In the article, I examine the relevance of Just War Doctrine to contemporary conflicts. Just War Doctrine, which grew out of Western Christian thinking, presupposes that evil might be confronted with force, if there is no alternative way to restore a just order. But modern trends call into question the certainty and universality of this doctrine. On the one hand, ideas of moral relativism and comparative justice have become more widespread, potentially undermining the use of the notions “just” and “justified” in relation to military conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of war is changing, as warfare is no longer only kinetic in character. I offer examples of how the evolving character of warfare challenges the traditional understanding of Just War Doctrine. For example, there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, but the ethical criteria for its use are not defined. In relation to Just War Doctrine, questions of whether and when pre-emptive cyber attack is permissible arise, what should constitute legitimate targets of cyber warfare and to what degree collateral damage could be acceptable. Another challenge to the traditional understanding of Just of War Doctrine was the putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Prima facie, humanitarian interventions do not comply with ius ad bellum criteria of Just War Doctrine, because of the absence of a direct military threat to the intervening state. The justification of humanitarian intervention is based on the assertion of an intolerable violation of accepted values. The weakness of such approach, as discussed in the article, is that it implicitly assumes that one protagonist’s values are superior to others. A further example of emerging challenges to Just War Doctrine is the phenomenon of hybrid war, a term used to describe a type of conflict that is multi-faceted and in which kinetic warfare is not dominant. The orchestration of several strands of conflict, each designed to be below the threshold to provoke a military response, exploits the absence of legal and ethical norms regulating such activity. I conclude the article by suggesting that, firstly, for Just War Doctrine to remain relevant, it should be expanded to include harms caused by non-kinetic actions, and, secondly, the distinctions between the states of war and peace should be redefined to reflect the changing character of war more accurately.

The subject of this article is the Orthodox Christianity’s approach to war. Christians of other denomination have developed an elaborate theory of war, so-called “Just War Theory” (JWT), which has also been accepted by non-Christians and even secular thinkers regarding the nature and justification of war. A vast literature has been produced in a dire attempt to render perfect the world by insisting on the claim that war is the act of punishment for breaking the law. The result is an epistemological ease from which everything seems evident in advance including who is right and who at fault, who is and who is not favored by God. By removing from war an essential feature – that it is a form of conflict – JWT takes away the concept of reciprocity and introduces an in advance declared inequality which enables removal of uncertainty about the war’s outcome. In Orthodox Christianity, the situation is different. With still live debate whether to persevere or abandon original Christian pacifism, for Orthodox Christianity, war is always a combination of cataclysm and temptation and far less Manichean than anything present in JWT. The aim of war is peace; but, however necessary, justice is an insufficient condition for justification. The difference between “justness” and “justification” is preserved through the uncertainty whom God, at war’s end, loves more, because both victors and vanquished remain and continue to be in His grace. Losing a war, as such, does not turn the vanquished into criminals, nor does victory give the vanquisher the right of revenge for defending oneself. The latter approach to war has significant potentialities: preserving the distinction of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, preserving reciprocity, mutual respect and trust, impossibility of incrimination of war per se, the possibility of honorable defeat, etc.

The article deals with the problem of moral justification of humanitarian intervention by modern just war theorists. At the beginning of the article, we discuss the evolution of the dominant paradigms of the moral justification of war and explain why the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention appears only at the present stage of the development of ethics and the law of war. It is noted that theorization of humanitarian intervention began in the last decades of the 20^th century. This is due to a significant transformation, a retreat in the legal and ethical studies of war from the position of radical condemnation of aggressive actions and the recognition of the political subjectivity of non-state groups. Thus, there is a rethinking of the long tradition, the Westphalian system of international relations, according to which the state was recognized as the main participant of big politics, and its sovereign right to conduct domestic policy was considered indisputable. Further, we take the works of Michael Walzer as the main source of modern conceptualization of the ethics of humanitarian interventionism, since Walzer repeatedly addressed this topic and formulated a position on this issue that is representative of the entire modern Just War Theory. The arguments of Walzer and his supporters in favor of the moral justification of humanitarian intervention are considered. Among them are the following. First, the argument about the state as an organization which goal is to protect the rights of its own citizens. If this goal is not not achieved, the state shall loose its power over these people and in this territory. Second, Walzer calls for identifying governments and armed forces involved in mass murders as criminal and, therefore, deserving of punishment. Finally, there is, perhaps the most important, demonstrative argument: an appeal to the self-evident impossibility to stand aside in cases of mass violence in any state. This is followed by a critique of these arguments, as well as a demonstration of how the modern Just War Theory can respond to these criticisms.

The article substantiates the possibility and necessity of the development of the political science of war in Russia as a relatively independent branch of political science. To solve this problem, a retrospective review of the emergence and development of a political component in the system of scientific knowledge about war is provided. This process was controversial in Russia. Some credible thinkers, including military scientists, denied the science of war as such. The study of war as a political phenomenon was usually disregarded. Eventually, in the pre-revolutionary period, there prevailed the free-from-politics paradigm of understanding war (the ways and means of its conduct, its causes and consequences for an individual, society, and government agencies). Such an approach had negative consequences for political elite, training of military personnel, and public consciousness, which was especially evident in the period of social disasters. During the Soviet period of history, as a result of the indoctrination of social sciences, the politicized study of war had prevailed, which also did not ensure its holistic perception and had negative consequences in the preparation and handling of military force. A comparison of the approaches of military science and social sciences shows that they study the phenomenon of war in fragments, within the framework of their method. At the same time, many valuable scientific works on philosophy, sociology, and psychology of war have been prepared. In conditions when it is generally recognized that war is a continuation of politics, the undeveloped political science of war is illogical, its absence does not provide a holistic perception of this complex phenomenon. The article concludes that nowadays Russia has the necessary prerequisites and conditions for the development of the political science of war.

