Education is the main institution of society that creates the righteousness and thereby the society itself. The contemporary life nullifies the righteousness and puts existence on the verge of dehumanization; excludes the righteousness from education, making it an institution without-righteousness. The righteousness as such is different from morality, ethics, values. It gives an internal basis for a human being to bear the name “man.” The education must redefine itself in order to become an institution of righteousness. To determine approaches to righteousness transformation of education, this work separates the notions of “spiritual” and “righteous,” “person” and “human” from a philosophical viewpoint. The uncertainty of righteousness is presented as a fundamental question facing the modern education. The reasons for growth of righteousness uncertainty are revealed and designated by categories of impenetrability, spuriousness, covertness, diffuseness, and shiftiness. The article considers experiencing of righteousness as an educational tool for overcoming the righteousness uncertainty. Didactic methods of experiencing the righteousness, managing the ethical risks, and a nuanced approach to ethical dilemmas that underlie the art of righteousness are discussed. The role of experiencing of righteousness in gaining the foresight in distinguishing between good and evil, and in shaping the existential center of personality. The righteous duty of education is defined as upbringing the humanity; issues of righteousness measure and overcoming the anthropocentrism of personality are touched upon. It is shown that the redefinition of Russian education in relation to righteousness and humanity should be based on national culture. The author gives examples of a striking difference between Russian and Western cultures in terms of education, a displacement of righteousness from Russian education by Western models incorporated into it. The negative impact of the Unified State Examination on righteousness in Russian education, on its creative function, and on the scientific-technological development of the country is reviewed. The author concludes that cultivating human qualities should be the primary focus of Russian education. 

Hegel’s dialectical method, constituting the foundation of his philosophical system, remains subject to diverse interpretations. It is generally assumed that, while, based on Hegelian philosophy, the understanding (Verstand) fixes contradictions as something independent and final, reason (Vernunft) dialectically sublates these contradictions by revealing their inner interconnection and transition into one another. However, the question remains as to how exactly, according to Hegel, this transition takes place. This article examines the fundamental problem in Hegel’s philosophy, the relationship between understanding and reason, by analysing Hegel’s treatment of the relationship between finitude and infinity. This analysis results in the concept of true infinity and proves to be an application and model interpretation of the sequence of what Hegel calls the moments of the logical domain: (a) “the abstract side or that of the understanding”, (b) “the dialectical or negatively rational side”, and (c) “the speculative or positively rational side”. These moments are the stages in which the insight into what is truly actual must unfold. They define the concept and the specific form of argumentation of Hegel’s philosophy. Insight into what is the truly actual arises from the critique of the way in which the ordinary, pre-philosophical consciousness, or what Hegel calls the understanding, conceives the concepts of the finite and the infinite. The understanding comprehends them, on the one hand, as separate and mutually exclusive spheres and, on the other, in such a way that one must go beyond the sphere of the finite to the infinite as the genuinely true and permanent. Since the infinite is conceived as the limit of the finite, the infinite in turn appears as something finite, beyond which the understanding seeks to go; that to which the understanding goes out is only the infinite again, which, however, is only the limit of the finite, beyond which the understanding again seeks to go out. In this way the understanding is driven out into an infinite progress. Hegel’s analysis reveals the conceptual deficit of the understanding, which consists in the inability to grasp the true connection between the concepts of the finite and the infinite under the guidance of the special concept of a self-referential negation, which defines the logical structure of the concept of true infinity.

