About the Morality and Neurophilosophy: Objections to Patricia Churchland, Frans de Waal and John Searle
Abstract
The article deals with questions of moral origination, it show that conditions for reflection of many altruistic behavior forms in the evolutionary developed brain structures is the repeating behavior that itself does not conditioned exclusively by genetically bases. The author also discusses the position of J. Searle about consciousness. It is shown that Searle in fact does not distinguish between the concepts of consciousness and psyche, and cannot explain why the neural processes associated with consciousness function realization acquire subjective meaning.
References
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Review
For citations:
Razin A. About the Morality and Neurophilosophy: Objections to Patricia Churchland, Frans de Waal and John Searle. Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences. 2015;(11):31-39. (In Russ.)
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