The article discusses the issue of the nature of analytic philosophy. It is shown that in the 1920s–1940s it was a certain philosophical school, whose representatives were united by some initial principles. Analytic philosophers saw the main task of philosophy in the analysis of the language of natural sciences, in establishing logical connections between scientific propositions, in the empirical substantiation of scientific theories and in the elimination of speculative concepts and proposals from the language of science. The tool for such analysis was the mathematical logic created at the beginning of the 20^th century by G. Frege, A.N. Whitehead, B. Russell. Another characteristic feature of the analytic tradition was a negative attitude toward philosophical speculation. Adherents of this tradition believed that philosophy does not provide knowledge about the world, therefore, it is not a science. Analytic philosophers have made a significant contribution to the methodology of scientific knowledge, offering an accurate description of the hypothetical-deductive structure of scientific theory, methods of scientific explanation and prediction, verification, confirmation and refutation of scientific statements. In the late 1930s, most of the analytic philosophers emigrated to England and the United States. The analytic movement is gradually losing its integrity and loses the features of a philosophical school. There is a rejection of mathematical logic as the main means of analysis, the connection with the natural sciences has been lost. In the second half of the 20th century, analytic philosophy from a specific philosophical school turns into a certain style of thinking of the philosophers of various philosophical research areas and orientations.

The article analyzes the conflict between the “analytic” and “continental” approaches in philosophy on the example of the development of historical epistemology, which can be considered as “French style” in the philosophy of science. The French tradition is especially interesting due to the specificity of the reception of analytic philosophy that took place in it, where analytic philosophy did not receive an institutional form. The phrase “analytic philosophy” was problematized in the French academy in the 1950s and indicates the existence of a number of differences between the two types of philosophizing, as well as the absence of any stable connection between the French and Anglo-Saxon philosophical communities. One of the main reasons of this divide is that the philosophers interested in logical positivism and seeking to acquaint the French philosophical public with its ideas have suddenly passed away. The author’s argumentation is based on the material of historical epistemology in France, which was traditionally associated with the philosophy of science much more than epistemology in other countries. The article considers two approaches to defining the difference between analytic and continental philosophy: theoretical approach (distinctions between these traditions that are based on the subject of research, methodological techniques, key ideas, style) and institutional (based on geographical division – a particular philosopher belongs to a country or an academy – or based on the choice of his predecessors by the philosopher himself). The author demonstrates the inconsistency of the theoretical approach to the definition of analytic and continental philosophical traditions.

The article discusses the reasons why modern formal semantics of natural language is an integral part of a larger philosophical research program for the study of the nature of intentionality. The purpose of this article is to show how research in the field of formal semantics of natural language became the implementation of a large philosophical research program that is focused on the nature of intentional objects, which since the time of F. Brentano have been considered an integral part of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are opposed to physical phenomena due to their inherent intentionality (being focused on an object). In modern philosophy, it is commonly considered that the comprehension of the nature of intentionality is the key to understanding the nature of consciousness, and, consequently, the nature of man. The article shows that formal semantics represents the structure of the meaning of linguistic expressions, with the help of which human thought is formed, which is one of the main objects of intentional consciousness. In formal semantics, this representation is carried out in a rigorous, systematic, and empirically verifiable way on the basis of natural languages, that is, on those symbolic systems that real people use in real practice to shape their thoughts. The research is based on the works of G. Frege, who laid the foundation for the formal-semantic methodology. Thus, the answer is given to the question of why modern formal linguistics, which originates in the analytical philosophy of the 20^th century, is a philosophically significant discipline. This response is a reaction to the objections of skeptics who believe that modern analytic philosophy cannot be considered a direction that has any serious philosophical significance.

