On the Reflective Truth and Valuative Truth

The author analyzes the differences between the two types of orientation activity of human mind. The purpose of orientation activity is the comprehension (cognition or awareness) of the present being that already exists in our world and doesn’t depend on a man. An alternative to orientation activity is the project activity of mind, the task of which is to construct what is not yet present in the world, but what should be in it for human life to be possible and comfortable. The author considers an important difference between a) the reflective orientation that cognizes the world in its own logic of existence, which is given to the subject of cognition forcibly and does not depend on its value preferences, and b) the valuative orientation that evaluates the world, correlating it with the needs and interests of people. The author believes that reflective orientation speaks in the language of the judgments of reflective truth, which are subject to verification that allows to distinguish objective truth from ignorance and misconceptions. The judgements of value can be universally significant and even mandatory, when the norms are embodied in legal and other acts as a prescribed way of thinking, feeling, andpracticalbehavior. However, neither the intersubjectivity of the judgments of value nor their obligatory nature are identical to their truthfulness. An opinion does not become true, even if it is the opinion of the majority, the illegal and punishable is not logically false, if it is made with the proper measure of awareness and understanding. Considering the dialectics of the co-existence of the “true” and “value” spheres of human life activity, the author defends the objective truth (but opposes its absolutizing, transformation into a substance of human spirit) and calls for a “civilized” (constructive, rather than pejorative) attitude to the judgments of truth. Only in this case, despite the variability of human ideas and the inability of man to know everything, we can defend the ability of our mind to reveal not an absolute and phenomenological but still objective truth.

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