The article examines the modalities of social development. Reconsidering the history of the evolution of ideas, it can be noted that the development of countries was usually interpreted only in two modalities – evolution and revolution. But the concepts of revolution and evolution – qua states of progress – cannot explain the whole variety of real but unique processes and events, cannot reflect the specifics of the development process in countries of different regions of the world. In the humanities, there is a domination of formal pragmatic ideas that social well-being is determined by the level of the economic and technical base of society, by the total volume of the benefits consumed. However, the state of public consciousness, being a form of the internal state of society, directly affects social well-being. For this reason, the concept of “trauma” is proposed as a term for a specific state, different from a revolutionary or evolutionary one, a state that draws society away from the logic of development and progress. Thus, we should talk about the “trauma society,” which should be understood as the third modality of social development along with evolution and revolution. The trauma state primarily manifests itself in the forms of social self-awareness. Trauma society lacks a clear strategy and understanding of its own prospects. The actions of society are inconsistent in nature and are not able to mobilize resources to overcome destructive processes. Due to that, the traumatic conditions have economic and political consequences. In a trauma society, national specificity is usually either ignored or, contrarily, exaggerated. The degradation of economic and government institutions leads to a merger of power and property. Therefore, the harmonization of public consciousness should be considered as one of the conditions for overcoming the institutional crisis.

The article considers the problem of the relations between modernity and secularization. The author argues that the discourse on secularization is the most appropriate strategy for modern self-understanding. The discourse itself is not homogeneous. One approach is a classical theory of secularization, which considers the secularization as a universal world-historical process, which passed the stages “modernization – secularization – rationalization.” Other approach is to interpret modern society as a post-secular society, but with relevance to religious ethos. This approach considers Modernity as a unique social reality with a specific type of rationality and a set of behavioral strategies, which were formed as a result of the transformation (secularization) of religious social reality, the center of which was a Christian myth. Accordingly, modernization becomes the result of secularization, and not vice versa, as the proponents of the first approach assumed. The thematization in the discourse on the secularization of a new type of society, which J. Habermas called post-secular society, demonstrates a crisis of principles constituting the Modernity’s foundations. Predictions of the epoch of an irreligious society did not come true, and secular reason is now forced to reckon with other types of rationality and take them into account, including in public space. This situation suggests that we are witnessing the birth of a new form of social reality. Thus, the article concludes: (1) discourse on secularization is recognized as the most adequate strategy of the comprehension of Modernity; (2) secularization should be viewed as a consistent detranscendentalization of Christian social reality; (3) the emergence of a post-secular society indicates fundamental transformations in the field of the most general ideas about the nature of cultural mind and cultural identities.

The paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of Alexander Piatigorsky’s observational philosophy within the context of the confrontation between two versions of the transcendental project of man-in-the-world. The first project accentuates the invariant functional organization of cognitive systems by abstracting from bodily, affective and phenomenological realization of this organization. On the contrary, the second project emphasizes the phenomenological perspective of the experience of givenness, always already dependent on whose experience this is and how the cognitive system living this experience is organized. The first project can be called functionalist, and the second – phenomenological. Ontological and epistemological positions of these projects are specified in the problem of the observer, its status in the world and cognitive practice. The observational philosophy possesses an intermediate position between these two programs since, aiming to disclose the invariant structure of observation, it proceeds from the factual experience of the embodied subject placed into the situation of self-observation and observation of the other subject. It is concluded that Piatigorsky’s philosophy borrows from the functionalist project the commitment to self-objectivation (observation of thinking is always the observation of the other thinking) and rejection from the spatiotemporal localization of cognitive activity (thinking is always “none’s” and does not belong to any kind of individual). With the phenomenological project of enactivism Piatigorsky shares the aspiration to disclose the invariant cognitive structures during the empirical observation of the real enactment of cognitive agency (the organization of cognitive systems is the same while its structural realizations are multiple), abandonment of substantialization of the self (“none’s” thinking is considered as the emergent effect of interaction among two or several observers – the autopoietic systems) as well as the refusal from theoretical formulation of the problem of consciousness (observational philosophy develops metatheoretical prolegomena to theory of consciousness, which in turn is considered as lived and essentially practical in phenomenology).

