

**ИСТОРИЯ ФИЛОСОФИИ.
СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ ВЗГЛЯД****Методология науки:
стратегия философского осмысления****“The Revolution of Relativity” and Self-Consciousness
in the History of Philosophy of the 20th Century****«Революция относительности» и самосознание
истории философии XX века***

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Оригинальная исследовательская статья

Аннотация

В статье анализируются особенности развития самосознания истории философии XX в. в сравнении с таковым в естественных науках. Предлагается авторский подход, в рамках которого этот этап философской историографии характеризуется как «революция относительности». Движение самосознания отмечает не только гуманитарные, но и естественные науки рубежа XIX–XX вв. Осознание вероятности – фундаментальное достижение неклассической физики, перевернувшее ее мышление. В противоположность ньютоновской схеме, квантовая теория использует категорию вероятности и настаивает на том, что мы можем говорить о некоторых физических явлениях только в вероятностном модусе и что наблюдаемые свойства физических явлений зависят от того, посредством каких средств и процедур мы проводим измерения. Следовательно, всякое взаимодействие «объект-субъект», а тем более «субъект-субъект» вовлекает опыт исследователя, который влияет на получаемые результаты. Та же самая модель интерпретации лежит в основании поворота самосознания в истории философии XX в. Классическая история философии построена на идеализации и дает объективное описание философского процесса. Следуя за дру-

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гими науками, философия XX в. начинает понимать, что историко-философская реальность во многом зависит от историков философии, что она конструируется определенными средствами, что есть историко-философская работа и при разных ее стратегиях, методах и подходах мы получаем разные результаты, которые начинают рассматриваться как дополнительные друг к другу. Время истории философии XX в. – время конкурирующих интерпретаций, а не постепенно прогрессирующих историко-философских систем. Это стимулирует поиски собственного идеала научности. Для философской историографии таковым становится герменевтический идеал структурного анализа текста или архитектурной реконструкции. Историко-философская революция относительности способствует развитию критической историографии, в рамках которой пересматриваются послы ее классической традиции.

Ключевые слова: история философии, философская историография, теория относительности, наблюдатель, историк философии, герменевтика, практика, интерпретация.

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“The Revolution of Relativity” and Self-Consciousness in the History of Philosophy of the 20th Century*

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Original research paper

Summary

This paper discusses the development of self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century compared with the same develop-

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ment in the natural sciences. The author characterizes this stage of philosophical historiography as the “revolution of relativity.” This movement of self-consciousness was apparent in not only the humanities but also the natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Awareness of probability is a fundamental achievement of non-classic physics, which has since reversed its paradigm. In contrast to the Newtonian scheme, quantum theory introduces the category of probability and insists that we can talk about certain physical phenomena only in a probabilistic mode and that the method of observation affects the phenomena observed. Consequently, any “object-subject” and “subject-subject” interaction involves the experience of the researcher, which thereby affects the results. The same model of interpretation lies at the basis of the turn toward self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century. The classical history of philosophy is built on idealization and gives an objective description of the philosophical process. Following the other sciences, the philosophy of the 20th century understood that historical and philosophical reality largely depends on the historians of philosophy; that such reality is constructed by certain means; that there is a certain kind of historical and philosophical work; and that, with different strategies, methods and approaches, we obtain different results that are complementary to each other. The 20th century was a time of competing interpretations rather than gradually progressing historical and philosophical systems. This stimulated the search for own ideal of objectivity. For philosophical historiography, this is the hermeneutic ideal of the structural analysis of text or architectonic reconstruction. The historical-philosophical revolution of relativity promotes the development of critical historiography and revises the foundations of its classical tradition.

Keywords: history of philosophy, philosophical historiography, theory of relativity, observer, historian of philosophy, hermeneutics, practice, interpretation.

