The article examines the French philosopher Jean Brun’s perception of the contemporary world, by analyzing the three pivotal components of Brun’s work, i.e., technology, language and sacredness. Modern people’s desperate attempts to escape their tragic destiny by trying to conceal the sacred lull human beings into an illusion of becoming creators of a technology-ruled space. In an attempt to escape the web of metaphysical anxiety associated with regrets, ontological Absence and separation, modern people hope to shelter behind the shield of materialism, horizontality and relativism. The article shows that, according to Jean Brun, technology and science are nothing but a veil, a painted veil with a sophisticated image of human deification. In an attempt at self-transformation, human beings, enslaved by technology, become the measure of all things. In their pursuit of absolute and ultimate knowledge, people focus their self-transformation on being rather than on cognition. Technology nurtured by excessive knowledge inevitably provokes alienation and robs humankind of humanistic, philosophical and religious sense. Finding themselves in an artificial, virtual reality where consumption and greed prevail, people easily reject objective reality. The instrumentalization of language enables standards and programs to plan all human activity. However, asking the question “Who am I?” instead of “What am I?”, human beings can cease seeing themselves in the center of the universe, can stop the process of alienation, can assess the world’s reality and the appeal of Everything Else.

The article examines P. Ricœur’s approach to the task of creating a critical philosophy of history. Ну turned to this issue as he felt it necessary, to highlight the different aspects of hermeneutic reflection on the process of comprehending history. According to Ricœur, identifying the features of research procedures on various levels, from archiving historical sources, analyzing and explaining, in order to build a consistent narrative, should be complemented by deeper hermeneutic reflection, to enable an ontological basis for comprehending history and judging its integrity and meaning in a global perspective. Accepting M. Heidegger’s “metaphysics of finitude” as a basis for interpreting the historicity of Dasein, which in its final instance gives birth to the basic aporias of a narrative description of events occurring in time, Ricœur discovered the importance of meta-historical reflection, helping to understand the transformation of categorical foundations of viewing history as a universal process consisting of specific events and their strings, and constantly initiating the search for the renewal of its meaning. Thus, far from rejecting the results of the “critique of historical reason,” which led to the discrediting of the substantialist historiosophical schemes in the post-classical Western thought, he comes to a partial rehabilitation of speculative theorizing within the boundaries of critical assumptions. Borrowing from R. Aron the term “critical philosophy of history,” Ricœur interpreted it in the spirit of H.-G. Gadamer’s “effective history” platform and R.D. Collingwood’s strategy of thought, as well as R. Koselleck’s historical semantics. Ricrœr’s critical philosophy is based on reflexive understanding of the categorical possibilities (extant since the 18th century) for considering history as universal and produced by the creative efforts of man, who is capable to judge the events through the confluence of the horizons of the past and “our present.” This implies the philosophical assumption that history is characterized by an open horizon of meanings and gives historians a right to make judgment of past events in the cognitive and moral perspectives, “beyond time limits.”

The concept of memory is fundamental to the phenomenological hermeneutics of Paul Ricœur. The scientist formulates the concept of fair memory and sets two major tasks in for this philosophy: the epistemological one presupposing preservation of authentic ideas about the past, and the ethical one, which requires an adequate assessment of agents in history from the standpoint of moral norms. The moral duty of memory obliges humanity to convey to future generations the knowledge of achievements and atrocities committed in history, in order to objectively qualify historical events that have taken place and to show compassion for the victims of social cataclysms. The activity of memory is characterized by two interrelated trends: the art of memory and the art of oblivion. The art of memory involves the forcing of spontaneous memorization inherent in consciousness, based on the methods of mnemonics. The art of memory is not an absolute task. From the point of view of Ricœur, ethical values are the highest goal. Since no society can exist in a state of continuous hostility and hatred, in exceptional situations, in order to maintain peace and prevent violence, it has to resort to positive oblivion, which allows transferring evil memories to reserve areas and clearing the memory of anger. As an example of such positive oblivion, contributing to neutralization of conflicts and consolidation of society, the philosopher analyzes the practices of amnesty, involving abolition of legal prosecution of opposition activists and adoption of a moratorium on the exposure and condemnation of their past actions, subject to future loyalty and non-violence. Ricœur comes to the conclusion that the metaphysical horizon of memory is its ability to forgive. The paradox of spirituality consists in confidence in man, in admitting that striving for goodness is inherent in humans. This confidence of the possibility of a person’s spiritual rebirth enables conditional par a guilty person, without abolishing the need for a just censure of criminal acts or compassion for victims. Such ethically enlightened memory stores knowledge of inflicted evil for the sake of selfpurification and further rejection of hatred.

