Key Aspects of Analytical and Transcendental Phenomenology within the Framework of Modern Philosophy of Consciousness

The article discusses the peculiarities and specific features of phenomenological approach developed in contemporary analytical philosophy. Despite the fact that the trust in phenomenological approaches continue to grow in analytical philosophy, it is necessary to recognize the presence of noticeable divergence between the classical transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl and contemporary versions of phenomenology in analytical philosophy. The article examines some of these divergences. It is shown that, unlike the skepticism of transcendental phenomenology in relation to scientific methodology in the research of consciousness, the analytical tradition of phenomenology is oriented toward cooperative dialogue with science. Phenomenology in analytical philosophy places great hopes on the possibility of making consciousness a subject of joint research of neuroscientists and phenomenologists. The article claims that in the course of realization of this task, phenomenology in analytical tradition often starts to be interpreted from realistic and partly from naturalistic positions, and that does not meet the project of transcendental phenomenology. As an illustration of this idea, certain approaches of analytical phenomenology are considered, in particular: phenomena are interpreted from the point of view of logical and linguistic analysis, intentionality is connected with the activity of the brain and is located in the natural world, phenomenal consciousness is interpreted as the awareness of a high order, and the phenomena have a gradual nature and are often identified only with sensual experience, which implies a correlative correspondence of the substrate data of brain physiology. In that regard, there are reasons to interpret phenomenological theories that are funded by analytical tradition as an example of a specific phenomenology of non-transcendental origin.

1. Baker L.R. (1998) The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 327–348.

2. Baker L.R. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3. Bayne T. & Montague M. (Eds.) (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4. Bickle J. & Ellis R. (2005) Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation. In: Smith D.W. & Thomasson A.L. (Eds.) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5. Brentano F. (2005) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge.

6. Chalmers D.J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: Toward a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

7. Chalmers D. (2015) How Do You Explain Consciousness? In: TED. Retrieved from https://tedandtalks.map4b.com/2014/07/how-do-you-explainconsciousness-david-chalmers/

8. Dreyfus H. & Hull H. (1982) Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

9. Frege G. (2008) Logico-Philosophical Works. Novosibirsk: Siberia University Pub. (Russian translation).

10. Gallagher S. & Zahavi D. (2007) The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. London: Routledge.

11. Gasparyan D. (2012) Absolute Imperatives of Rationality in Transcendental Pragmatics and Communication Theory. Middle East Journal of Scientific Research. Vol. 12, no. 9, pp. a1210–1215.

12. Gurwitsch A. (1964) The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

13. Horgan T. (2011) From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. In: Bayne T. & Montague M. (Eds.) Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14. Horgan T. & Tienson J.L. (2002) The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In: Chalmers D. (Ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

15. Husserl E. (1994) Logical Investigations. In: Husserl E. Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. Novocherkassk: Saguna (Russian translation).

16. Husserl E. (2004) Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Saint Petersburg: Vladimir Dal’ (Russian translation).

17. Husserl E. (2009) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. Moscow: Academic Project (Russian translation).

18. Kelly S.D. (2005) Temporal Awareness. In: Smith D.W. & Thomasson A.L. (Eds.) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

19. Kim J. (1998) Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kriegel U. & Williford K. (2006) Self-Representational Approaches to

20. Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

21. Ladov V.A. (2001) Interrelation of Subjects and Methods of Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology. Tomsk State Pedagogical University Bulletin. 2001. No. 3, pp. 7–28 (in Russian).

22. Mensh D. (2010) The Question of Phenomenology Naturalization. Annual Review of Phenomenological Philosophy 2009–2010. Moscow: RSUH (in Russian).

23. Metzinger T. (2003) Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 353–393.

24. Mohanty J.N. (1989) Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

25. Petitot J., Varela F. J., Pachoud B. & Roy J.-M. (1999) Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

26. Rosenthal D. М. (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 329–359.

27. Searle J.R. & Willis S. (1983) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

28. Seebohm T.M., Føllesdal D. & Mohanty J.N. (2012) Phenomenology and the formal sciences. Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media.

29. Serkova V.A. (2015) Logic of Obvious in Philosophy. Logiko-filosofskie shtudii = Logico-Philosophical Studies. Vol 4, pp. 259–278 (In Russian).

30. Siewert C. (2005) Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality. In: Smith D.W. & Thomasson A.L. (Eds.) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

31. Sokolowski R. (2000) Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

32. Smith D.W. (2004) Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

33. Smith D.W. & McIntyre R. (1982) Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

34. Smith D.W. & Thomasson A. (Eds.) (2005) Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

35. Varela F. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies. Vol. 3, no 4, pp. 330–349.

36. Varela F.J., Thompson E., & Rosch E. (2001) The Embodied Mind. Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press.

37. Zahavi D. (2012) The Oxford Handbook on Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.