The Problem of Quest for the Neurophysiological Foundations of Morality: Neuroethics

Abstract

The article deals with the current state of neuroethics, which can be defined (due to the concept of T. Kuhn) as pre-paradigmatic, characterized by quest for systematic theory and basic principles, criteria for analyzing and interpreting the results of measurement procedures. Among the key questions that this theory should cover, the problem of the neurophysiological foundations of morality especially highlighted. We claim that the search for such grounds lies largely along the continuation of the “discussion” of the Kantian rationalistic tradition of treating morality, and the standpoint of D. Hume, which stresses the emotional bases of moral actions. In the very focus of the article is the state of the second level theories (metaethics) in neuroethics: the idea of the emotionally-intuitive foundations of moral judgments, and criticism of J. Green’s deontological theory of honesty and dishonesty, and M. Hauser and J. Mikhail’s “Universal Moral Grammar”. Particular emphasis placed upon comprehension the nature of moral judgments and the influence of feelings of disgust on moral decisions. It speaks for the fact that there is a close interaction between emotional-sensory and rational in moral judgments. The results of neuroethical studies pondered over through the prism of Kantian motifs associated with the dilemma of psychologism and antipsychologism. An attempt made to analyze the idea of a priori under the angle of current experimental data related to the neurophysiological foundations of morality.