In the article, I seek the answer to the main question of the confrontation of contemporary nation-states with globalization processes, which gradually and systematically neutralize specific cultural and historical experience, embodied in language, customs, traditions, religion, art, and everyday life of the various societies. Where should lie the inevitable contact line between the national (one’s own, local, particular) and the global? How to reconcile the cultural practices that seems to be incompatible: on the one hand, one’s own, traditional, rooted in archetypes practices and, on the other hand, borrowed, alien, often imposed practices? What kind of the combination of these two practices will allow the country to be integrated on the fair principles into the global cultural and civilizational space and will form the modern way of life of the population? How should the domestic national strategies for the economic and socio-cultural development of the Russian state be built? The reasoning in the article leads to the idea that in the confrontation between different cultural and civilizational groups, which developed under the conditions of dynamically developing globalization processes, the only way to preserve a national statehood is the real independence (not illusory, stated only in words, as happens so far in many countries) and strengthening and further development of Russia precisely as a sovereign national state. In the face of the increasing challenges of our time, the basic principle of a practically effective mechanism for strengthening statehood is the reliance on one’s own national identity. This should be the national idea of modern Russia, its official state ideology.

The article presents a theoretical, philosophical solution to a sharply debatable issue, discussed in Russian social and human sciences, about the nature of Russian statehood and about promising ways of further reforming  the  institutions  of  Russian  government  and  management. Therefore, attention is drawn to the recent recognition of the long historical existence of two types of social organization of society, one of which is inherent in Western civilization, the other one is inherent in non-Western civilizations. The author considers the ways of theoretical combination of sociological developments about two types of societal organization of society with what has been done recently in modern cultural studies for the description and modeling of the cultural code of a local civilization. In the article, the introduction to the core of the socio-philosophical knowledge of the concepts of two types of society is based on the philosophical and historical analysis from the standpoint of world-system analysis of the development of human society. The article shows why for five centuries, world history did not and could not change the cultural code, the cultural matrix in non-Western civilizations, including in Russia, despite all the efforts of the West. It is also emphasized that such a situation cannot be explained by an appeal only to the low culture and ignorance of the Russian people, it is connected with the action of historical factors. The author, answering this question, analyzes facts of Russian and world history and reveals the latent logic of Russian history.

The article discusses the problems of political domination of the United States as a global “center of power,” which is an intermediate condition between the empire and hegemony. The modern New Order in the form of globalization is the result of historical dynamics of territorial displacement of “centers of power.” This dynamics is methodologically revealed within the framework of the concept of “spaсе fixation.” American leadership is unique. For the first time in the history a project of totally unipolar world is implemented. At the base of the American project is the “enterprise-state” model. The “enterprise-state” model is intended to replace the European model of development in the form of a “nation-state.” The American model generates a new type of leadership, which embodies the synthesis of the functions of ideology and economy in the enterprise. Media enterprises are becoming the leading structures in the society. The peculiar figure of an intellectual-“commanager” appears. It combines two areas, of communication and of management. The worldwide hegemony is building its own infrastructure that is the “global information society,” which produces a new type of policy – “noopolitics,” or “war of knowledge,” “information war.” The leading principle of the new perception of hegemony is “global information domination.” It shifts the focus from material domination to hegemony in political culture and through political culture. It takes the form of a discourse of “moral leadership and superiority.” The “milestones’ changing” in the process of “spaсе fixation” has been starting now. It undermines the basis of American global superiority. New “centers of power” are emerging in different regions of the world. The status of the “centers of global development” is also claimed by China and Russia, which are in the midst of a geopolitical confrontation.

The author, considering an ideal of classical rationality, reveals three its fundamental premises: 1) everything, occurring in the world, is carried out according to rigid laws strictly and precisely described by mathematical language; 2) these laws have universal character and operate in the same manner without an exception everywhere in the Universe; 3) an universality of these laws has not only spatial but also time character as these laws always operated, operate and will operate. The first of these premises was introduced by R. Descartes, which into the Discourse On Method asserts that “a thing is clearly and distinctly perceived that it is of itself true.” The second premise is rooted in I. Newton’s statement that the laws of mechanical interaction act absolutely in the same manner in all the pars of the Universe. The third premise is introduced by C. Lyell, arguing an invariance and eternity of laws of “natural history.” Thus, the ideal of scientific rationality is based on a number of volitional statements that express strong belief in a certain model of the world order. Though founders of this scientific tradition realized the conditional character of these statements, their followers not always take into consideration their presumable nature and accept the paradigmatic statements as the “reality itself.”