The article examines the reception of Kantian ideas within the theoretical framework of an influential contemporary French philosopher. In the current philosophical landscape, references to Kant by various scholars are typically justified by both historical and theoretical considerations. Professor Frédéric Worms, Director of the École Normale Supérieure, while not identifying as a Kantian, endeavors to refine his portrayal of thinkers and epochs through nuanced details, within which Kant’s philosophy occupies a significant position. For instance, Worms illustrates the period of French philosophical history associated with the problem of spirit by referencing, among other sources, the intellectual legacy of Henri Bergson. Worms methodically unfolds the Bergsonian universe, frequently appealing to Kantian ideas: specifically, he elucidates Bergson’s concept of experience by contrasting it with Kantian critique, understood as a restriction to possible experience, and highlights the divergence in the two thinkers’ interpretations of space. When discussing the question of existence in philosophical history, Worms juxtaposes Kant and Sartre. It is not coincidental that the preeminent existentialist titled one of his principal works Critique of Dialectical Reason. According to Worms, Sartre is not parodying his predecessor but rather undertaking, in the spirit of criticism, a project within which it becomes impossible to address objects without analyzing the subject. While Kant rejected the cognizability of the thing-in-itself, Sartre attempted to circumvent historically deterministic laws imposed by necessity, which would otherwise subsume any possibility of freedom. Addressing contemporary trends and debates within philosophical discourse, Worms emphasizes the importance of reinterpreting classical texts, which, under transformed intellectual conditions, can generate unexpected yet productive associations and hypotheses. In this context, Kant’s intellectual legacy functions as a source of creative inspiration and authoritative concepts responsive to contemporary demands, while simultaneously remaining an object of critical reflection.

The article addresses the problem of animal thinking, an issue that remained unresolved within Kant’s philosophy. Reflecting on animal sensibility, Kant posits that animals possess intuitions, representations, and sensations, yet lack understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft). He criticizes the Cartesian conviction of the animal-machine and places animals under the protection of an “indirect duty” in the Metaphysics of Morals. However, in the Anthropology, Kant equates animals with things, thereby approaching Cartesianism, and asserts that animals can be treated arbitrarily. The article attempts to elucidate the rationale behind this transformation in Kant’s position. It is argued that the decision to align animals with things might have helped overcome certain problems arising from the inclusion of non-human agents into Kant’s anthropocentric system. Contemporary Kantian scholarship moves beyond Cartesianism and engages with both pre-critical and critical Kant in the context of current research confirming that animals possess, at a minimum, sensibility. The discussion regarding their cognitive status is situated within the debate on conceptualism and non-conceptualism in Kant. The article posits that, despite Kant’s inclination toward conceptualism concerning humans, he allows for non-conceptualism when discussing animals. Arguments supporting this thesis are drawn from Kant’s original texts, as well as from the models proposed by J. Hutton, L. Allais, and L. Stevenson. Allowing for non-conceptualist types of perception makes it possible to suggest that the foundation of animal sensory intuitions might consist solely of space, without time. Within the framework of Kantian philosophy, such approaches cannot be consistently defended concerning human perception. However, Kant’s theory demonstrates the potential to incorporate novel non-human types of non-conceptual awareness, and developments in this area prove promising for epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.

The article examines the metaphysical doctrine of priest Pavel Florensky concerning symbols as the foundation of his religious-philosophical worldview. The author investigates Florensky’s symbolism through analysis of his memoirs and several philosophical works from 1918–1922 (Philosophy of Cult and At the Watersheds of Thought). Florensky’s “concrete metaphysics” and original understanding of Platonism emerged from his personal experience and spiritual quest for truth. The article discusses Florensky’s ideological and personal connections with Symbolists, his points of convergence and divergence with Andrei Bely during Florensky’s early intellectual development (1904–1905), his unsuccessful attempt at dialogue with Dmitry Merezhkovsky, and his rapprochement and communication with Vyacheslav Ivanov. His fascination with literary symbolism became the impetus for Florensky’s further investigations into religious symbols. In his later period, he studied symbols as an essential component of cult, culture, metaphysics, and philosophy – as universal ideas directly influencing humanity, human life, and consciousness. According to Florensky, symbols in their highest and purest form are presented in religious cult and sacraments, the system of which is elaborated in Philosophy of Cult. He maintained that sacraments constitute a process of interaction between higher reality and earthly actuality, a connection between life phenomena and their “absolute root”: the “natural” transitions into the “supernatural.” The author argues that in Philosophy of Cult, by developing the “deduction of the seven sacraments,” Florensky presented his final version of symbolism based on a metaphysical interpretation of religious symbols.

