Incommensurability of Theories as Incompatibility of Taxonomic Categories

This article explores the explanation of incommensurable theories as alternative conceptual schemes based on different categorical or taxonomic structures. The concept of incommensurability, which is a cornerstone of the late philosophy of Thomas Kuhn, is elucidated, reflecting his approach to avoid assessing the history of science in terms of the truth and falsity of scientific paradigms. It is shown how Kuhn has combined Frege–Russell’s descriptivist semantics and the causal theory of reference by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke. His version of semantics consists in redefinition of natural kinds in terms of neuropsychology, in substantiating mentalist and internalist perspective on language. Kuhn’s philosophical position is identified as post-Darwinian Kantianism. It is expressed not in a priori nature of knowledge, but in its determination by conceptual schemes and sociocultural relativity. Despite the fact that the incommensurable terms seem to occur in the history of knowledge, incommensurability remains not the clearest and most consistent way of thinking on the history of science. Kuhn repeatedly refined his views on incommensurability, ultimately aligning it more closely with alternative classifications of objects serving as a framework for subsequent theories. Natural kind concepts, like taxonomic units, distribute the perceived objects into hierarchies reflecting structures of external world. On the one hand, kinds differentiate objectively existing objects into groups. On the other hand, kind terms are both mental modules and cultural constructs that are used to organize the experience of language speakers, identify objects, and provide the basis for group beliefs. Kuhn posits that the development of scientific theories constitutes an evolution of conceptual schemes characterized by disparities and incommensurability.

1. Argamakova A.A. (2018) Modeling Scientific Development: Lessons from Thomas Kuhn. In: Mizrahi M. (Ed.) The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? (pp. 45–60). London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.

2. Argamakova A.A. (2022) Scientific Revolutions without Incommensurability. The Digital Scholar: Philosopher’s Lab. Vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 52–74 (in Russian).

3. Bird A. (2015) The Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Synthese. Vol. 195, no. 4, pp. 1397–1426.

4. Carnap R. (1947) Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

5. Dupre J. (1981) Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa. The Philosophical Review. Vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 66–90.

6. Hoyningen-Huene P. (1993) Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

7. Jutronic D. (2019) The Qua Problem and the Proposed Solutions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 19, no. 57, pp. 449–475.

8. Knigin A.N. (2002) Teaching on Categories. Tomsk: Tomsk State University Press (in Russian).

9. Kravets A.S. (2001) Rigid Designator. Proceedings of Voronezh State University. Series 1: Humanities. No. 2, pp. 94–127 (in Russian).

10. Kuhn T. (2000) The Road since Structure. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

11. Makeeva L.B. (1996) The Philosophy of H. Putnam. Moscow: RAS Institute of Philosophy (in Russian).

12. McDonough J.K. (2003) A Rosa Multiflora by Any Other Name: Taxonomic Incommensurability and Scientific Kinds. Synthese. Vol. 136, no. 3, pp. 337–358.

13. Oberheim E. & Hoyningen-Huene P. (2018) The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories. In: Zalta E.N. (Ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/incommensurability

14. Putnam H. (2002) Reason, Truth, and History (T.A. Dmitrieva & M.V. Lebedeva, Trans.). Moscow: Praxis (Russian translation).

15. Stanford P.K. & Kitcher P. (2000) Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 97–127.

16. Subbotin A.L. (2001) Classification. Moscow: RAS Institute of Philosophy (in Russian).

17. Zimmerman D.W. (2017, August 29) Universal. In: Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/universal