The article examines two worldview strategies of the evolutionary-projective philosophy of Russian Cosmism: the strategy associated with elimination of human corporeality, which has found adherents in current transhumanism, and the strategy proposed by humanistic worldview paradigm that directs humanity to the implementation of a deontological noospheric project of coevolution of planetary nature and society as a necessary condition for progress of our socio-natural universe. The focus is on analysis of the worldview insights of Russian Cosmists. In particular, the article addresses Vladimir Vernadsky’s worldview concepts regarding the changing role of man in nature and society. This is caused by changes in material resources, methods and degree of man’s transformation of the world as a result of the use of the microworld’s objects and processes as tools of labor (which are now called nanotechnologies). Among V.I. Vernadsky’s major insights that have been successfully verified in social practice, the article considers such worldview conceptions as orientation toward peaceful use of nuclear energy and the inevitability of replacing organic energy sources with inorganic ones; the need to maintain invariability of the biogenic constants of the planetary ecosystem (biosphere); human autotrophy – providing mankind with abiogenic food and other technogenic resources instead of substances and resources of biogenic origin; formation of a specific hu man person as a factor in the evolution of a planetary socio-natural whole. Taken together, all of these are due to the change in the place and role of modern man in nature and society, and these are also reflected in the formation of an ideological paradigm that is adequate to new trends in the practical evolution of the planetary socio-natural whole.

The article analyzes the socio-cultural risks of the modernization of Belarusian society as well as the opportunities to minimize these through communication mechanisms of cultural tradition. Since in the postmodern conditions social transformation takes the form of a “reflexive” modernization, its inherent risks should be considered as closely linked with globalization of culture, in particular, with glocalization, pluralization of social identity, hybridization of cultural traditions, fragmentation of the “lifeworld” and of the nation’s historical memory. The author considers various levels of the structure of cultural tradition, paying special attention to the national mentality as its basic layer. The goal of this paper is to show how the specific features of Belarusian mentality become sources of risk and to reveal the role of cultural traditions in preventing or reducing such risks. Analyzing different strategies for constructing the national identity, the author defines the vulnerabilities involved. It argues that the formation of modern forms of national identity in Belarusian society is due to interaction of at least two identification models: the “strong” and “weak” ones. By analyzing the specifics of the “strong” national identity of Belarusians, the author notes that its poles – the nationalist and the patriotic ones – are largely compatible and do not respond to the most urgent challenges. On the contrary, the model of a “weak” identity has a high capacity to adapt to the conditions of “reflexive” modernization. This model is implemented in the process of constructing a pluralistic civic identity of Belarusians, but it has potential risks, especially in conditions of geopolitical turbulence and external pressure on Belarusian society. A reflexive attitude to the past is considered a possibility to minimize such risks, to avoid or to limit potential adverse impacts of social mobilization or national identity construction. It is emphasized that discussions about the past should be carried out in the form of a dialogue that meets the rules and requirements of communicative rationality.

The article exposes diverse historical-philosophical meanings of the concepts of praxis and practice. Using the works of Aristotle, I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, H. Lotze, and H. Arendt, the author demonstrates the main ways of distinguishing between these two notions. The article clarifies meanings of praxis and prudence in Aristotle’s philosophy. The crucial transformation of the sense of practice in classical German philosophy, its further neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian interpretations are also considered. The author reveals a range of categorical forms of comprehending the practical and traces the basic directions of the development of definitions of praxis and practice, indicating the historical-philosophical contexts of their evolution. The article compares the conceptions of the acting subject developed by I. Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, K. Marx, and H. Lotze. Special attention is given to the explication of H. Lotze’s practical philosophy in building and distributing the conception of active life. Marxist and Lotzean approaches to praxis are compared, and their role in the formation of its current interpretations is revealed. These interpretations are problematized, taking into account the partly reconstructed initial meanings of praxis in Aristotle’s philosophy. The author justifies the relevance of H. Lotze’s legacy in Russian philosophy, examining the categories of social action and active life, the acting subject and society. The article demonstrates prospects for their reconsideration in social philosophy by approaching H. Lotze’s practical philosophy. The conclusion highlights consequences of the replacement of the Aristotelian definition of praxis with the Lotzean version, the possibility and necessity of reproducing the initial sense of praxis as different from practice in diverse historical-philosophical interpretations.

This article uses the key concepts available in Karl Marx’s texts and attempts to answer the question, “What is man?” The author explores such constitutive aspects of man’s generic essence (Gattungswesen des Menschen) and of man’s worldly being as corporeality and relationship with nature; suffering as a product of desire; praxis (Praxis) as productive creative activity (produktive Tätigkeit, Selbstbetätigung) that is carried out in the dialectical processes of objectification (Vergegenständlichung, Äußerung) and de-objectification (Entgegenständlichung, Aneignung); man’s universality; objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) of the man-made human world; intersubjectivity and sociality/sociability (Gesellschaftlichkeit); interplay of social relations (das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse); the existential and emotional relations of man (menschlichen Verhältnisse zur Welt) to the world of nature, to human activity, to the results of one’s labor, to other people, and to oneself. We demonstrate that the generic essence of man is not granted by nature but evolves in the course of historical development. Moreover, in Capital, Marx distinguishes between the invariant essence (Praxis) and historical modifications of praxis. Therefore, history is understood as “continuous change of human nature,” and man himself as a historical being. In spite of later reductionist interpretations, Marx conceptualizes man as a living, uniquely generic (socially individual), integral being, whose essential mode of existence is praxis (social conscious purposeful transforming objectal-instrumental material and spiritual activity). Man is an integral bodily-spiritual being, transforming the natural world (Welt) and creating “worlds” of his own, those of material, social, and spiritual culture (Umwelt), society and its relations (Mitwelt), which are interiorized and form an inner world (Innerlichkeit, Eigenwelt) in the process of practical activity. The article concludes that, following Marx’s philosophical anthropology, man should be considered not only as a “practical being” but also a suffering one, experiencing his worldly existence in the form of partial, existential relations to the world and to himself.