The article reconstructs the premises of the reception of analytic philosophy in jurisprudence and shows that the development of a method for clarifying the meanings of legal concepts is not least connected with the problem of legitimizing law enforcement. The article analyzes H.L.A. Hart’s approach to the problem of correlation between the “letter” and “spirit” of the law in the process of interpreting legal norms. The article argues that the process of interpretation is determined teleologically. In its limit, the interpretation of legal norms presupposes the re-creation of the desired image of society, the reconstruction of such social ontology that is most consistent with the ideal of achieving social welfare. The article examines the collision of the “ideal of order” and the “ideal of justice” as two regulations of law enforcement. The author believes that the interpretation of this collision within the analytical tradition was characterized by a gradual movement from the ideal of “mechanical” law enforcement, which minimizes the creative role of the interpreter, to the ideal of flexible interpretation focused on achieving legal goals in a changing environment. It is noted that, according to analytic approach, a theoretical solution to this conflict was proposed due to the development of the ideas of an “open texture” of law (H.L.A. Hart, F. Waismann). The author demonstrates that the development of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence has shown that the criticism of language and the interpretation of meanings are not technical tasks, but it presupposes the construction of a metaphysics of law. In this regard, the author concludes: the development of the ideas of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence demonstrates that the thesis about the absence of a positive program in analytic philosophy, put forward in the first (A.L. Nikiforov’s) article of the discussion, can be challenged.

Max Weber analyzes the science of the Modern Period. The revolution in physics at the beginning of the 20^th century, the creation of quantum mechanics bring to the fore another type of scientific thinking. It is important to note that past knowledge in this case is not refuted, not destroyed, it becomes marginal and enters into communication with its competitor. It is this type of communication with Weber’s philosophy of scientific thinking that helps us to understand its specificity. According to Weber, new knowledge is derived from the previous one, refuting its truth. On this basis, Weber writes that science is different from the art, where the created works retain their significance regardless of the time when they were created. For modern science the predecessor is necessary as another, without which not any communication is possible. Classical science, about which Weber writes, is necessary and continues to function. Satisfying the reemerging needs of society, it can detect previously hidden possibilities and, at the same time, encourage new scientific thinking to strengthen its position.The concept of revolution disappears gradually from the works on science. Instead, sociological concepts such as an innovation center or a technopark that combine simultaneously changes in the logic of knowledge and in the technical equipment of society are becoming popular. Logical and social characteristics of science are combined, the boundary between them becomes less noticeable. If in the era of classics the artificial world surrounding man was built on the basis of the laws of nature, now it is being created on the basis of the laws of thinking. For Weber, this world was silent and dead, this is what classical science testified to. Now the world around us is endowed with artificial intelligence, and we must be able to communicate with it. To understand Weber, it is necessary to establish contact with the world of classics, and not to try to destroy it and to declare it worthless.

The article presents the main provisions of S.D. Bodrunov’s theory of noonomics and synthesizes them with the leading theories of the leaders of the Frankfurt school: Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Noonomics refers to a new stage in the development of society as a whole, in which people will be forced out of material production, which will allow everyone to freely develop their creative powers. However, on the way to noonomics, humanity must avoid falling into a state of “digital concentration camp,” which is possible only by transforming human nature itself, moving “from zoo- to noo-state.” This implies a synthesis of science and culture and the highest value of moral self-improvement for each person. Therefore, it is the development of the human mind that will allow the transition to noonomics. It is the study of the content and possibilities of the mind that will allow us to creatively develop the theory of noonomics by using J. Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality and A. Honneth’s new theory of socialism. Communicative rationality is a special capability which makes possible to achieve mutual understanding between representatives of con-flicting social classes and develop universal norms of activity that allow for the sustainable development of society as a whole. This capability can be developed within a special institutional environment based on solidarity activities. Thus, each person will consider the successful implementation of the plans of others as a condition for the possibility of implementing their plans. This network of social institutions based on solidarity activity will be the realization of freedom in its social form. Within the framework of solidarity activities, new universal meanings of social development arise, which the communicative community will be able to formulate. Further, these meanings will replace the existing ones, which are focused on profit and unlimited economic growth, and thus transform the existing institutional system.

The aim of the paper is to investigate paths along which a transformation of the doctrine of natural signs was developed in works by Paracelsians, forming one of the main religious and philosophic currents of Late Renaissance. The modifications of the doctrine are discussed in a context of intensive speculations on the essence of the primordial language of humankind and on the possibility of its restoration, which can describe the intellectual life of that epoch. It is argued that within “chemical philosophy” the possibility of restoration of the Adamic language directly depends on mastering the art of interpreting natural signs (signatura rerum), which can give a key to correct understanding of nature. And shifts in the conceptualization of such signatures involved transformations in formulating and solving of the Adamistic problems, which did not exclude reverse causation. It is also ascertained that the most orthodox followers of Paracelsus usually appealed to the Adamistic narrative in order to reinforce legitimacy of the symbolic hermeneutics of nature, developed with chiefly medico-pharmacological purposes. Meanwhile, relatively more independent Paracelsians often paid more attention to linguo-philosophic issues. Realizing the deficiency of the doctrine of signatures for reconstruction of the primordial language, they postulated the necessity of one (or two) of the following premises: (a) supplementing the doctrine with a mystical illumination; (b) acceptance of a weaker version, according to which natural signs are just sparse reference points slightly simplifying empirical study of nature; (c) abandonment of search for the Ursprache and constructing its artificial substitute, a universal semiotic system.