The article discusses the main features of the Russian philosophy of war that developed in the first third of the 20^th century. The author shows that in Russia, the philosophy of war did not develop as a separate broad line of research but limited itself to only a few meaningful, but rather brief, experiments. Nevertheless, many Russian philosophers (Fyodor Dostoevsky, Vladimir Soloviev, Evgenii Troubetzkoy, Ivan Ilyin, Nikolai Berdyaev, Lev Karsavin and others) left deep, well-founded reasoning about war, which can be reconstructed as a consistent system of views. One of its features is the shift in the focus of considering armed violence from the sociological and political to the anthropological and ethical; the focus is not on war as a social phenomenon, but on the human’s position in war. In this regard, the attitude to war in Russian philosophy is paradoxical. On the one hand, war brings a lot of evil in the form of death of many people and destruction, but, on the other hand, it promotes to the manifestation of the best moral qualities in people, up to selflessness and heroism. Armed violence seems to be a tragedy of the Christian conscience, and each participant must independently find a justification for his participation in the war. Based on the conditions of a difficult moral choice, personal, existential justification may come from the idea that people cannot commit violence with a clear conscience. In this case, the person choosing to participate in a war perceives the battle as his own guilt that should be expiated.

The article deals with the concept of war in modern political realism. Realism claims to have an original notion of war, which distinguishes it from empirical war studies and from other schools in international relations theory. Realism does not have a strict formal definition of war like empirical studies do, it focuses on understanding the causes and nature of war instead. The distinction between realism and other international relations theories like idealism, Marxism or constructivism consists in the realist notion of politics. Realism understands politics as an eternal struggle for power that underlies all social life, while war is the most intense manifestation of this struggle. Thus, the possibility of war cannot be eradicated. The article shows the normative aspects of such understanding of war. Realism, unlike pacifism or just war theory, is less enthusiastic about ethical or legal regulation of war; furthermore, it shows the dangers that may be caused by political moralism and “criminalization” of war. On the other hand, realism fails to provide a set of norms or principles that would surpass the just war principles. The realist principles of national interest and prudence are as vague, unclear and prone to misuse as classic just war principles are. Author draws a conclusion that to be able to create a valid set of principles of war, realism needs to further converge with international relations theory schools and “enlarge” the set of its base theoretical notions.

Since the beginning of UN peace operations, there has been discussion as to exactly how they should be carried out. Thus far, a just theory of UN peacekeeping operations has not yet been formed, in the way a Theory of Just War for waging war or a theory of police ethics for law enforcement in a peace context had been formed. The article discusses what a justified risk distribution between UN peacekeepers and local civilians should be. One of the points of criticism of UN peacekeeping missions is the lack of protection of the local population in the course of an escalating situation. Familiar examples are the traumas of Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995). Discussing differences between UN peacekeeping missions, warfare, and law enforcement, it appears that peacekeepers have more in common with law enforcers than with combatants during wartime. Through the method of analogy and by applying some typically military ethics principles, the moral status of the UN peacekeepers is analyzed. Finally, a risk distribution analysis between UN peacekeepers and the local population is carried out, by offering a concise overview by philosophers of arguments for and against taking fewer risks by peacekeepers. The analysis reveals important deontological and consequentialist arguments. Taking also into consideration that transferring more risk to the peacekeeping troops alone does not mandatory lead to less exposure to risk of the vulnerable and innocent local civilians, it can be concluded that a more practical, virtuous, responsible risk calculation will be necessary at that point to find the best risk distribution.

This article analyzes two traditional approaches to teaching military ethics, aspirational and functionalist approach, in light of the existing technological development in the military. Introduction of new technological solutions to waging warfare that involve dehumanization, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as employment of different technological tools to enhance humans participating in war and to improve military efficiency (such as built-in AI algorithms), not only bring to the surfaces the obviously existing weakness and inadequacies of the two traditional approaches to military ethics education, which have been rendered suboptimal, but also raise new challenges. The paper argues that teaching military ethics solely from the two perspective does not meet the demands of the upcoming (perhaps even already ongoing) military technological revolution and that the future will demand a more profound and conceptual moral education of military personnel that will reassess the role of martial virtues, increase responsibility for killing in war (making war more “real” and riskless killing more “difficult”) and result in military professionals that resemble “a Renaissance man” in their philosophical outlook. Only by ensuring that all military professionals (in particular high-ranking officers) have been properly and adequately ethically educated, future armies, as well as entire societies, can actively aspire toward optimal armed forces structure, a more professional and efficient approach to military profession, and ultimately better and more responsible military personnel in total.

Book Commentary:
A.Yu. Korobov-Latyntsev. Philosopher and War. On Russian Military Philosophy. Moscow: Russkaya filosofiya, 2020