Mental Causation as Informational Causation in D.I. Dubrovsky’s Theory of Consciousness

The article analyzes David Dubrovsky’s approach to informational causation in comparison with research on mental causation in the analytic philosophy of mind. Central to this analysis is the question of whether consciousness and mental properties can serve as causes of physical events. Building on Dubrovsky’s premise that his conceptual framework is commensurable with the terminology of analytic philosophy, the paper discusses three core principles underlying contemporary debates on mental causation: the causal completeness of the physical, the no-overdetermination principle, and supervenience. Dubrovsky positions his theory as a form of non-reductive materialism and explicitly critiques reductionist accounts. However, the present author asserts that Dubrovsky’s core thesis – that information must necessarily be instantiated in neurodynamic processes – is structurally equivalent to the principle of the causal closure of the physical. Furthermore, within this context, the terms “materialism” and “physicalism” should be treated as interchangeable, as should “the principle of the causal completeness of the physical” and Dubrovsky’s “principle of the material unity of the world.” Embracing the causal completeness of the physical naturally preserves the ban on overdetermination, leading to the conclusion that mental states lack independent causal efficacy over physical processes. Consciousness can influence behavior only by virtue of its embodiment in the physical, and this embodiment of consciousness in brain processes constitutes a core tenet of Dubrovsky’s theory. The article argues that the mind–brain relationship explored by Dubrovsky effectively corresponds to the logical supervenience of the mental upon the physical, thereby allowing for a reductive explanation of both informational causation and consciousness as a whole. The author concludes that Dubrovsky’s framework most closely aligns with a reductive variant of physicalism – specifically, mind–brain identity theory.

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