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Introduction

The history of philosophy in the last century has changed many images, and every thinker’s doctrine leaves an imprint on its tasks. Hence, there are a number of discussions about the genres of the his-

tory of philosophy and, accordingly, its subject matter. "One of the difficulties that faces the historian of philosophy is that his subject is not at all clearly demarcated for him," writes A. Ayer. "Not only has the prevalent view of its relation to other subjects, and especially to the natural sciences, been liable to frequent changes in the course of time, but at any given period there may be very wide differences in the aims and methods of those who are deemed to be engaged in its pursuit" [Ayer 1982, 1]. "An outstanding feature of 20th-century philosophy, of whatever sort, has been the growth of its self-consciousness," he continues. "Philosophers have been more seriously concerned with the purpose of their activity and the proper method of conducting it" [Ayer 1982, 14]. The history of philosophy is no exception.

Almost half a century ago, Martial Gueroult stated: "The history of philosophy has only recently become a problem for philosophy" [Gueroult 1969, 563]. He called for the formulation of the problems of the 20th century: before that, the history of philosophy, having been growing as a philosophical tradition, was not a mirror for (modern) philosophy itself but was silently resting in the past. Philosophers addressed the history of philosophy as necessary, attracting individual figures but not awakening it whole, as its own unique thought. It was the 20th century that gave us the opportunity to say, as A.F. Zotov did, "The function of the history of philosophy is the self-reflection of philosophy, that is, reconstruction in the philosophical consciousness of the changes that occur with philosophy as a special organism within the culture" [Zotov 2014, 331].

What are the main milestones of historical and philosophical changes, and what new opportunities did they bring to historians of philosophy? Why, in the end, did the last century lead to the fact that it is impossible not to "think differently" in the history of philosophy?

Dependence of the research on the observer: the initial model of self-awareness

The movement towards self-awareness marks not only the humanities but also the natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is by no means a coincidence – it is no accident that the development of self-consciousness in science is recognized as one of the aspects of the scientific revolution of the beginning of the 20th century. In physics, this idea is expressed in the postulation of the dependence of the research on the observer. "...We cannot disregard the fact that natural science is formed by men," says Werner Heisenberg. "Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is a part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning" [Heisenberg 1989, 44].

Defining the differences between classic Newtonian physics and quantum theory and trying to identify the basis of the revolution in physics in the early 20th century, Heisenberg emphasizes the fact that the Newtonian scheme, which gives us an objective picture of the world, is built on idealization. “It may be said that classical physics is just that idealization in which we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves. Its success has led to the general ideal of an objective description of the world” [Heisenberg 1989, 23–24], he explains. In contrast to this scheme, quantum theory introduces the category of probability and insists that we can talk about certain physical phenomena only in a probabilistic mode and that the method of observation affects the phenomena observed.

Awareness of probability, which accompanies the awareness that parameters and observation results depend on an observer, is a fundamental achievement of non-classic physics that has reversed its thinking. At first glance, it is associated with the subjectivation of science, and physics is well aware of this. “After this interaction has taken place, the probability function contains the objective element of tendency and the subjective element of incomplete knowledge, even if it has been a ‘pure case’ before” [Heisenberg 1989, 22], as Heisenberg notes. However, the interpretation here looks different: we must realize that physics deals with physical events in which laws are established, and the fact is that “the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the observation” [Heisenberg 1989, 23]; therefore, in relation to everything else, we can speak only in the category of probability.

The outcome of the worldview of corpuscular theory is well formulated by Bohr: “...the unavoidable interaction between the objects and the measuring instruments sets an absolute limit to the possibility of speaking of a behaviour of atomic objects which is independent of the means of observation. <...> ...No result of an experiment concerning a phenomenon which, in principle, lies outside the range of classical physics can be interpreted as giving information about independent properties of the objects, but is inherently connected with a definite situation in the description of which the measuring instruments interacting with the objects also enter essentially” [Bohr 1958, 25–26].

The formulation of Bohr in another work is even clearer for interpretation in the light of the development of the history of philosophy: “This crucial point... implies the *impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear.* <...> Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as *complementary* in the

sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects" [Bohr 1958, 39–40].