We discuss the “axioms of dark ontology” proposed by the US philosopher Levi Bryant. The axioms are analyzed in a context of the historical development of diverse philosophical viewpoints united by the concept of the denial of consciousness. The “deniers” declare the direct conscious experience to be an illusion. As for the philosophical provisions that will not fit into their very limited conceptual straitjacket, they proclaim those inimical to science and therefore subject to elimination from the epistemological discourse altogether. Analyzing the viewpoints of the denialist philosophers, we show their inner contradictions that primarily are related to their inability to apply their assertions about consciousness to their own methods, arguments, and conclusions. We review the historical development of the critique regarding the denialists’ views taken from sometimes very diverse philosophical corners. We show that Bryant’s assertions are not axioms in any logical sense, but rather a scientism manifesto created in response to a technocratic demand for dehumanization. We also show how Bryant’s rejection of the human-centered position of philosophy follows from deconstruction practices undertaken by the structuralists and poststructuralists. To advance his ideas, Bryant imitates Ludwig Wittgenstein’s forms of discourse. He also engages moralizing and sophistry. We show that Bryant’s failure to create a robust, coherent system demonstrates weaknesses in the poststructuralist ideas that his concepts stem from. We conclude that the process that the doctrine of the denial of consciousness becomes mainstream attests, in Heidegger’s terms, the final stage of European nihilism and the crisis of science and philosophy of knowledge.

The article discusses the causes for the formation of the polysemanticity of the Latin word virtus (virtue; strength, valor, masculinity) and term virtual, which was derived from virtus. The emergence of the polysemantic character of virtual became possible due to the unique semantics of the word virtus, in which there are two dominant meanings – virtue and strength. According to Ekaterina Taratuta, there are two lines of constructing the meanings of concepts based on the root vir(t) – “Platonic” and “Aristotelian.” We believe that on the basis of the first semantic “dominant” of the word virtus (virtue) a “Platonic” group of meanings of the word virtual was formed, and on the basis of the second “dominant” (strength) the “Aristotelian” group of meanings was formed. The first cause of the existence of the “Platonic” group of the meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word ἀρετή using the Latin word virtus in Roman philosophy, Biblical texts and Greek-Byzantine patristic writings, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic and Christian concept of ἀρετή. The second cause is that through the Plato’s doctrine of arete-eidos the concept of virtus has been enriched with the meanings of the Platonic concept of εἶδος. As Hans Kremer has shown, in Plato’s doctrine eidos is the source of order and beauty, which is reflected in the empirical world as arete – virtue, goodness; thus, eidos is inextricably linked with arete. As a result, in the “Platonic” sense the virtual is understood as the eidetic, the ideal. The first cause of the existence of the “Aristotelian” group of meanings of virtual is the translation of the Greek word δύναμις using the Latin word virtus in Biblical texts and in Greek-Byzantine patristic writings, as a result of which the concept of virtus has been enriched with the Christian meanings of concept of δύναμις. The second cause is the translation of the Aristotelian concept of δύναμις using the Latin word potentia: the word δύναμις has become the medium, linking the words virtus and potentia and, under the influence of the latter, differences in the meanings of virtus and potentia (and especially their derivatives virtualis (virtual) and potentialis (potential)) have gradually disappeared. As a result, in the “Aristotelian” sense the virtual is understood as the potential, the possible.

