The Philosophical Choice of the 1940 Armistice: Civil or Military Responsibility?

The article examines the ethical and socio-political rationales behind France’s decision to sign the armistice with Nazi Germany in June 1940. Subsequent to the defeat, France confronted a binary choice: capitulation or armistice. Capitulation would have entailed responsibility falling on the military; in contrast, in the case of the armistice, it fell on civilian authority. Unlike capitulation, which did not bind civilian governance and remained an exclusively military action, the armistice extended the suspension of hostilities across territories under French sovereignty. In practical terms, capitulation would have allowed France’s legal government to continue the war from other locations, whereas the armistice strictly prohibited such actions. Despite these constraints, France chose the armistice in an attempt to shield its populace from Nazi atrocities. However, this protection ultimately proved illusory. The article contends that the subsequent delegation of full constituent powers to Marshal Pétain deepened societal divisions between collaborationists and members of the Resistance. Contrary to popular belief, General de Gaulle mythologized the Resistance after the war not merely to glorify it but also to alleviate national tensions and position France among the victors of World War II. Reflecting upon the experience of French history, the article concludes on the political and social consequences of decisions regarding war and peace, contingent upon whether political or military leadership assumes the responsibility.

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