In his speech "The Philosophy of Natural Science and the Culture of Peoples," Bohr emphasizes the fundamental nature of the discoveries of quantum theory for understanding observation in psychology and the essence of a psychological experiment as well as all phenomena whose reception is related to interaction with the investigating subject. Any "object-subject" interaction and, even more, any "subject-subject" interaction involves the experience of the researcher, which influences the results obtained, and in this case, we should realize that the same principle of complementarity operates in non-classical physics [Bohr 1958, 26–27]. Bohr emphasizes that the recognition of the dependence of the research on the observer was a fundamental discovery, showing the limitations of classical physics, and, at the same time, a powerful source of development of physical theory in the 20th century.

"The revolution of relativity" in historico-philosophical practice

Exactly the same model of interpretation lies at the basis of the turn toward self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century. The classical history of philosophy is also built on idealization, and that is why it provides an objective description of the historico-philosophical process. We are talking here about the development over time of philosophical knowledge, about geographical certainty, and about different schools and trends. In this case, we construct an idealized objective scheme post factum, or after the fact. Following the other sciences, the history of the philosophy of the 20th century begins to speak not so much that we should talk about a researcher-man, that he has certain stereotypes, motives and tasks dictated by time, however true these characteristics might be. The history of philosophy begins to understand that the historico-philosophical reality largely depends on the historians of philosophy – that it is constructed by certain means, that there is a certain kind of historico-philosophical work, and that with different strategies, methods and approaches, we obtain different results that are increasingly regarded as complementary to each other. The 20th century was a time of competing interpretations rather than of gradually progressing historical and philosophical systems.

A classic example of such an understanding can be found in the preface to F. Copleston's multi-volume *A History of Philosophy*, where the eminent author emphasizes: "To mention a 'point of view' at all, when treating of the history of philosophy, may occasion a certain lifting of the eyebrows; but no true historian can write without some point of view, some standpoint, if for no other reason than that he must have a principle of selection, guiding his intelligent choice and arrangement of facts. <...> ...if he attempts to write history without any principle

of selection, the result will be a mere chronicle and no real history, a mere concatenation of events or opinions without understanding or *motif*: <...> ...in the case of an historian of philosophy, the historian's own personal philosophical outlook is bound to influence his selection and presentation of facts or, at least, the emphasis that he lays on certain facts or aspects" [Copleston 2003].

Despite the appeal to the personal aspects of historico-philosophical work, it should be recognized that the concomitant subjectivization of the history of philosophy does not occur. The pole does not change from the objective to the subjective, no changes are taking place here, but the view is transformed, which now allows us to see the starting point of the history of philosophy: the historian of philosophy himself, his practice, and his situation. Thanks to this, questions that were not raised before are possible now, and it has become possible to make progress not in schemes (what exactly was common in the 19th and early 20th centuries) but in research approaches.

In the history of philosophy, the "probability revolution" occurred somewhat later than the physical revolution and progressed much more slowly. The first blow to the classic Hegelian scheme of the history of philosophy can be called the so-called methodological disputes: discussions that seized sociologists, psychologists, historians, and cultural researchers. For the history of philosophy, which is closely related to all these areas (especially, of course, with history and philology), the dispute about the objectivity of methods and judgements was extremely important. In the background of these disputes, the foundations of the hermeneutic history of philosophy were laid.

The history of philosophy, history, and philology are influenced by hermeneutic disputes and the realization that any study of the historical and cultural heritage of mankind necessarily contains a mixture of research views. The platform of the hermeneutic tradition is the study of the spirit by referring to its objectification in the work and to its subjectification in psychic life, referring to the past stages of its development in the present.