The article examines the nature of P.A. Florensky’s historical worldview. The author analyzes the long-standing discussion regarding the specific features of the thinker’s historical perception and presents arguments challenging the traditional view of his “ahistoricity.” Florensky’s historical ideas are situated within the context of Russian religious-philosophical thought at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and related to concepts such as empirical vs. supratemporal history, immanent vs. transcendent history, “history-as-fact” vs. “history-as-project,” the catastrophic nature of history, the end of history, and “other history.” The article reveals the affinity of this intellectual tradition with F. Schelling's ideas concerning history as the unfolding of human freedom in unconscious unity with the revelation of infinite spirit. The specific characteristics of Florensky’s proposed methodology for historical cognition are demonstrated, highlighting their intrinsic connection to his doctrine concerning discreteness, antinomy, and entropy as universal principles of being. The “particle-universal” semantic model is examined as a crucial element of historical cognition. The link between Florensky’s historical views and his cultural-philosophical and political conceptions is traced, particularly concerning his doctrine of the immanent rhythms of culture and the two principles of state organization. The article argues that, for Florensky, history is not a process but a state or condition – a supratemporal expression of the national spirit; it is presented as an intuitively cognizable phenomenon, a holistic image existing within time. History, in this view, defies predetermination and rigid determinism, characterized instead by wholeness-in-diversity, ancestral memory, rootedness in the past, and a sense of entelechial future possibilities. While the scientific cognition of history is deemed possible and necessary, Florensky maintained that, detached from religious experience, it cannot yield truly positive results.

The article explores the distinctive nature of Russian philosophical thought on music. Spanning a rich history from the 15^th century to the present, the author examines how Russian philosophers and thinkers have consistently viewed music as a means of human salvation. The article begins with Nil Sorsky’s early ideas about “prayer singing” and proceeds to analyze the musical philosophies of thinkers such as Grigory Skovoroda, Vladimir Odoevsky, Pavel Florensky, Alexey Losev, Nikolai Lossky, Ivan Lapshin, and Evgeny Trubetskoy. The author also proposes its own model of the philosophy of music. The article investigates how Russian philosophers linked the understanding of music with the Orthodox religious tradition, particularly hesychasm. It emphasizes the tendency in Russian philosophy to consider music not just as an aesthetic phenomenon, but as a powerful means of transforming a person, anticipating their encounter with God. Unique concepts developed within this tradition are examined, such as Skovoroda’s idea of Symphony as a manifestation of cosmic harmony, and Odoevsky’s theory of living and deadening principles in music. The author’s proposed model, termed “New Synergetic Philosophy of Music,” generalizes the concepts of the Russian philosophy of music. By presenting the ideas of Russian philosophers concerning music, the article contributes to a more thorough understanding of the foundations of the Russian mentality, which is particularly necessary in our time.

The article analyzes the contents of the second volume of the anthology S.N. Bulgakov: Pro et Contra, which presents both the philosopher’s original texts and scholarly investigations of his works during his emigration period (1923–1944). The article examines contributions from various authors, their perspectives, and methodological approaches to S.N. Bulgakov’s philosophical and theological legacy. The central focus of analysis is sophiology and its relationship to Christian philosophy and Orthodox theology. While some scholars attempt to propose novel approaches to understanding sophiology, others prefer to examine it within the broader historical and philosophical context of Bulgakov’s epoch. The authors investigate Bulgakov’s heritage through various contextual frameworks: political (A.P. Kozyrev), tensions between different theological schools in emigration (D.A. Krylov, S.S. Horujy), personology (A.F. Upravitelev), theology of personhood (Bishop Methodius (Zinkovsky), Bishop Kirill (Zinkovsky)), philosophy of history (P.B. Mikhailov), and others. According to the article’s author, a critical issue in sophiological research concerns the relationship between philosophy and theology in Bulgakov’s works. The synthesis of philosophical and theological concepts resulted in several contradictions that have received divergent assessments from researchers. S.S. Horujy considered sophiology an interesting intellectual experiment that, nevertheless, lacks contemporary relevance. Hieromonk Tikhon (Vasiliev) argues that Bulgakov’s limitations stem from his amalgamation of philosophy and theology in constructing a “philosophy of Trinitarian being” and his assertion that “dogma possesses philosophical meaning.” Overall, this new volume of the anthology S.N. Bulgakov: Pro et Contra provides valuable insight into the current state of scholarship regarding the thinker’s philosophical and theological worldview and demonstrates the diversity of research perspectives on sophiology.