In the article, I analyze Georg Simmel’s essay on individual law and summarize his criticism of the concept of a universal moral law, which was developed by Immanuel Kant. Simmel identifies two ways of conceptualizing the concept of a moral law: as universal, referring to the regulation of the actions of all rational beings, and as individual, including a specific acting person in his integrity and connection with the world, which is, at the same time, absolute only for him. Kant became the personification of the first method for Simmel; Simmel put forward the second method as an alternative to the first. The central characteristic of law for Simmel is its integrity and individuality, not rationality and universality. If Kant understands the moral law through a distraction from personal characteristics and inclinations in favor of impersonal norms that operate for all rational beings, then, for Simmel, the moral law manifests itself as an integral and individual human act, in which the flow of life manifests itself in the whole. Simmel insists that the idea of Kant’s universal law overlooks the very es-sence of moral obligation, which can only be individual, since only in an individual form life manifests itself – a single source of both the real and the proper. The article ends with a criticism of Simmel’s example of an individual law, which, as I show, not only contradicts a number of Simmel’s statements made earlier, but also demonstrates the undeveloped nature of his concept as a whole, namely: Simmel’s insensitivity to the distinction between integrity and totality as well as disregard for the figure of the Other.

The article considers the religious-philosophical anthropological paradigm in Soviet philosophy during the years of perestroika. It was during this period that Soviet idealist philosophers, forced to work under the conditions of a “scientific underground” for seven decades, first gained the right to participate legally in academic discussions. They substantiated the idea of man as a divine immortal being called to deification, restored, and approved in the official discourse the religious-philosophical anthropological model, either reinterpreting it according to the samples of Byzantine patristics, or synthesizing it with oriental beliefs. The article reconstructs and analyzes the basic provisions of this paradigm: ideas about the origin of man, the relationship of soul and body, free will, the meaning and purpose of life, the relationship between the individual and society. It is concluded that the development of late Soviet religious and philosophical anthropological thought was determined by the tendency to self-isolation, associated with the actual refusal of its supporters from a constructive dialogue with adherents of materialistic teachings, and, consequently, the refusal to develop a synthesized concept of man. Adherents of the religious-philosophical approach expressed the hope that Christian anthropology would be taken as the basis for all philosophical developments of the future. However, contrary to their plans, this paradigm did not acquire a dominant position in modern Russian philosophy, and remained an object of interest for historians of philosophy and not for experts in philosophical anthropology and social philosophy.

The article considers the approaches to theodicy’s problem of Russian and German philosophers with clear religious orientation: Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev and Max Scheler. However, for more explicit insight into our topic we found, the article provides the general overview of theodicy tradition (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz). Standpoints of these thinkers living in different epochs are linked by the steady belief in a reasonability of the world created by God. The main obstacle to acceptance of this argumentation is the problem of evil’s existence. The way of thinking that has the goal to demonstrate the world’s perfectness presumes either necessity of evil as a mean (for good’s revealing) or the evil’s insignificance or even its illusiveness, which is the result of “too human” perspective. Such ways of thought have become impossible since the second half of 19th century, when the concrete person’s experience (not a separated from it thought) had been recognized as a main source of philosophy. In Russian culture, this attitude became widespread after F.M. Dostoevsky, in German culture – after F. Nietzsche. Berdyaev and Scheler inherit the impulse of their thought. Distinctive feature of religious philosophies of Berdyaev and Scheler (compared to early Christian and Western philosophical and theological traditions) is conceptualization of the assertion of God’s need in human being, for God is in the process of becoming, is in the inner move toward full self-realization. And human being, who is capable to adopt or to reject the God’s “call,” is the crucial stage of God’s formation. For this tradition of theodicy, exactly human creative act and the direction of this act have the main role in world history.