Thus, with the accentuation of the figure of the historian of philosophy as an active force, the question of the specific objectivity of historico-philosophical research is posed. This question is posed by Paul Ricœur in a development of the promises of the hermeneutical tradition. He convincingly shows that a philosopher can be likened to a scientist-researcher whose task is to reflect the objective state of affairs: the philosopher emits the reflection of modernity. In Ricœur's eyes, there are no problems with the tasks of philosophy as such and philosophy's status with respect to science, though it is quite another matter with the history of philosophy. The historian of philosophy does not reflect reality; his creative work is aimed at recreating the

structure of the previous philosophical experience and the work that is its bearer. The objectivity of research here is in the objectivity of structure, but the structure of the historian of philosophy does not always exactly match the structure of thought of the philosopher of the past. The impurity of subjectivity is its necessary element. "...I will answer generally that philosophy (or, as is awkwardly said, general philosophy) and the history of philosophy are two distinct philosophical activities," says Ricœur, "I used a term devised by Gueroult in speaking of the 'architectonic reconstitution' of a work. But I believe that all other historians – even if they speak in a more Bergsonian sense of philosophical intuition – admit that it is impossible to duplicate a work. The most one can do is grasp it anew from a constellation of themes which have been produced by intuition and especially from a network of articulations which in a sense constitute its substructure and underlying framework" [Ricœur 1974, 162].

This dilemma of the hermeneutic tradition is well reflected in the dispute between H.-G. Gadamer and E. Betti. The former tells us that in the hermeneutic tradition, the researcher more or less accurately recreates the author's spiritual world; the latter tells us that the author always appears before the researcher as another man. A consequence of the difference in interpretations is the difference in understanding the objectivity of hermeneutic research and the technique of work. For Gadamer, the objectivity of historico-philosophical and historical reconstruction is associated with the reconstruction of such a structure of the work and historical event, as the past in it is always modernized [Gadamer 2004]. Betti, as much as possible, strives to preserve classic historical objectivity, although he recognizes that for humanitarian sciences, objectivity has a specific meaning: the picture of past is conditioned by the historian's perspective. He insists that hermeneutics should move from subjectivation to objectification and to an appraisal interpretation of always alien and fundamentally unassailable creative power. Hermeneutics is a dialogue, not a monologue: the interpreter must comprehend another's opinion precisely as another's [Betti 1980].

The hermeneutic tradition begins to speak not only of the practice of objective research but also of the personal practice of a historian of philosophy and a philosopher. "As we can see, it is not only the role of hermeneutics in the sciences that is in question here but also mankind's understanding of itself in the modern age of science. <...> Philosophically regarded, what emerges from the background of the great tradition of practical (and political) philosophy reaching from Aristotle to the turn of the 19th century is that practice represents an independent contribution to knowledge. Here the concrete particular proves to be not only a starting point but also a continuing determination of the content of the universal" [Gadamer 2004, 560], Gadamer insists.

The hermeneutic tradition's completion is the practical turning point of the history of philosophy in the works of existentially oriented thinkers. Thus, Karl Jaspers emphasizes that personally colored communication with the philosophers of the past plays a leading role in the history of philosophy and insists that it is only possible to rise to philosophical truth by appealing to the individual and his own spiritual historico-philosophical practice [Vlasova 2018]. Martin Heidegger, on the basis of the existence of historico-philosophical practice, distinguishes the dead historiography and the living history of philosophy. The former is only an objective reconstruction, which alone is in no way capable of approaching the thought of the past. The latter deals with the experience of co-thinking, with the fact of philosophizing through historico-philosophical material [Heidegger 2015, 26].

If German history and the history of philosophy seek to free themselves from the contradiction of “psychologism–universalism,” torn between the reality of individual understanding and the essential discretion of the universal, then the French history of philosophy and its methodological research of this problem acquires a “historically oriented” tinge. What happens in the historical and philosophical science of that time and place can be characterized as a change in position from the standpoint of objectivism to “radical idealism.” This term is used in dianoematics by Martial Gueroult, who refers to them as the approach that allows us to approach the development of philosophy not from the side of doctrines but from the part of philosophers and that will simultaneously allow us to comprehend both the variability of philosophical ideas and the eternity of the philosophical truth conveyed in them. Russian scholar I.I. Blauberger describes his position, “one must... proceed from the concrete fact – the existence of the history of philosophy, and then, in Kant’s spirit, proceed to the identification of the conditions for its possibility” [Blauberger 2008, 75].