The article discusses the formation and development of the philosophy of war in the works of French scholars from the 19th century until present times. The emergence of the philosophy of war was a natural event in the development of views on war set forth in the works of ancient philosophers as well as by thinkers, political and religious figures of the European Middle Ages. In France, the emergence of this philosophical trend, which was an organic part of the philosophy of politics, was associated with the artillery general Marquis Georges de Chambray, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. It was he who introduced the term “philosophy of war” into scientific use. This name was soon accepted, not only in the French philosophical environment, but throughout Europe. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, there appeared an entire galaxy of French authors who closely studied the phenomenon of war from the standpoint of philosophy. These included P.-J. Proudhon, R. Henry, J. Lagorgette, G. Lagneau, E. Lavisse, C. Letourneau, A. Rambaud and others. They contributed to the formation of the philosophy of war in French philosophical and political thought. The First and Second World Wars discovered new names in the French philosophy of war: Teilhard de Chardin, A. Bergson, M. Proust, J.-P. Sartre, R. Aron, C. de Gaulle, G. Boutoul and others. A later generation of “philosophers of war” successfully developed the already established trend in philosophy. Thus, A. Philonenko continued the tradition in his Essay on the Philosophy of War. French authors are very interested in the works of the Prussian philosopher of war C. von Clausewitz. Considering his views, R. Aron and R. Girard wrote works discussing the place of war in social life. In the 21st century, the problem of wars and military conflicts has not lost its relevance. The author concludes that French philosophy of war meets modern challenges. Its current representatives, such as J.-B. Jeangene Vilmer, J.-P. Dupuy and others, confirm the vitality and relevance of this trend.

In terms of subject-centered philosophy of existential realism, the article discusses the ontological theories of George Berkeley and Bruno Latour, outlining and clarifying the conceptual relationship between the two. This relationship manifests itself: (a) in the attention that both paid to the issue of discreteness/continuity of matter and the limitations of its divisibility, (b) in their shared inclination toward nominalism and methodological affinity for the complementarity principle, (c) in an increased attention to weaker bonds of a correlation (coordination) type rather than to strong bonds of determination type, (d) in linking the above orientations to the discussion of the ontological status of the subject, who first of all is human. G. Berkeley raises human subjectivity to a level that is as high as possible within the framework of religious idealistic philosophy. Such a position is achieved through several steps: through a postulate-based prohibition of infinite divisibility of matter and tabooing reduction of the macro-world to elements of the micro-world; through a sharp delimitation of the subject from everything the subject is not; through the hypothetical assumption of solipsism, which, in fact, always remains relative; through combining solipsistic nominalism and theistic realism based on the complementarity principle. However, B. Latour minimizes man’s personal agency. This paradigm is associated with a number of others: with the assumption of the infinite divisibility of matter, at least with reducing three dimensions to one, and macro-level to micro-level; with equalizing the subject and the non-subject, humans and non-humans; with his caution to an individual as an opponent of democracy; with combining scientist nominalism and technologism of the actant-rhizome network based on the complementarity principle. Latour’s claims to non-trivial materialism and realism, if he has them, are inconsistent. An existential realist is likely to define his ontology as technologically desubjectified Berkeleianism.

The school of “ideologists” (l’école des idéologues) exerted significant influence on the intellectual atmosphere in France during the Revolution, Consulate and the First Empire. Originally, the philosophical and political program of the ideologists was published in compressed but systematic form in Volney’s The Ruins, or Meditation on the Revolutions of Empires. In the year of its publication, Napoleon wrote a small text devoted to comparison of monarchy and republic. The result was not in favor of the old regime; Napoleon obviously shared republican sympathies during that period. In the next year, in a letter addressed to the military commissioner in Valence, he listed Volney’s most important works, expressing approval of his political outlook. After Napoleon’s return to Paris from the Egyptian campaign, the ideologists welcomed his rise to power. However, mutual disappointment came before long, when Napoleon took measures to restrict the influence of philosophical opposition. Napoleon was the first to give a negative political coloring to the concept of ideology, initially used by philosophers for designation of science about ideas, their origin and development. Breaking off with the republican beliefs of his youth, which continued to inspire the ideologists, Napoleon remained close to them in another aspect: limiting the role of the clergy in public life. Napoleon said more than once that religion was necessary for society as a reliable support of morals. But at the same time he reproached priests with inappropriate love of to them, to worldly goods, accused them of hypocrisy and deception, conferred on them responsibility for numerous wars. The author concludes that Napoleon was not to completely get rid of the philosophical spirit of his epoch: the anticlericalism of Rousseau, Voltaire and the later Enlightenment - school of ideologists - persisted in his outlook.

