The paper aims to give some conceptual clarifications to two interrelated issues, disobedience and whistleblowing. There is an obvious difference on the intuitive level – disobedience is considered wrong and blameworthy while whistleblowing has the aura of something positive and desirable. However, despite the differences, the logic of their constitution and functioning is, at least in part, alike, making the matter of real interest when are they justified – taking they prima facie are not justified. I propose that justification (of both) resides in a valid aspiration to justification. Starting from there, I offer an analysis in five sections. In the first section, I analyze the nature, functioning, and scope of loyalty and obedience as instruments of attaining responsible coordination and cooperation in complex human structures requiring hierarchies and discipline. The main features we encounter as relevant in this analysis are the concepts of loyalty, sincerity, trust and confidence, a strong sense of belonging and responsibility. In the second section I explore how dissent and disobedience get motivational force in the context of uncertainty. It is the context in which loyalty becomes divided, producing opposing motivations. The institutionally constituted obligations conflict with a need to dissent, disobey and resist when obeying or fulfilling established expectations is perceived as risky, dangerous, humiliating or wrong. The motivations may be different, and it is an interesting question – what is more critical or characteristic in making decisions to dissent. Warning against potential harm, preventing crime, or just avoiding complicity are the most visible motives, but there are possibly many, not all of them necessarily justified. The third section briefly explores some conditions for possibly justified whistleblowing. These conditions include: competence, good intent, existence of some real risk and facing a dilemma what to do; missing any of these conditions would make an act something else or unjustified. In the fourth section, I explore a question of whether an act of whistleblowing is a mere right or a duty – or a different issue like supererogation, an act which is beyond the duty, implying that it is, like any other sacrifice, something we have the right not to engage in. In connection with this, there is a problem of codification, i.e., legal protection of whistleblowers; both insufficient protection and overprotection have their deficiencies and shortcomings. In the fifth section, I apply this analysis to military issues. I find that there are three types of morally relevant cases of disobedience, indicating that the most difficult one is the case of manifestly legal but at the same time morally wrong orders.

The article examines the problem of correlation between the “knowledge society” and “knowledge practice,” based on analysis of the phenomenon of security expertise as a part of political expertise. In the article, we consider the relationship between politics and security and demonstrate under what circumstances security becomes politics. It is noted that at present the concept of security has become very multifaceted and includes various spheres, from military-political to informational and humanitarian. We defines security expertise, list its key parameters, origin, its institutionalization and practices. Special attention is paid to the characteristics of the main schools in the study of security expertise problems. Their general ideology and inherent problems are analyzed, including the correspondence of the quality of the expertise to recognized standards of scientific knowledge. We explain why security issues appeal to experts and result in numerous studies. We raise an issue of causes that may lead to possible deprofessionalization of security expertise. We identify a number of institutions with an expert status in the field of security and explain the global growth of analytical centers specializing in security expertise. A brief description of such analytical centers and their main features is given. We look into examples of practical impact of expertise on political decision-making, and possible mechanisms of expert support. It is concluded that expert analysis can exercise direct impact on political processes, and the experts become influential shadow participants. On the one hand, this may contribute to adopting more balanced decisions, but, on the other hand, it may result in deprofessionalization of experts who will try to adjust to the demands of politicians. Thus, in the sphere of security expertise, one of the results of the formation of a “knowledge society” is a decrease in the autonomy of the scientific sphere, which has a side effect in the form of deprofessionalization of knowledge. 

 The article is devoted to the phenomenon of interstate confrontation known as “hybrid war.” It attempts to consider this phenomenon in relation to pankration, the ancient Greek martial art with minimum limitations. The paper defines the philosophical and historical preconditions for hybrid war, its epistemological and ideological aspects. The author assesses the statement declaring Russia guilty of waging this type of war. Analysis of relevant sources allows us to answer the question of the theoretical prerequisites for the formation of the concept of hybrid wars and to name the authors who first expressed ideas of the transformation of war into a new type of military confrontation. An attempt is made to perform a comparative analysis of various interpretations of the concept of “hybrid war.” The place of this concept among others that are related to the so-called “new wars” is considered. The author questions a negative connotation to the concept of hybrid war and the legitimacy of attempts by Western countries to attribute the conduct of this type of military action exclusively to Russia. A number of countries attempt to use Russia as a “scapegoat,” and this complex has been described by the French philosopher R. Girard. A broader interpretation of this mechanism leads to sacralization of collective aggression, but not in relation to an individual but in relation to a participant in international relations. Comprehension of the essential features of hybrid war, of its tendencies towards eliminating restrictions and regulating forms and methods of achieving military and political goals makes it possible to identify the possibilities of resisting aggressive aspirations of some countries trying to impose their scenarios for resolving international contradictions on other states.

The paper argues that in our usage of moral language we relate three concepts: guilt, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This assumes that we can distinguish between external actions and internal executions, because guilt as well as forgiveness and reconciliation are realities that first affect our inner humanity. When a relationship has been damaged by culpable actions (sometimes even by both sides), forgiveness is the precondition of reconciliation. As long as people accuse each other, there can be no talk of true reconciliation. Although these are attitudes, that is, inner engagements, reconciliation also becomes outwardly recognizable as peace. However, these relationships can only be explained well in the connections of individual persons to each other. When political communities confront each other, our moral sense becomes fuzzy, because it is not so easy to say how such collectives (e.g., peoples) are to be determined in their inside and outside. Who can and may forgive, if other persons have become victims of culpable actions, but cannot forgive themselves? Here, then, the difficulty of individuality and collectivity is added. The essay pleads for maintaining the conceptual conjunction between individual and collective forgiveness. However, this should not be done at the price of a complete socio-ontological dissolution of collectives. Therefore, one must also be cautious about rash universalistic appropriation of the Other or the other group, because this is usually accompanied by a failure to recognize and endure the selfhood of the Other. Before it comes to a “false” reconciliation in this way, it is better to at least recognize each other – also in diversity. This should also be reflected in the rules of conflict, which must above all be oriented toward ensuring that conflicts are not carried out in such a way that the manner in which the conflict is carried out makes reconciliation impossible. But in both collective and individual reconciliation, the person does not have the outcome of the process entirely in his or her own hands. Reconciliation is not a technique, but a relational event that is carried out in an “open space.”

