This article aims to examine the place of the use of economic sanctions in the liberal international order, and more specifically, the place of economic sanctions in the defence of the liberal international order against a foreign policy of a state deemed to be ‘deviant’. This article shows that the use of the term “sanction” – which implies the idea of punishment – instead of the realistic notion of coercive measure, manifests the use of a biopolitical vision of international relations – in which the actor who threatens the liberal order is similar to a threat to what it represents, to a disease. Biopolitics refers precisely to this medicalization of thinking as politization of life in international relations. Discourses on sanctions are thus constructed using a medical vocabulary that often departs from the accepted meaning of sanctions. Analysing the discourses through the lens of biopolitics allows us to question the legitimacy of the international order and what contributes to its acceptance. Moreover, such medicalization of sanctions represents one of examples of the realness of Foucault’s concept of neoliberalism as biopolitics, i.e., as the process of fragmentation of political sovereignty.

The article offers a semantic examination of three ways in which modernity has been conceptualized and problematized: first, a broadly Kantian account; second, an epistemological account that treats modernity as a discursive formation of a particular kind; and third, a postmodernist account associated with historicism, the search for historical truth, and the interpretation of modern history as a discursive effect. The article argues that, in this context, modernity comes to function as the narrative effect of a certain kind of discourse – one that seeks neither to elaborate an ontology of thought nor to establish an epistemology of history. From the standpoint of a pantextualist view of reality and of the possibilities of knowing it, such a move appears entirely justified, since, from this perspective, Enlightenment modernity itself was no different from this kind of semi-consciously produced modernity. At the same time, this position still leaves room for a distinctly modern optimism, tied to the claim that reason can exercise control over modernity and project the future. The common-sense objection – that such constructions are merely ideal formations with no referent in reality – must therefore be met by a critique of common sense itself, understood as a discursive moment shaped by the currently accepted forms through which truth is legitimated. The crucial point is to resist the temptation to produce a new metaphysics by revising subject-object relations, the phenomenology of perception, or the hermeneutics of history. Modernity in this sense – modernity as a moment of intellectual production – may be understood as an attempt to revive an image that emerged half a century ago among structuralist thinkers who anticipated a rapid revolution in thought. Once stripped of the excesses of its time, of the rhetoric of political economy, and of an overly critical pathos, this construct nevertheless continues to prove viable.

The article presents the results of a historical-philosophical analysis of P.A. Kropotkin’s reception of F. Nietzsche’s ideas. The empirical foundation of the study draws on both published works and correspondence of the Russian thinker, as well as archival sources preserved in Kropotkin’s personal collection at the State Archive of the Russian Federation. The paper reconstructs the sources of Nietzsche’s conceptions of anarchists and illuminates E. Hartmann’s role in integrating Nietzschean philosophy into leftist discourse. The author traces the evolution of Kropotkin’s views on Nietzscheanism from his first mentions during a lecture tour in the United States (1901) to his culminating work Ethics (1922). Particular attention is devoted to analyzing how Kropotkin disavowed the concept of “will to power” as a metaphysical abstraction, counterposing to it a natural-scientific foundation for mutual aid and solidarity. The article examines the Russian anarchist’s strategy of discrediting Nietzsche by pointing to his dependence on the ideas of J.-M. Guyau, as well as his critique of the Nietzschean philosophical-anthropological model of the “Übermensch.” The study is supplemented by the publication of a previously unknown draft review by Kropotkin of A. Fouillée’s book Nietzsche and Immoralism, accompanied by detailed commentary. This document allows for a detailed reconstruction of the anarchist theorist's critical argumentation and his effort to present Nietzsche as a “secondary” thinker. The author concludes that Kropotkin's attitude toward the German philosopher was profoundly critical for several reasons. First, there was a fundamental misunderstanding and rejection of Nietzscheanism’s individualistic ethos; second, there was apprehension that the popularity of Nietzsche’s ideas in radical circles might deform the ethical foundations of anarchist doctrine. For Kropotkin, the critique of Nietzscheanism represented a principled defense of anarchism's humanistic and social vectors against the influence of radical individualism.