The article examines the life and research activities of Hegumen Andronik (Trubachev). Hegumen Andronik was a member of the Liturgical Committee of the Russian Orthodox Church and served as the abbot of the Valaam Monastery of Savior Transfiguration, participated in the publication of the Priest’s Handbook, Orthodox Encyclopedia, and other projects. Hegumen Andronik authored many liturgical texts and articles dedicated to Russian Saints (Venerable Sergius of Radonezh, Venerable Paphnutius of Borovsk, Venerable Ambrose of Optina, etc.). However, his most significant contribution was made to the study of Russian philosophy. The main work of Hegumen Andronik was analysis and preparation for publication of materials from Pavel Florensky’s archives. The article describes important points in the biography of Hegumen Andronik and the difficulties he overcame in his major activities. Hegumen Andronik did not only “re-discover” Florensky for Russian philosophy and theology but also proposed and substantiated the position according to which the works of the priest can be adequately understood. He substantiated that Florensky’s legacy is a part of the corpus of Christian philosophy, Christian science, and Christian art. In the opinion of Hegumen Andronik, this unique heritage can provide material for the development of theology, but in itself it is not theology. It becomes obvious that Florensky’s works are also of interest in other areas of human knowledge, since methodologically they go back to the ideas of “integral knowledge” and “theurgy,” according to which all areas of knowledge and human activity do not mix or lose their specificity but are synthesized in a common relationship with religion and worship.

The article discusses some works on priest Pavel Florensky’s philosophical and theological legacy of the 1930s–2020s. The author of the article has examined changes in the perception of Florensky and his ideas among Russian émigré philosophers as well as in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. The difference in such assessments is clearly visible in two reviews of 1930 of the priest’s book called The Pillar and Ground of the Truth. The review written by G.V. Florovsky has a critical bias, while that of V.N. Ilyin is very positive. We find a more comprehensive expression of Ilyin’s attitude to Florensky in the article Father Pavel Florensky. The Silenced Great Miracle of Twentieth Century Science (1969). The works published in the Russian emigration are characterized by subjectivity due to lack of sources, as most of Florensky’s works remained unpublished. In Soviet Russia, one of the most famous works about Florensky was S.S. Khoruzhy’s book named Florensky’s World View (1999). In this book, Father Pavel’s worldview was reconstructed from the perspective of “existential” experience. S.M. Polovinkin gave another, “personalistic” interpretation in his book Christian Personalism of Priest Pavel Florensky (2015). Hegumen Andronik (Trubachev) was the first to highlight the significance of anthropodicy and its connection with theodicy in his work Theodicy and Anthropodicy in Priest Pavel Florensky’s Works (1998). He presented Florensky’s worldview as a system of concrete metaphysics, combining theodicy and anthropodicy. Moreover, he refuted the popular misconception of Florensky’s philosophy as “the allunity metaphysics.” Further, Hegumen Andronik wrote a fundamental work on Florensky’s life and works that he named The Way to God (2012–2020). The present article states that Hegumen Andronik’s work trailed the path to objective research, overcoming the inertia of thought that arose from bias and lack of sources.

The article, written in the form of a dialogue/discussion, examines the problem of freedom in the context of its interpretation in religious and philosophical thought. The starting point for considering freedom is the thesis that the concept of freedom, as it is presented in the metaphysical and spiritual traditions, hinders both the philosophical understanding of freedom and its implementation in practice since the status of the concept requires the identification of freedom with the knowledge of freedom. However, the knowledge, as it always implies being universal, excludes the possibility of a different understanding of freedom, which leads to the confusion of freedom and necessity. While criticizing this thesis, Mikhail Sergeev insists that the adoption of a particular system of beliefs, including religious faith, does not necessarily make other people understand freedom the same way, which leads to the elimination of freedom in real life and to the substitution of freedom by necessity on theoretical level: as the history of philosophy and religion shows, there have always been many different concepts of freedom, even within the same school or tradition. From the point of view of Aleksandr Rybas, the variety of interpretations of freedom is such only formally since each of these interpretations is aimed at formulating the only one, “true” concept of freedom, resulting from the chosen point of view and therefore making it necessary to characterize alternative views as false: the very idea of “true” freedom is rooted in the specifics of metaphysical thinking, which should be seen the reason for the rejection of freedom. As a result of the discussion, however, some common views on freedom were developed. In particular, freedom was defined as the inherent ability of man to consciously initiate his own changes and determine the parameters of his own existence. Moreover, it was argued that there could not be the only valid or universal form of human life.