The founder of the philosophy of the history of philosophy of the 20th century is Émile Bréhier, who emphasizes in every way the fact that “the philosopher looks at the world of spiritual values of his time, asserting, criticizing or transforming them. Where there is no effort to hierarchize values, there is no philosophy” [Bréhier 1938, 11]. Therefore, philosophy in different epochs can take the form of science or art and politics or moralizing and different views can take philosophy’s subsequent study: psychology or history, the history of science or art history. However, in the understanding of Bréhier, the expression “history of philosophy” does not reflect a simple sum of terms: the history of philosophy is neither history nor philosophy. Historians deal with the past, which does not return, but the past of philosophy has a special power: philosophy not only returns but also transforms the present.

The question of “what does a historian of philosophy do?” is of interest to É. Bréhier and L. Brown, M. Gueroult and F. Alquié. It is around

this issue that controversy unfolds regarding the approach to Descartes' philosophy. Everyone answers this question in different ways: Bréhier talks about the continuation of the movement and, in the Bergsonian spirit, interprets the development of the intuition of the philosopher [Bréhier 2012]. Gueroult tends to follow Descartes, pointing to the logical, oriented to the validity of judgments, unfolding of thought [Krotov 2018].

The problem of the accuracy of reconstruction becomes central to the historical and philosophical discussions of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, which are focused on the question of the degree of permissible constructive interpretation by the historian of philosophy. The problem of whether the historian of philosophy is an independent or constructive thinker, as perfectly posed by Richard Rorty, moves the discussion of the status of the history of philosophy to among a number of other disciplines.

Rorty begins from the historical-philosophical process to the activity of the historian of philosophy, and his approach determines the specificity of historico-philosophical reconstruction. He prefers to treat the history of philosophy not as something frozen and buried in the ages, but as an activity of transforming the thought of the past. Rorty is convinced that without this transformation, the history of philosophy is impossible: in one way or another, it is present in all its genres, because for him it is primarily an interpretive reconstruction. "They have argued," writes Rorty at the very beginning of the article, "that unless one does this one might as well turn over the history of philosophy to historians – whom the picture as mere doxographers, rather than seekers after philosophical truth" [Rorty 1984, 49].

In his address to the philosopher of the past, the historian of philosophy simply cannot purify his consciousness enough to see only the departed and penetrate into someone else's thought. His consciousness always carries a mixture of the contemporary socio-historical situation, and, even more, is driven by the constructive task to which he addresses a particular thought. According to Rorty, the historian of philosophy works, for the most part, not in the past, but in the present: he is in his epoch and free of the past, he must interpret it in an original way. This is how historical and philosophical knowledge functions: through constructive reinterpretation of the past. Russian researcher I. Dzhokhadze evaluates this position as follows: "In fact, here we are dealing not with the *re*-construction (historical or rational) but with the *de*-construction of philosophical thought. This is a history of philosophy that does not leave one stone upon another stone from its title subject, completely emasculating and depreciating (eventually writing off into a literary archive) the very philosophy 'whose history it calls itself'" [Dzhokhadze 2012, 19–20].

Conclusion

It is noteworthy that the historico-philosophical revolution of relativity contributes to the development of critical historiography that revises, rather than develops, the principles of classic tradition. If classic philosophical historiography (of the 18th and 19th centuries) is built on the desire for objectivity, which is shared by all sciences, the 20th century brings the understanding that it cannot be limited by one objectivity. The natural sciences themselves pass the stage of awareness of relativity, and in addition, philosophy understands that it cannot compete with them in objective cognition, and this stimulates philosophy's search for its own ideal of scientific character. For philosophical historiography, this becomes the hermeneutic ideal of the structural analysis of the text, or, as Ricœur describes it, an architectonic reconstruction. In philosophical historiography the desire for objectivity adjoins to the awareness of the dependence of the research on the historian of philosophy and the recognition of the author's character on practice. The self-consciousness of the history of philosophy, expressed as philosophical historiography, follows the path common for all sciences.

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