The article examines the views and activities of Alexis de Tocqueville during the period when he was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (from June 2 to October 31, 1849). The study of his ministerial work is significant for a better understanding of his political conception. Tocqueville is considered a liberal politician and thinker. Meanwhile, the research demonstrates that Tocqueville shared certain conservative ideas. The article explores the specifics of his conservatism and reveals the reasons for his rejection of certain aspects of liberalism. For example, Tocqueville discusses the contradictions inherent in democratic forms of government. He believes that it is necessary to take certain steps that will not allow the institutions of democratic governance to evolve to its contrary, to despotism. Tocqueville’s actions during his Roman expedition show the respect he had for the Roman Catholic religion and the importance he attached to it. Religion in his eyes is not only one of the most effective ways to create a democratic society, which is intrinsically vulnerable to the dangers of materialism, but also the core of civilization, seriously damaged by revolutionary turbulence. Although Tocqueville has a passion for freedom, all of his writings testify to his desire to understand and neutralize the passion for revolution, which he considered, not unlike Burke or Chateaubriand, dangerous both for freedom and for human dignity. In the midst of deep political, social, spiritual and civilizational crisis that the West is experiencing at the beginning of the third millennium, reflections on the works of Tocqueville seem more topical than ever.

The article deals with the problems that confront modern society owing to globalization in culture and interpersonal communication. The digital revolution in the modern world causes great changes, not only in various spheres of human activities, but also in the domain of spirit, and society has to meet new cultural imperatives. In this context, the author writes about civilizational shifts that demand greater than ever consistency between economics, politics and culture. The notion of innovation does not only belong to the economic field, as innovative activity also affects human mentality. Social relationships become a field of warfare through exchange of information and opinions. The author is guided by philosophical-anthropological approaches to interpretation of human nature and, following Bergson’s philosophy, she makes a distinction between intellect and spirit, which is significant for pedagogy. Knowledge should be accompanied by enhancement of the creative and spiritual potential. Thus, the interests of the digital industry (increasing the number of users by facilitating work techniques, by attractive games and entertainment, improving performance, and creating the effect of emotional release) do not coincide with the interests of either social culture or ethics of public life (expanding intellectual cooperation, building mutual understanding, developing collective intelligence, promoting access to education and demand for new knowledge). The concept of human rights, which initially assumed the supremacy of universal values in every person, cannot be reduced to the ethics of comfort. The author concludes that it is only through personal development that human beings can solve actual problems of their existence.

In the article, the author writes about his formation as a scientist, about contacts with French colleagues and his research in the field of French philosophy of history. The author took an internship in Paris in 1972-1973. His research supervisor was the outstanding French philosopher, sociologist and political scientist, founder of the critical philosophy of history R. Aron. Under this guidance, he wrote a doctoral dissertation in modern philosophy of history. The article emphasizes that French historical science, strongly influenced by positivism (with its rejection of philosophical methodology), has come to a standstill. It was Aron who played the most important role in overcoming this impasse, proclaiming the need to identify the possibilities of historical knowledge using philosophical methodology. The article discusses Aron’s criticism of the interpretations of Marxism by J.-P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty, and L. Althusser. Aron called these interpretations “imaginary Marxism,” believing that the above authors only called themselves Marxists, but, in reality, they used a different methodology. The author notes that Aron was not only an outstanding scientist but also had a wonderful personality. He was very responsive and humane, helping the author in solving certain personal issues. The article also analyzes the views of representatives of the Annales school, who played a great role in criticizing positivism. The author personally met the prominent French historian F. Braudel, the leader of the second wave of this school. The article notes that Marxist philosophy occupies an important place in the spiritual life of France. Much attention is paid to the work of the world famous French Marxist philosopher L. Althusser, with whom the author maintained friendly relations until his death in 1990. I.A. Gobozov continues to be friends and collaborates with many French philosophers.