This article deals with the question of a proper methodological strategy of interaction between psychology and neuroscience. In recent decades, due to the intensive development of neurosciences, the interaction of the two disciplines has been dominated by the theme of the search for so-called neural correlates of mental phenomena and events. Meanwhile, in recent literature, an opinion has been expressed about the possibility of a genuine integration of psychology and neuroscience. In this work, the author critically examines three recent projects of reduction of psychology to neuroscience: the conception of integration of functional and mechanistic types of explanation by the philosophers Gualtero Piccinini and Carl Craver, the project of the neurophilosophy by the famous philosopher Patricia Churchland, and the reductionist hypothesis of one of the leaders of the modern science of consciousness Stanislas Dehaene. The author shows that at the present moment there are no grounds for reduction of psychology to neuroscience. Moreover, it is noted that in the absence of real alternatives for specific empirical investigations even opponents of the strategy of identification of neural correlates of mental phenomena and events are forced to appeal to it in their works. It is argued that the currently dominating practice of identification of neural correlates of mental, cognitive and conscious phenomena will retain its leading methodological status in the interaction between psychologists and neuroscientists.

This article considers the concept of Sachverhalt in the Austrian philosophical tradition of the 19^th  century. In particular, we examine the works of Bernard Bolzano, Rudolf Lotze, Julius Bergmann, Franz Brentano, Karl Stumpf, Anton Marty and Alexius Meinong. The emergence of the concept of Sachverhalt, or the state of things, in extensive philosophical discussions is connected with the works of L. Wittgenstein and phenomenologist Adolf Reinach. Reinach criticized previous theories of judgment. He wrote that they were built on the evaluation, affirmation or negation of a particular object. And that is a mistake. Only introduction of the concept of Sachverhalt allows us to solve a number of logical contradictions that faces the theory of judgment. We find this term in the works of Lotze and Stumpf, but what is its position in their theories? Does it solve the problems that mentions Reinach? Therefore, in this study, we answer the question of how fair is Reinach’s criticism. Also we analyze the various theories of judgment in Austrian philosophy to determine whether it is possible to speak of Sachverhalt as a single entity connecting the concepts of all authors in the Austrian tradition.

In the introduction of the article, there is an inspired by Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right proposition that the Russian revolution was in world history the second attempt after the French revolution to build the real and, consequently, reasonable state. At the same time, unlike French one, the Russian revolution relied not on subjective opinion of crowd but on objective scientific research – on political economy of Karl Marx. In the process of revolution the people of Russia, having taken the power in their own hands, started conscious transformation of a way of life and, in a short period of time, achieved such a level of education that any people in the world had not achieved before. That gave ground to Mikhail Lifshitz and Andrey Platonov to treat the revolutionary events that started in Russia with the revolution of 1917 as the great national revolution. The article demonstrates a fundamental difference between reactionary and revolutionary conservatism. Based on the works of Lifshitz and Platonov, it is proved that they were revolutionary conservatives. For this reason, they understood revolutionary denial of the old regime as a way of conservation of positive achievements of world and Russian culture. In the conclusion, the author reveals the reasons of curtailment of Russian national revolution in the 1990s. The author argues that the continuation of reunion of high and popular cultures in Russia is impossible without education system that needs to be created on the basis of logical philosophy as a result of the historical development of classical philosophical thought from Thales to Hegel. 

The article analyzes G.G. Shpet’s understanding of the October Revolution, as reflected in his An Outline of the Development of Russian Philosophy. The author  examines  Shpet’s  theory  of  the  types  of  intelligentsia  (ecclesiastical intelligentsia, ministerial intelligentsia, and oppositional intelligentsia) and their attitude to the Russian Revolution, which Shpet treats as an ideal notion aimed at promoting cultural development. The author maintains that, according to Shpet, oppositional intelligentsia, forming the new Soviet government, and the former ministerial intelligentsia treated culture similarly. Thus, in the sphere of cultural development, Soviet Russia abode by tsarist cultural policies. This enables the author to conclude that Shpet views the Russian Revolution as a wasted opportunity to change the relationship between government and culture. Having analyzed Shpet’s ideas, one can conclude that the political events of 1917 cannot be truly considered revolutionary, since the idea of a revolution implies a radical change of the existing political order, something which can hardly be said in case of the “Revolution of 1917.” The history of opposition vs. government confrontation in the tsarist epoch appears to be similar to the social processes associated with the dissident movement in the USSR. The article gives special attention to Shpet’s interpretation of N.G. Chernyshevsky’s work. The article shows that Shpet rightly links Chernyshevsky’s creative work with 18th-century European Enlightenment, comparing Chernyshevsky with Voltaire. Shpet believes that Russian oppositional intelligentsia can be associated with the Enlightenment. The article uses a range of traditional methods of history of philosophy: hermeneutics, comparative method, and historical reconstruction.