The Concept of the First-Person Perspective in Epistemological Rupture of Objective and Subjective
Abstract
The article addresses to main subject of current debates in philosophy of mind and neuroscience that is simultaneously one of the aspects of mind-body problem in general. It is devoted to the problem of evaluating significance of first person perspective for the mind research. The problem is treated on the basis of analysis of philosophical conceptions of D. Dennett and T. Metzinger. First person perspective is treated as one of the qualitative phenomena of consciousness that can’t be adequately depicted with the help of objectivist language of natural sciences.
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Review
For citations:
Chirva D. The Concept of the First-Person Perspective in Epistemological Rupture of Objective and Subjective. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences. 2013;(10):63-70. (In Russ.)
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