The Problem of Justification of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: Is Transcendence of the Conscious Experience Possible?
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the so called “one-level account of consciousness” based on the idea of pre-reflective self-consciousness. The account shared by the most phenomenologists (F. Brentano, E. Husserl, J.-P. Sartre, D. Zahavi) is compared with the “Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness” (the HOT theory), which in turn is aimed to elucidate the structure of conscious mental states. In light of the analysis, the author attempts to relieve the difficulties of the both lines of thought by taking into consideration the pre-consciousness self-cognition as the necessary condition of possibility of consciousness.
About the Author
Tatiana Ryabushkina
National Research University 'Higher School of Economics'
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Ryabushkina T. The Problem of Justification of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: Is Transcendence of the Conscious Experience Possible? Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences. 2015;(6):72-86. (In Russ.)
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