Epistemological Analysis of Theoretical Discussion

The article analyzes the epistemological mechanism of discussion concerning descriptive theoretical knowledge and formulates rules for conducting such discussion that enable the proponent and opponent to understand each other and acknowledge each other’s arguments. It is demonstrated that before the discussion begins, during the research stage, the proponent formulates a theoretical problem, finds its solution, and substantiates it. The purpose of the discussion is merely to test the results of this three-stage work, to determine whether the descriptive theoretical knowledge constituting the content of the proponent’s thesis actually corresponds to its subject matter. Since both the proponent and the opponent are interested in correctly resolving this task, theoretical discussion can be represented as a joint search for a solution to a common problem. The article distinguishes three stages of theoretical discussion. At the first stage, the proponent’s thesis is tested for internal consistency; at the second stage, in case of success, it is tested for correspondence with those theoretical knowledge claims whose truth has already been recognized by the scientific community; at the third stage, the main examination begins, namely the testing of the theoretical thesis for correspondence with indisputable empirical facts. At each stage, the discussion participants face fundamental philosophical questions, the answers to which determine their understanding of the structure of the discussion, its principles, and its outcomes. Does a world exist beyond the boundaries of their consciousness? Is it knowable? Are its statistical laws secondary in relation to dynamical ones? Does theoretical knowledge arise independently of empirical knowledge or in the process of its historical self-development? The article offers participants in theoretical discussions answers to these questions based on the principles of realism, consistent determinism, aposteriority, and the classical theory of truth. The possibility of constructing theoretical discussion on alternative methodological principles is acknowledged but not analyzed in the article. The research concludes with the formulation of universal rules for conducting scientific dialogue – from the presumption of good faith of the parties to the principle of observability – adherence to which enables the transformation of a clash of opinions into a procedure for testing and developing scientific knowledge.

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