flow of life can be thought of only as a continuous reversion to oneself, which... is nonexistent. It is what happens when nothing happens. This event is can only be heard with inner hearing. The Great Way as a ‘reverse action’ is the limit of all activity, a universal ‘transformation of transformation,’ a steady self-avoidance, a medium of pure affect. This eternal non-recurrence to oneself is the very *beingness* of being, a universal difference, as holistic as the inexhaustible wealth of diversity, that constantly reproduces itself, diverges in an endless series of self-similarity. Such is the nature of ‘that which is in itself,’ which in fact turns out to be an ever-lasting gap, the unitedness of the ever-divided” [Malyavin 2018, 42].

According to Christian eschatology, paradise also presents no *events*, i.e., what is different from the constant flow of life and suddenly happens in a certain place and at a certain time, since in the eschatological perspective paradise is a realm of eternal bliss, where, after the Judgment, the righteous, resurrected in special, imperishable, eternal, spiritual bodies (1 Cor. 15:42 onwards), “walk before God” and where there is no crying or sighing, but only joy; this is eternal being with God, devoid of earthly spatio-temporal characteristics, but there is a true self, which determines the personhood, which is a characteristics of European Christianity and missing in Taoism.

As for the moments of ultimate awakening, which can be experienced by a person and which means depersonalization in the Chinese version, with all the radical differences, the qualities of this kind of awakening can be experienced in Christianity in an outwardly similar way – by

means of experiencing a return to one's true self, but, so to speak, through this self, to the ultimate Meeting with the Heavenly Father because He is "the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (John 1:9). This is the experience of the Kingdom of God, which is within us (Luke 17:21; Matt. 11:12), which is holiness achieved in life (restoration of the image of God and His likeness through acquisition of grace – deification) and which is outside of us, but is promised to us as our future being with the Lord (Rev. 11:15) and can be experienced during life on Earth as if we could "see in a mirror, darkly" (1 Cor. 13:12; 2 Cor. 12: 2). It is also noteworthy that Christ rejects the temptation of earthly power (John 18:36), but the Chinese sage accepts it.

The doctrines of the "heart," which are in some respects similar in Taoism and Christianity, on the one hand, occupy an important place in the Chinese traditional mentality, and, on the other, in the European and Russian traditional mentalities. In particular, this concerns the preaching of austerity, "education" and "purification" of the "heart," "heart culture" (for example, there are parallels between Taoism and Hesychasm). However, for the collective consciousness, the European cult of rationality is absolutely justified, and it is the "correct" cult of Reason, logic and science, against which postmodernity revolted.

The irrelevance of Euro-American centrism for the interpretation of the Chinese "face"

Let us, however, return once again to the discussion of the issue of "face" and Fukuyama's interpretation of identity. The philosopher does not conduct any comparative analysis in his book. Adopting the principle of Lutheran justification of man by the faith of his heart, Fukuyama promotes secularization of this idea, which is paradoxically transformed into its opposite, i.e., into a belief that modern European culture is highly rational and everything illogical and irrational should be rejected, to pay tribute to the progressive era. This has become the basis of all modern Western paradigms of human rights, neglecting the fact that the idea itself has been turned inside out and, therefore, has lost its validity. If man is not the Creator's favorite creature and the crown of creation, what makes us claim dignity and demand that we should be treated with respect, unlike inanimate objects? There is no justification for that.

The main value for the Chinese, as they define it, is harmony between people, when everyone communicates with everyone else and

this communication is ritually regulated. It should be noted that the principle of ritualism is exceedingly important for the Chinese.

Prevailing stereotypes associated with Chinese collectivism have recently been transformed (despite the fact that modernization has always been associated with cultural individualism). According to K.M. Tertitsky, international Sinologists hold two directly opposing views: one states that the Chinese lack individuality and the other suggests that the Chinese are extremely individualistic [Tertitsky 1994, 34]. This fact does not seem to be coincidental. It can be assumed that the European opposition of collectivism/individualism simply does not work to characterize the Chinese mentality: it has arguments to affirm either component of the opposition. There are examples of powerful impacts of collective actions of the Chinese, and there are vivid examples of their utter egocentricity and rivalry. What does it mean? It must be assumed that taking care of one’s self (in its general sense which incorporates not only the person but also one’s family, friends, and acquaintances) is a traditional value for Chinese people. However, the principle of rigid social hierarchy enables the Chinese, when required, to act as a single unified force. This is neither individualism nor collectivism; it is something that cannot be described through the above-mentioned binary opposition. The Chinese mentality cannot be characterized as either individualistic or collectivistic. To describe the Chinese culture, one needs a special denotation, which is definitely missing in European languages. It should also be noted that the principle of sociality does not belittle the importance of individuality nor does it overstate the significance of collectivism.