The article analyzes the traditional and innovative worldview components in the political doctrine of Saint-Pierre, developed in his work Project for the Establishment of Perpetual Peace in Europe. Reflecting on the political prospects of mankind, the abbot highlighted the psychological motives that, in his opinion, determine acts of rulers. He proceeded from the idea that human nature does not change, his worldview is characterized by the belief that the final forms of government are already present in his epoch and are not subject to transformation. In his view, the existing political structure prevailing in various countries should not be changed, but there should be formed a supranational collective body, authorized to carry out international arbitration. Referring to Henry IV’s plan for universal peace in Europe, Saint-Pierre did not literally repeat it, although in order to promote his ideas he presented himself as a follower of the great monarch. Proclaiming the value of impartial reasoning, the abbot attached particular importance to convincing the rulers that war is not beneficial to them personally or to their subjects. He connected happiness with the wealth and prosperity of society, subordinating politics to morality. Recognizing progress in the intellectual and economic spheres, he treated wars as a factor impeding mankind’s progress. Unlike most philosophers of Enlightenment, Saint-Pierre did not adhere to anticlericalism. He believed that the other states would join gradually join united Europe, although this process would certainly be very long. Saint-Pierre attached exceptional importance to the legal side of the issue, to the formal agreement, and he definitely underestimated economic differences among nations.

The article discusses the views of Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky (1822–1855) on the war and its historical purpose. The Russian philosopher used a new, civilizational and cultural approach to the analysis of world development and social phenomena, which later found a worthy application in the philosophical works on war of V.S. Solovyov and other Russian philosophers of the Silver Age of Russian Culture. Danilevsky considered war as an acute stage of the conflict of cultures, a clash of civilizations, the result of the struggle of different historical and cultural principles. According to Danilevsky’s civilizational theory, the origin of war is an expansion as an immanently inherent property of civilization, an element of its essential, intrinsically inherent natural state, which consists in the desire to expand cultural, political, and economic influence. The philosopher sees the world-historical meaning of the war in the struggle of the West with the East and fears European expansion against Russia, discussing this trend in detail. The author of the article draws attention to Danilevsky’s forecasts for the upcoming world wars and to the relevance of the provisions of his military-philosophical views for modern world development, in particular, to his justification for the strength of political alliances created on a civilizational and cultural basis. The article concludes that it was Danilevsky who initiated the formation of the tendency of the forecasting Russian military philosophical thought, manifested in the works of V.S. Solovyov and other Russian philosophers who reflected on the problems of war and the clash of world cultures-civilizations.

The article examines the main theoretical problems of depicting war in cinema and analyzes how they are solved in E.G. Klimov’s film Come and See. Traditional war cinematography focuses on heroic actions and personal sacrifice, often portraying plots of national historical mythology on the screen. The war, placed in such a framework, looks like a fascinating and spectacular action. The author argues that Klimov seeks to get away from this model. Although he takes as a basis an ideologically conventional plot about the struggle of Soviet partisans against the invaders, he sets the task of conveying, first of all, the horrifying and traumatic effect that hostilities have on the participants. In this aspect, it becomes possible to parallel with the intention of the 19^th century war theorist Karl von Clausewitz to debunk the views of “armchair” theorists and highlight the factors under the influence of which war turns into “the realm of physical exertion and suffering.” These factors include danger, physical stress, lack of knowledge, and accident. Klimov’s Come and See, in contrast to previous works of military cinema, consistently simulates the impact of these factors on both the hero and the viewer. According to the author, the main difference is that Clausewitz deduces in his theory the figure of a military genius, i.e, someone who, through experience, competence and fortitude, is able to overcome unfavorable circumstances and impose his will on the enemy. There is no such figure in Klimov’s film; we see war through the eyes of a teenager who is not ready for it either physically or morally. Although in the course of the film he begins to gain experience and change internally, in the end he is broken and devastated. As a result, the film turns out to be neither a pro-war nor an anti-war statement, but a full-fledged study of the nature of war and an attempt to reconstruct the specific experience that is formed under its influence.

The author reviews the collective work Military Sciences versus the Science of War in Austria and in Russia (2021). The reviewed book considers methodological and ideological problems of modern war and its aspects. The author draws attention to several topics, which are important for understanding modern war. The reviewed work is analyzed from the point of view of its contribution to the development of the philosophy of war. The author focuses on the peculiarities of classical researches on war, pays attention to the conceptual and categorical apparatus, conducts a comparative analysis of thoughts and judgments of Russian and Austrian scholars, shows their conceptual vision of everything related to the war. The article considers the approach to the modern science of war. The possibility of its exclusion from the historical process is analyzed. The main factor preventing the elimination of war is a strong social inertia. Analyzing concepts and categories of the philosophy of war, the collective work discussing the art of war, strategy, and the meaning of war. Strategy, even being divided into military and political one, is a part of the art of war. The review’s author considers the views on philosophical foundations of war of Russian and Austrian scholars, who are in search for moral basis for countering this social and political phenomenon. It is noted that analyzing the views on the nature of war of scientists in Austria and Russia, the political ambitions of their nations should be taken into account. The monograph emphasizes that an effective opposition to militarism should be based on an analysis of its nature and the real historical situation.