The article examines the concept of Zeitgeist (“spirit of the age”), which was introduced by G.W.F. Hegel and played an important role in the philosophy and culture of Romanticism, but today this concept is mainly used in journalism. It is noted that, in the romantic tradition, an epoch is associated with an individualist hero, in whose personality the key tendencies of this epoch reveal themselves, and on the basis of those tendencies the essence of historical life is revealed. The research considers the reflection of this concept in Russian philosophy and culture (N.A. Berdyaev, P.Ya. Chaadaev, G.V. Florovsky, V. Khlebnikov). The task of an intellectual is to apply a kind of historical hermeneutics, analysis of the spirit of the age, and critical identification of negative tendencies that could lead to a repetition of negative experience. The article provides an overview of some manifestations of the spirit of the age in modern Russia: the formation of civil religiousness, latent multiculturalism that complicates the formation of national political unity, the conventionality of legal reality, and elements of legal nihilism. It is concluded that the conceptual representation of modernity can be associated with the concept of the spirit of the age, or the spirit of the times. Intellectuals have to act as spokesmen for the spirit of the age, performing functions of critical analysis and warning.

The article is concerned with the social transformations of the post-metaphysical era. It emphasizes the fact that the current state of society is a result of cardinal changes in the subject area of metaphysical discourse. It means transformation of our understanding of the nature of reality as well as the status of reason and truth. Classical modernism is based on belief in the existence of objective reality, universal reason and the truth as a correspondence of rational judgments to the actual state of affairs. Thus, science becomes the main guarantor of this belief in modern society. At the same time, the article shows gradual delegitimization of this belief in the main traditions of European philosophy (phenomenology, analytic philosophy, pragmatism) since the middle of the 20 th century. After post-positivism and new trends in the philosophy of science, scientific knowledge lost its unique cultural status. Since then, it could no longer make final judgments of reality. Due to major discoveries, the concept of reality fundamentally changed, and it is now conceived as intersubjective rather than completely objective. The universal status of reason has “disintegrated” into several historical types of rationality. The absolute truth has been replaced with the pluralist theory of truths, opening the era of post-truth. What the article emphasizes is that such fundamental changes in our notions of existence, reason and the truth lead to a transformation of the whole social system. At the world-systems level, alternative civilization projects appear, promoting their own understanding of social goals and values and devaluating the role of the expert community, which had crucial importance for classical modernism. New identities, ways of mobilization and solidarization are formed, new forms of stratification appear. At the same time, the article states that the main feature of the post-metaphysical era is that unique way of relating to existence, which means conscious construction of reality. Relying on this statement and Heidegger’s tradition, it is proposed to define the modern paradigm of relating to existence as “the time of the construct of the world.”

The article discusses some significant aspects of studying the problem of spontaneity and planning in the course of mankind’s history. The author emphasizes the fundamental importance of a clear definition of the epistemological premises of the research. With this regard, the articles analyzes the main versions of the epistemological substantiation of the projecting role of consciousness – the concepts of “radical constructivism” and socio-historical practice. The author examines the role of ideology in mass movements of the 20^th century, the nature of ideocratic societies created on their basis, and issues of the structural composition of society as a determining factor in its historical evolution. It is argued that in view of all the ideologies that guided large masses of people, the course of history in the 20^th century did not undergo significant changes and was, as in previous eras, chiefly spontaneous. At the same time, according to the author, the spontaneous nature of history does not reject the constructive role of thinking. Reasonable purpose has always been, is, and will be the most important characteristic of human activity. At the same time, the author asserts that the course and results of historical development are determined by objective necessity. Finally, the article considers the current problems of mankind, caused by the large-scale use of information technologies. The article concludes that in such circumstances the role of reliable knowledge as an indispensable requisite for development of rational strategies for sustainable development has grown considerably.