Therefore, when analyzing Chinese realities, it is essential to remember that the European binary opposition of individualism/collectivism cannot be applied to the Chinese mentality (it is worth noting that there are contemporary researchers who recognize the limitations imposed by the individualism/collectivism dichotomy [Rosemont 2015, 85–86; Omi 2012; Zabel 2015; Zaharna 2016]). The fact is, however, ignored by such a renowned philosopher as F. Fukuyama, who considers, that, since the 19th century, the identity politics has displayed bidirectional development: towards liberal individualism (liberal societies of North America and Europe) and towards collective identity associated with national or religious adherence [Fukuyama 2018, 91]. According to liberals, Chinese society is traditionally characterized as the latter type, being an authoritarian, dictatorship-oriented society, which controls and suppresses one’s individuality [Fukuyama 2018, 49]. However, one

can hardly agree with this characterization because Chinese society has developed a specific set of attitudes towards a human being. This set of attitudes is characterized by synergy of individual and collective principles, the synergy of personal dignity, dignity of a group (be it a family or a clan), and national dignity. It can be assumed that personal democratization in China is moving at a slow pace, which can be accounted for by the traditional vertical hierarchy accepted in Chinese society. However, it is going on, women more frequently enjoy equal rights with men; ethnic minorities (Tibetans and others) enjoy equal political, economic, and cultural rights with the majority of the population. According to Fukuyama, this means democratization of the collective identity. However, in contemporary China a person's individual voice can also be heard. We are speaking about the "outer" social rights and individual activity, whose presence or absence serve as a signal of either developed or undeveloped identity, be it personal or collective. However, Fukuyama believes that only liberal individualistic societies have paradoxically managed to integrate individualistic and collectivistic tendencies [Fukuyama 2018, 122–123, 164]. It is worth mentioning that, despite his Western-oriented apology, the American philosopher highlights the internal inconsistency of the Western concept of identity, which proclaims that inner selves of all people are equal. However, it can hardly be denied that some people's inner selves have inherent honesty and compassion, while others can be completely or partially devoid of these qualities and demonstrate inherent viciousness, cruelty, and disrespect for other people (criminals, for instance). Therefore, there can hardly be any equivalence. This fundamental and inescapable contradiction becomes obvious when we consider the claims that regardless of their natural differences, all people should be entitled to equality. In contradiction to the liberal view, we find it essential to highlight the insolubility associated with the requirements of being tolerant to those who lack tolerance: recent research has shown that radical transformations of society are promoted by intolerant minorities [Taleb 2018, 69–88]. Cultures also differ in how people and groups belonging to those cultures substantiate their right to demand respect: in the modern Western world, people claim that they should be respected for their uniqueness, for the fact of being different from other people and other (dominant) groups ("you must respect me because I am/we are different") [Fukuyama 2018, 107], while in China people believe that they should be respected for being similar, alike to other people and groups ("you must respect me because I am/we

are like you”) [Knabe 2002]. We believe that the value of a criterion is predetermined by its balance of diversity and generality. Excessive diversity and otherness, when everyone seeks to oppose themselves to others, results in a failure to act and live together, brings about violence and social breakdown, while deficient diversity and otherness result in suppressed initiatives and incentives for development and eventually lead to stagnation. According to the American philosopher, only liberal democracies can find the golden mean, which may be justifiable though ungrounded hope.

A significant observation made by Fukuyama is his statement that national identity in China had considerably developed even before the onset of modernization [Fukuyama 2018, 126, 128]. The country survived civil wars and other crises. But as soon as traumatic historical events are over, the country managed to restore its unity (or, probably, the country’s ability to survive and unite itself is the sole reason for its continual resurrection). It is essential that we should remember that national identity can rely both on liberal democracy, which Fukuyama believes to be the leading force of social progress, and on autocracy. It is worth mentioning that, enumerating the functions of national identity, the philosopher highlights the fact that citizens who feel that they are members of one “big family” have greater trust in one another, more readily and fully approve of state programs, and have a better developed sense of ownership. However, everything mentioned above has always been typical of China (cf. the Chinese co-communication principle) and is ardently supported by the present regime, which Fukuyama negatively assesses as an autocracy building a dictatorship. Moreover, despite a great number of ethnic minorities, the ethnic composition of the Chinese population is rather homogeneous (the Han people is the prevalent ethnic group, making up over 90% of the total population), which facilitates social integration and solidarity.

Conclusion

F. Fukuyama analyzes the problem of identity through the collectivism/individualism dichotomy, which does not help to comprehend the diversity of meanings that constitute the concepts of the individuality in various cultures, especially in non-Westernized, like Chinese, nations. Thus, Fukuyama believes that liberal democracy is the ideal form of organization of society because it can best satisfy people’s natural need for identity. Meanwhile, the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century offered various interpretations of the forma-

tion of individual and social awareness of themselves and of the time. The concept of the union of space and time (space-time continuum, chronotope, etc.) has been introduced alongside the concept of a non-linear nature of time and a theoretical possibility of temporal reversibility (I. Prigogine). The concept of multidimensional time has been proposed (J.M.E. McTaggart, J.W. Dunne). The ancient ideas of cyclical (Nietzsche, Spengler, Toynbee, L.N. Gumilyov) and eschatological (“an arrow pointing backwards”) time have once again gained popularity (cf. N.F. Fedorov’s “resurrection of all the fathers” (late 19th century), T. de Chardin, et al.). However, Fukuyama, like many other liberal thinkers, adheres to an anti-pluralistic way of thinking and a hostile attitude to all the alternative forms of society organization.

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