Max Weber on the Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge

Abstract

The author examines the key provisions of M. Weber’s methodology, which include the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge, the principle of “freedom from value judgement,” and the principle of “intellectual honesty.” The author connects objectivity of scientific knowledge with the fundamental difference between the two basic functions of human consciousness: orienting and projecting. The former consists in the comprehension of being, the cognition and understanding of what already exists in the world or should appear in it independently of human consciousness; the latter represents the next stage: the construction of a reality that does not yet exist, based on certain value attitudes and the desired image of the future. Equally important is the distinction between reflective and evaluative forms of a person’s orientation in the world. The former is based on “pure” cognitive activity aimed at exploring reality in its logic, which is independent of the intentional attitudes of a researcher and his value preferences. Reflective orientation uses the language of true judgments that can be verified in accordance with scientific methodology, and understanding the truth as objectivity, given to us phenomenologically and not subject to further interpretation, i.e., as correspondence between knowledge and reality. Valuative orientation remains outside the framework of cognition of the world “as it is,” but it is still an activity for value awareness – first of all, in the form of correlating objective reality with human needs and interests; it judges in the categories of good and bad, justice and injustice, and thus forms people’s expectations. Within the framework of the value orientation, value judgments are also formed that do not lend themselves to verification or refutation but simply perform the function of generating opinions about the world that may become generally valid, although they cannot be defined as objectively true or objectively false. The author concludes that the requirement for objectivity of scientific knowledge also implies freedom of science from value judgments but not from assessments in general, for there can be objective assessments when the significance of functional institutions that have their own purpose is evaluated.