The article discusses the issues of modernization. The author supposes that capitalism is the only viable form of social organization in the modern world. Accordingly, modernization can be understood as a process of building capitalist social relations. However, capitalism is also variable and is implemented in different conditions. Modernization becomes successful if it is carried out in the form of a national modernization project – a unique program for a given society to adapt to modernity, combining creation of basic institutions of capitalism and taking into account the characteristics of a specific socio-cultural environment. Other projects can occur as mere experiments; any attempt to completely copy a certain model, albeit successful in other conditions, is doomed to failure. In the implementation of modernization, two mistakes should be avoided: rejection of the capitalist orientation and copying someone else’s experience. The latter usually manifests itself in the form of Westernization. The positions of Russian intellectuals are split between the two extremities. According to the author of the article, the greatest threat to the formation of a domestic modernization project now comes from traditional anti-capitalism, largely reinforced by the failure of the accelerated Westernization methods in the 1990s. It is no mere coincidence that anti-capitalism is taking on nationalistic and religious forms. One of the options to be considered is the “Orthodox socialism.” In our opinion, the result of the implementation of the program of “Orthodox socialism” cannot be a successful adaptation to modernity, but a political restoration, reviving the ineffective Bolshevik model in a different ideological form. At the same time, it is argued that a successful construction of capitalism in Russia is not only desirable but also possible. This is historically confirmed. In particular, history demonstrates the authentic forms of effective entrepreneurship that developed in Russia in the 19^th–20^th centuries in the Old Believer (Starovery) communities. The article concludes that the development and implementation of a national modernization project, which involves the construction of a capitalist model (taking into account the domestic socio-cultural reality) is a necessary condition for Russia’s successful adaptation to modernity.

The author examines the key provisions of M. Weber’s methodology, which include the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge, the principle of “freedom from value judgement,” and the principle of “intellectual honesty.” The author connects objectivity of scientific knowledge with the fundamental difference between the two basic functions of human consciousness: orienting and projecting. The former consists in the comprehension of being, the cognition and understanding of what already exists in the world or should appear in it independently of human consciousness; the latter represents the next stage: the construction of a reality that does not yet exist, based on certain value attitudes and the desired image of the future. Equally important is the distinction between reflective and evaluative forms of a person’s orientation in the world. The former is based on “pure” cognitive activity aimed at exploring reality in its logic, which is independent of the intentional attitudes of a researcher and his value preferences. Reflective orientation uses the language of true judgments that can be verified in accordance with scientific methodology, and understanding the truth as objectivity, given to us phenomenologically and not subject to further interpretation, i.e., as correspondence between knowledge and reality. Valuative orientation remains outside the framework of cognition of the world “as it is,” but it is still an activity for value awareness – first of all, in the form of correlating objective reality with human needs and interests; it judges in the categories of good and bad, justice and injustice, and thus forms people’s expectations. Within the framework of the value orientation, value judgments are also formed that do not lend themselves to verification or refutation but simply perform the function of generating opinions about the world that may become generally valid, although they cannot be defined as objectively true or objectively false. The author concludes that the requirement for objectivity of scientific knowledge also implies freedom of science from value judgments but not from assessments in general, for there can be objective assessments when the significance of functional institutions that have their own purpose is evaluated.

The article suggests an interpretation of human understanding as a three-level process of aligning sensory material with intersubjectively fixed patterns of social games, whose repertoire and general characteristics (which shape tactical game goals, priorities, general norms, and values) are ordered by the ontological schemes of cultural ideas about existence as such. Ontological schemes are assimilated by each social individual as limiting notions of the order of the universe, of the possible and the impossible, and such schemes constitute the limiting background of understanding. The system of social games, which are included in the cultural repertoire, presupposes a certain configuration of the cultural field of its own realization and the type of subjectivity as well as a specific rationality as an invariant and mediator of social activity, and, therefore, this system constitutes the lifeworld of a specific culture. It is shown that stable empirical complexes (things) are functions of social games, which, in turn, cannot falsify cultural ontology. Due to that, the fundamental ideas of a cultural subject about the world, society, and a person remain stable for a long period. In the past, changes in ontological schematism could be associated with transitional breaks in cultural paradigms, for example, between ancient culture and Christianity. At the same time, purposeful actualization of various “regions” of the lifeworld, even in a short period, can change the beliefs of a particular social group or community as a whole. If the process of understanding in the form of translating empirical material into playing and ontological schematism can be identified as the construction of social reality, then, in the case of purposeful manipulation of the repertoire of social games (via media, social networks, political regulations, political technologies, etc.), one cannot but see an external interference in natural processes of reproduction of the semantic universe of culture.

