Rational Choice under the Risk Conditions: Methodological and Value-based Grounds

The paper presents the author’s methodological position that the risk is al- ways connected with the person and the decisions which this person makes. Risk is an integral indicator combining assessments of both the probabili- ties of implementing a solution and the quantitative characteristics of its consequences. Integration of these assessments is carried out by the person that choses the alternatives that most fully correspond to the person’s goals, other assessments and value system. The paper considers the famous results made by A. Tversky and D. Kahneman that show how the objective limitations of human cognitive capabilities, random access memory, speed of perception and processing of information, etc., influence, and often determine human behavior, and how they became the basis for errors, contradictions, illogicalities in decision-making processes. The rational conclusion that can be drawn from the study of real decision-making practices under the risk conditions is that it is necessary to take into account the irrationality of a person when analyzing these processes. Each individual has his own set of values and reacts to the situation of risk in accordance with his preferences, so the real behavior of a person in such conditions is often far from the “ideal” one. We think that the decision-making under the risk conditions should be a conscious choice based on rational grounds. At the same time, normative models of decision-making serve as guidelines and methodologi- cal basis for actions for a person facing a difficult choice problem.

рациональный выбор, общество риска, принятие решений, вероятность, модель, полезность, ценность, неопределенность, rational choice, risk society, decision-making, probability, model, utility, value, uncertainty

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