Contradiction as a Positive Property of the Mind: 90 Years of Gödel’s Argument

The article discusses the V.V. Tselishchev’s original and unique systematic study of the specific and extremely complicated problems of Gödel results regarding the question of artificial intelligence essence. Tselishchev argues that the reflexive property should be considered not only as an advantage of human reasoning, but also as an objective internal limitation that appears in case of adding Gödel sentence to a theory to build a new theory. The article analyzes so-called mentalistic Gödel’s argument for fundamental superiority of human intelligence over machine one and the non-algorithmic nature of natural thinking. The discussion about the Gödel argument is not entirely speculative, but contains new knowledge. An example of such knowledge are the results of R. Smullyan levels of computers “awareness,” which are may be interpreted in a psychophysical sense. The concept of “zero level of intelligence” is proposed for such a reflexive property as “awareness of selfconsciousness.” Reflexive ranks below the awareness of self-consciousness can be considered negative levels of thinking in the sense that the intelligence, being reduced to them, significantly loses its completeness. Even self-consciousness turns out to be a negative level of thinking, since, according to Smullyan, the subject of self-consciousness is unaware of the type of thought to which he belongs. A thought experiment is proposed that allows us to establish the distribution of the properties of Smullyan stability and normality and to answer the question “Does an intuitive belief in the truth of a formal proof affect the truth of a proposition being proved?” According to intuitionism, the most unpleasant epistemic property is instability: beliefs that are not based on deep intuitions have no value. According to the constructivist philosophy of mathematics, instability is a less negative property than abnormality: the fact that high-ranking beliefs cannot be immersed to the very foundations is not significant because violation of truth due to lowering the rank of reflection is not critical.

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