The article deals with the transition from world-pictures (images of the world) in the traditional sense to a new “digital world,” which is currently happening. At the beginning of the article, we define the concept of a “world-picture” (Weltbild) in its general form, its difference from “worldview” and present a brief overview of the evolution of world-pictures. The influence of different images of the world on the idea of social order is revealed. Following M. Heidegger, the article discusses the specifics of the modern image of the world, as well as whether every era develops its own world-picture. A comparative analysis of M. Heidegger’s and K. Jaspers’s ideas of the world picture is carried out. We discuss the idea of Jaspers that, along with the image of the world, we should take into account the orientation in the world because the image of the world is only an auxiliary tool, moreover, an incomplete one. H. Arendt’s point of view on this issue builds a bridge to the modern perception of the world through technical means, separating us from direct perception of objective reality. It emphasizes the idea that, in the end, we do not get an image of reality, nature or the universe, but only of ourselves. At the same time, the modern attitude to reality is characterized by the fact that digital technology involves all new aspects of human life, and as a result, sometimes it is no longer possible to distinguish a construct from material reality, we can observe substitution of reality with artificial reality. These processes bring us back to the old philosophical problem of mind, in particular regarding the presence or absence of mind in artificial intelligence.

This article uses the key concepts available in Karl Marx’s texts and attempts to answer the question, “What is man?” The author explores such constitutive aspects of man’s generic essence (Gattungswesen des Menschen) and of man’s worldly being as corporeality and relationship with nature; suffering as a product of desire; praxis (Praxis) as productive creative activity (produktive Tätigkeit, Selbstbetätigung) that is carried out in the dialectical processes of objectification (Vergegenständlichung, Äußerung) and de-objectification (Entgegenständlichung, Aneignung); man’s universality; objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) of the man-made human world; intersubjectivity and sociality/sociability (Gesellschaftlichkeit); interplay of social relations (das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse); the existential and emotional relations of man (menschlichen Verhältnisse zur Welt) to the world of nature, to human activity, to the results of one’s labor, to other people, and to oneself. We demonstrate that the generic essence of man is not granted by nature but evolves in the course of historical development. Moreover, in Capital, Marx distinguishes between the invariant essence (Praxis) and historical modifications of praxis. Therefore, history is understood as “continuous change of human nature,” and man himself as a historical being. In spite of later reductionist interpretations, Marx conceptualizes man as a living, uniquely generic (socially individual), integral being, whose essential mode of existence is praxis (social conscious purposeful transforming objectal-instrumental material and spiritual activity). Man is an integral bodily-spiritual being, transforming the natural world (Welt) and creating “worlds” of his own, those of material, social, and spiritual culture (Umwelt), society and its relations (Mitwelt), which are interiorized and form an inner world (Innerlichkeit, Eigenwelt) in the process of practical activity. The article concludes that, following Marx’s philosophical anthropology, man should be considered not only as a “practical being” but also a suffering one, experiencing his worldly existence in the form of partial, existential relations to the world and to himself.

The article considers the philosophical and methodological aspects of research on the evolution of modern capitalist society. In this context, the issue of the relevance of classical Marxist methodology is discussed. Lenin’s theory of imperialism is shown from the standpoint of developing the ideas expressed by K. Marx in Capital, addressing a new historical material. Marx believed that concentration, centralization, and monopolization of capitalist production serves as the ripening of prerequisites for the “expropriation of the expropriators” and the eve of a social revolution, which paves the way for a post-capitalist social order. Lenin drew attention to new developing trends in this process. He came to the conclusion that monopoly capitalism is characterized as the end of “free market” or, in other words, that imperialism is the end of “pure” capitalistic forms. This idea echoes the ideas of Marx expressed in the preface to the first volume of Capital: the era of transformation of the capitalist mode of production is beginning. In the present article, the author gives a brief review of post-war history, examining its three eras (“welfare state”, including Soviet society; neoliberalism; neo-mercantilism) as forms of transformation of the capitalist mode of production on the basis of its incomplete rejection. According to the author, this process can be interpreted as the downward development of capitalism, or its systemic crisis. It is argued that neither Marx nor Lenin could have foreseen the difficulties that arose as a result of the prolonged crisis. At the same time, Lenin’s book indicates two factors that became a condition for this: the embourgeoisement of the industrial class (“opportunism”) and the emergence of non-economic bureaucratic relations within monopolies. The article concludes that it is not at all necessary to refute Marx and Lenin in order to characterize modern capitalism. However, it is necessary to adjust the Marxist sociological “optics” to a more detailed mode. Then, we will be able to move from the abstract schemes of Soviet historical materialism to a more accurate, dialectical reflection of the economic realities of our time.