On the Attributes of Consciousness
https://doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-5-80-96
Abstract
One of the main fields of consciousness studies is the search for the function of consciousness. The article deals with the hypothesis of the function of imagination as an attribute of consciousness. In the regard of the issues of the attributes of consciousness, the author analyzes the phenomenon of aphantasia, that is, lack of imagination. Despite the lack of formalized ideas about the function of consciousness and despite the scientific trend of the narrowing research areas where subjective experience is necessary for a normal behavior of brain, there is a tendency to expand the presence of consciousness in the world in the modern Western philosophy of consciousness. The result of this “emancipation of consciousness” is the idea of the theoretical essential closeness of a human being and other agents: animals, artificial intelligence, plants. A consequence of the “emancipation of consciousness” is the emergence of modern versions of panpsychism, which propose expanding the space of consciousness to the world as a whole. However, studies in the field of conscious cognitive processes show that the processes that need the participation of consciousness, according to the standard intuitions, in some cases successfully performed without it. For example, the phenomenon of aphantasia shows that the tasks of imagination are performed in the absence of the ability to imagine. Therefore, it is important to take also into account the theoretical possibility of the lack of the realization of the function of consciousness. This makes it possible to ask a question about the presence of consciousness in the space that is traditionally endowed with consciousness, according to the dominant views in philosophy. Therefore, by approaching the question of the attributes of consciousness, the author demonstrates the limitations of the program for the emancipation of consciousness and offers an alternative solution to the question of the scale of the presence of consciousness in the world.
About the Author
Sergei S. Merzlyakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow
Russian Federation
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Research Fellow at the Laboratory of the Philosophy of Economics
Russian Federation
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Research Fellow at the Laboratory of the Philosophy of Economics
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Review
For citations:
Merzlyakov S.S. On the Attributes of Consciousness. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences. 2019;62(5):80-96. https://doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-5-80-96
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