The Discussion on the Principle of Universalizability in Moral Philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s: An Analysis

The article offers a review and analysis of the discussion on the principle of universalizability at its initial stage (1950s and 1960s). The author determines the theoretical roots and key points of the discussion and reveals the directions of controversy and the position of researchers. In particular, the problem field depends on the divergence of the ethical and logical aspects of the principle of universalizability. As a result, two areas of discussion are formed: 1) the search for an ethical interpretation of the principle of universalizability, 2) an analysis of the principle of universalizability in its relation to the ethical idea of the action. The author proposes the semantic models (versions) of the principle of universalizability designed to turn it into a substantive moral principle (within the framework of the first direction). These models are based on ideas: a) impartiality, b) justice, c) equality. The models of harmonization of universal normativity and moral experience, law and action are designed to protect the idea of universalizability from accusations of formalism and dogmatism (within the framework of the second direction). The grounds and vulnerabilities of the proposed semantic models of the principle of universalizability are examined (within the framework of the first direction) and the possibility of harmonizing law and action is analyzed (within the framework of the second direction). The understanding of universalizability in analytic philosophy is metaphysical. Within the limits of the metaphysical understanding of universality, the problem of harmonizing the universal law and the idea of individuality cannot be solved. A possible way of solving the problem is an appeal to such a concept of universality in which the idea of universality can be reconciled with the idea of the individual freedom.

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