Preview

Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences

Advanced search

Subjective Experience, Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Sense Modeling

Abstract

This article explores the symbol of grounding problem in the framework of artificial intelligence, the AI. The author explicitly demonstrates that values are one of the most pronounced parameters of differentiation the subjective perspective from the objective. The research applies a problem of computer formalization of the meaning. As a result the article shows that explanatory opportunities of science are far from the opportunities that supposed to be used for study the mental facts. It is assumed that this is not due to flawless of the method, but because of the peculiarity of the «subject». In this case, subjective experience is presumably significantly associated with nature of values. In this sense, the use of the reducing strategies as the scientific method does not allow to approach the first-person experience and consciousness, but only their mental correlates. To demonstrate this idea the author involve the notion of values to show a significant role of subjective affectation, as grounds for stopping the infinite regress of meanings that occurs when a purely linguistic procedure is applied.

About the Author

Diana Gasparyan
National Research University 'Higher School of Economics'
Russian Federation


References

1. Harnad S. The symbol grounding problem // Physica. 1994. P 100-Mo.

2. Rapaport W. How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room // Minds and Machines. 2006. 16 (4). P. 381-436.

3. Searle J. Minds, Brains, and Programs // Rosental D. (ed.) The Nature of Mind. - N. Y., 1991. P. 20-24.

4. Soares N. The value learning problem // Technical Report. 2015. VoI. 4, pp. 65-74.


Review

For citations:


Gasparyan D. Subjective Experience, Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Sense Modeling. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences. 2017;(4):98-109. (In Russ.)



Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


ISSN 0235-1188 (Print)
ISSN 2618-8961 (Online)