Not uncommon for Russian translations of British philosophical classics is the problem of not conveying the notions of imagination and fancy properly. The purpose of this paper is to serve as a reminder of the fact that concepts of fancy and imagination began to grow apart as early as the first part of 18^th century, and it is necessary to treat them accordingly for the translation to be correct. Very soon, the notion of imagination and the distinction between imagination and fancy began to be involved in the contemplation of political reality. Today it is the notion of political imagination that attracts researchers the most, providing a tool for explaining continuity and discontinuities in political process as well as left utopianism and conservative nostalgia. The awareness of the distinction between imagination and fancy could foster research activity in such fields as the history of ideas and intellectual history as well as studies in ideology and power. The distinction is examined on the basis of texts usually considered to be written by authors of conservative strand. It is an interesting fact, indeed, that it was conservatives who made the main contribution to the development of this distinction in English-language philosophy. Among them are Coleridge, who resolutely draw the line between fancy and imagination, and Burke with his appeal to the moral imagination. The kindred typology of imagination was proposed in 20^th century by such thinkers as Irving Babbitt, T.S. Eliot and Russell Kirk. The importance of Kirk lies partly in that fact that he began the discussion of the conservative attitude to imagination and tried to frame it as a coherent narrative.

The article examines the philosophy of Henri Bergson and William James as independent doctrines aimed at rational comprehension of spiritual reality. The doctrines imply the paramount importance of consciousness, the need for continuous spiritual development, the expansion of experience and perception. The study highlights the fundamental role of spiritual energy for individual and universal evolution, which likens these doctrines to the ancient Eastern teaching as well as to Platonism in Western philosophy. The term “spiritual energy” is used by Bergson and James all the way through their creative career, and therefore this concept should considered in the examination of their solution to the most important philosophical and scientific issues, such as the relationship of matter and spirit, consciousness and brain, cognition, free will, etc. The “radical empiricism” of William James and the “creative evolution” of Henry Bergson should be viewed as conceptions that based on peacemaking goals, because they are aimed at reconciling faith and facts, science and religion through the organic synthesis of sensory and spiritual levels of experience. Although there is a number of modern scientific discoveries that were foreseen by philosophical ideas of Bergson and James, both philosophers advocate for the artificial limitation of the sphere of experimental methods in science. They call not to limit ourselves to the usual intellectual schemes of reality comprehension, but attempt to touch the “living” reality, which presupposes an increase in the intensity of attention and will, but finally brings us closer to freedom.

Philosophers actively discuss Black Notebooks – Martin Heidegger’s philosophical notebooks. Their publication opened for researchers a new field in the concept of existential history. The Notebooks are a good example of how closely related philosophical thought and the political atmosphere of time can be. Heidegger witnessed events that caused him to be confused. He had certain ideas about the reorganization of a German university, the formation of “aristocracy of spirit,” which is why he became involved in the National Socialist Party. Of course, this period of his activity and work should be carefully analyzed by many historians of philosophy in order to have a broad and well-founded idea of the motives of one of the most influential thinkers of the 20^th century, to realize the degree of solidarity with the policy of the Nazi party, and, most importantly, to grasp philosophical content in politically biased texts of those years. History knows examples when a philosopher, in his desire to influence reality, collaborated with government, but such collaboration hardly ever turned fruitful for his philosophical research. The article contains an analysis of Heidegger’s text as well as a review of contemporary discussion on the Black Notebooks. The author gives his assessment of the evolution of the political and philosophical views of Heidegger from 1931 to 1948. It can be concluded that Heidegger was never the ideologist of the Third Reich and his works must be considered primarily as the result of a philosophical comprehension of the events taken place in the world, in the country, in the academic sphere.

The review reveals the basic conceptions elaborated by one of the major Russian modern sociologists Zh.T. Toshchenko in his new research. The reviewer argues that the book’s author thoroughly examines the various methodological grounds for identifying the essential characteristics of social dynamics. At the same time, the reviewer focuses on the further development of the theory of modern society, proposed by the book’s author. Thus, Zh.T. Toshchenko, who spent many years researching social deformations, formulates an important concept – the concept of a society of trauma as the third modality of social development along with evolution and revolution. The book offers a fundamentally new view of social life, there is a holistic, systematic approach to all its processes and phenomena. The reviewer concludes that the new book of the social theorist Zh.T. Toshchenko is a significant contribution to sociological theory, since it develops ideas about the state and prospects of Russian society, gives accurate assessments of all social processes.