The article introduces the concept of socio-individualism into scholarly discourse by offering an epistemological justification for the author’s model of the “Self – Tri-D/communication – Other” system, here referred to as the Lektorsky–Auzan system. The proposed system brings together Vladislav Lektorsky’s nonclassical epistemology and a socio-individual interpretation of Alexander Auzan’s Tri-D concept, which includes long-term orientation, trust, dialogue, agreement-building capacity, mutual understanding, and related principles. This synthesis is examined as a mechanism of intersubjective cooperation within Victor Polterovich’s theory of social evolution and Ruslan Grinberg’s theory of the social market economy. At the conceptual center of the system is the author’s notion of socio-individualism, understood as a mediating alternative to Sigmund Freud’s ego-individualism and Zbigniew Brzeziński’s egocentrism. At the same time, socio-individualism is presented as a substantive extension of the Enlightenment concept of the individual personality that evolved in European thought between the 17th and 19th centuries. The article develops the socio-individual foundations of the system in several stages. First, it critiques the absolutization of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative and advances a dynamic conception of the human being as the subject of their own development, drawing on Vladimir Bibler and Confucian thought. Second, it elaborates a nonclassical understanding of personality through the capacity of the Self to respond to the call of the Other, with reference to Mikhail Bakhtin and Vladislav Lektorsky. Third, it interprets Lektorsky’s philosophical paradox as a mechanism through which the individual is transformed into the social. Particular attention is given to the communicative and sociological dimensions of the proposed system. Its structure and internal mechanisms are analyzed through Niklas Luhmann’s concept of autopoietic communication, Michel Foucault’s idea of a “network of relations,” and Vladimir Arshinov’s principle of “thinking together-with.” The article concludes by outlining possible directions for the further development of the system, including the theory of communicative law as a sociology of the “sphere between,” the construction of a dual index for measuring social development, and a dialectical approach to the mutual complementarity of unification and diversity.

The concept of interoception has undergone significant development and has been incorporated into a range of research contexts. Contemporary understandings of interoception transcend narrow neurophysiological frameworks – which traditionally focus on signal processing from internal organs – to encompass higher-order cognitive processes, including the awareness, perception, and interpretation of internal bodily activity. This article situates internal bodily sensations within the context of contemporary philosophical debates on introspection. Because internal bodily experiences entail introspectively accessible mental processes, interoception offers a rich subject for philosophical inquiry. Interoceptive activity is defined not merely by physical processes within the boundaries of the body, but is fundamentally tied to subjective phenomenal experience. It is therefore important to examine introspective access to mental events generated by the internal bodily milieu. While introspection provides a unique, first-person vantage point that grants subjects direct awareness of their own mental states, and has traditionally been viewed as the primary mechanism for apprehending internal bodily changes, this paper challenges the presumed infallibility and privileged nature of introspective access to interoceptively driven states. In several contemporary models of introspection, private internal bodily experience is either overlooked or inadequately theorized. Against this backdrop, the article raises skeptical objections to radical representationalism, demonstrating the untenability of fully extrapolating the argument from diaphanousness, or transparency, to the domain of interoception. Unlike other perceptual modalities, interoception is paradoxical: it exhibits robust phenomenal properties yet lacks clearly identifiable representational content. This leads to the conclusion that internal bodily experience is largely opaque to introspective observation. Ultimately, the author argues for a shift toward a pluralistic model of introspection – one that successfully integrates interoception as a core cognitive mechanism shaping an agent’s self-awareness and emotional experience.

The article offers a socio-philosophical review of three international conferences held in Moscow in autumn 2025, each devoted to rethinking the future of humanity, society, and civilization amid the rapid development of information technologies, artificial intelligence, and global transformations. The analysis focuses on the BRICS forum on the future of cities, Cloud Cities; the Frolov Readings, held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences; and the Third Autumn Sretensky Conference – the Kurdyumov Readings, Worldview Foundations of a New World Order. Although these events differed in their participants – ranging from experienced policymakers and administrators to prominent philosophers and leading scientists – as well as in their thematic priorities, they were united by a shared concern with the design of the future and the search for value-based foundations for sustainable development. The article examines three distinct visions of the future. The first is associated with a technologically oriented model of the smart and environmentally responsible city. The second is developed through the philosophy of new humanism, which places at its center the preservation of the human being, human agency, anthropological integrity, and the moral foundations of culture. The third is represented by the synergetic concept of the Great Anthropic Transition, which presupposes a shift from a technocratic logic of civilizational development toward an anthropo- and bio-oriented paradigm. The article concludes that these approaches are complementary, since they all address a common key problem – the preservation of the human being as a subject of development in the face of global technological and civilizational challenges.